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The renewed Lebanon war between Israel and Hezbollah that began on March 2 is now over a month old, with little change in the overall picture or disposition of the main actors. However, Israeli officials have reframed initial publicly stated goals for the conflict away from an imminent disarmament of Hezbollah, signaling a more prolonged approach. Simultaneously, political disagreements over the conflict and Hezbollah\u2019s status have arisen in Lebanon while Hezbollah has escalated its attacks against Israel and rhetoric. \u00a0<\/p>\n
The Israeli military continues to control the tempo of the fighting. Israeli operations against Hezbollah remain more intense and expansive than the September to November 2024 phase of the war, but have noticeably transitioned from an initially ferocious retaliatory campaign to a sustained war of attrition. Israeli war aims remain the same. However, the apparent means of achieving them have crystallized into narrower objectives of establishing a security zone in southern Lebanon and continuing to attack Hezbollah\u2019s assets and personnel, while pressing the Lebanese government to disarm the group.<\/p>\n
Lebanon, meanwhile, remains unable to implement any of the decisions it has taken against Hezbollah or its Iranian patron, including<\/a> a March 2 ban on Hezbollah\u2019s military activities and a directive to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to disarm the group. Hezbollah continues to fight in defiance of Beirut\u2019s orders. Amidst this impasse, the international community, including the United States, has shown little practical interest in ending the conflict in Lebanon.<\/p>\n Israel shifts its immediate war goals but remains committed to Hezbollah\u2019s disarmament<\/p>\n Israel\u2019s overall objective during this phase of the Lebanon war remains achieving Hezbollah\u2019s disarmament. At face value, this appears more expansive than the Israeli goal from October 8, 2023, until the ceasefire that went into effect on November 27, 2024. Then, Israel merely wanted Hezbollah to end its attacks in support of Gaza and withdraw from the Southern Litani Area, which would allow northern Israeli residents to return home without the threat of rocket fire.<\/p>\n Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir articulated this goal at the outset of the renewed fighting, saying<\/a> Israel \u201cwould not relent from disarming Hezbollah.\u201d Several senior Israeli officials echoed the sentiment since then. However, Zamir later clarified<\/a> that he envisioned achieving this aim through a prolonged process<\/a>. Perhaps reflecting this assessment, on April 3, the IDF reframed its objectives more narrowly, saying militarily disarming Hezbollah was unrealistic<\/a> because such an endeavor would require occupying all of Lebanon, which surpasses Israel\u2019s means.<\/p>\n Hezbollah\u2019s political and operational nerve center sits in Beirut\u2019s southern suburbs, and it maintains military assets and training sites from the town of Beqaa up to the town of Hermel. The IDF lacks the manpower to invade these strongholds and hold them until Hezbollah is disarmed. The Israeli military\u2019s roughly 635,000<\/a> active and reserve personnel include a far smaller combat force.<\/p>\n Israel would have to occupy hostile, unpacified terrain over extended lines while simultaneously pushing north through south Lebanon, up the coast toward Dahiyeh, and along Lebanon\u2019s northeastern border with Syria\u2014all while<\/a> remaining undermanned<\/a> and overcommitted<\/a> across other vital active fronts, and prepared<\/a> for additional theaters to ignite. Airpower alone cannot disarm Hezbollah. Israel\u2019s sustained aerial campaign over the past 15 months hindered, but didn\u2019t halt, Hezbollah\u2019s comprehensive regeneration.<\/p>\n The IDF is instead planning to soon present the Israeli government with a proposal to establish a \u201csecurity zone\u201d in south Lebanon about 2\u20133 kilometers from the Blue Line, Israel\u2019s de facto frontier line with Lebanon. Per the plan, no Israeli outposts will be built in the area. Lebanese civilians would be evacuated from the zone to prevent friction between the locals and IDF troops.<\/p>\n The campaign, however, is expected to persist\u2014even past a ceasefire with Iran\u2014during which the IDF aims to ensure Hezbollah operatives do not return to locales within the security zone. In fact, as far as can be told from open source materials, the IDF has already begun pushing into south Lebanon to establish this zone, in some cases seizing the second line of Lebanese frontier villages approximately 6 kilometers from the border.<\/p>\n A map showing the latest IDF, Hezbollah, LAF, and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) positions in south Lebanon (Google Maps, created\/annotated by David Daoud and Ron Kimel):<\/p>\n Israeli officials have repeatedly spoken about establishing such a buffer zone in southern Lebanon. It remains unclear, however, whether the IDF still intends to reach the Litani River along both the southern Lebanese coast and the interior before falling back to this smaller strip of territory.<\/p>\n The political echelon, meanwhile, remains committed to achieving the maximalist goal\u2014but, ultimately, through Lebanese efforts. Politically, Israel still wants a Lebanon where Hezbollah is disarmed or at least is no longer a cross-border threat, and continues<\/a> to call on Beirut to move toward such an outcome.<\/p>\n Lebanon struggles to assert its sovereignty<\/p>\n Domestic disunity continues to hamper Lebanese efforts to implement the government\u2019s decisions to disarm Hezbollah and other attempts to assert sovereignty. Domestic fractures are, according to a recent Reuters<\/a> report, nearing breaking points along sectarian and political lines. Displaced Shiites have encountered<\/a> hostility from other Lebanese, with local authorities vetting the arrivals for links to Hezbollah and the presence of the group\u2019s operatives, for fear they may attract Israeli targeting.<\/p>\n On March 24, Lebanese Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi declared<\/a> Iran\u2019s ambassador-designate to Lebanon, Mohammad Reza Shibani, persona non grata and ordered his departure from Lebanon by March 29. The move was symbolic, as the ministry said it would not impact Beirut\u2019s relations with Tehran, and Shibani had yet to formally assume his ambassadorial role. Nevertheless, Iran has refused to comply, with assistance from influential Lebanese actors\u2014namely, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement.<\/p>\n Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who is also the leader of Amal, opposed<\/a> the decision and asked Shibani to remain in Lebanon. The two parties have also created a narrative casting doubt on the legitimacy of the move, characterizing it, despite<\/a> contrary reports<\/a>, as a politically motivated personal move by Raggi that was not coordinated with the Lebanese president or Council of Ministers.<\/p>\n Shiite opposition to Raggi\u2019s decision regarding Shibani has also included Minister for Administrative Reform Fadi Makki, an ostensible political independent and an appointee of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Makki, unlike his Amal and Hezbollah counterparts, has continued to attend<\/a> cabinet sessions, despite<\/a> Berri\u2019s requests. However, he has nevertheless expressed<\/a> his opposition to the decision\u2014echoing the Amal\/Hezbollah line that it is unnecessarily divisive<\/a> at a time of existential crisis.<\/p>\n As of April 2<\/a>, 1,345 Lebanese have been killed and over 4,000 have been injured during the renewed conflict. An estimated 1.2 million have been displaced. Neither the Lebanese Health Ministry nor Hezbollah has provided an official count of the group\u2019s fallen fighters. However, the IDF claimed<\/a> to have killed 700 Hezbollah operatives so far, while unnamed sources \u201cfamiliar with Hezbollah\u2019s count\u201d told Reuters the group\u2019s casualties stood at 400.<\/p>\n Hezbollah continues fighting<\/p>\n Hezbollah remains defiant on the battlefield and in the political sphere.<\/p>\n The group continues to launch attacks into Israel that have escalated<\/a> in volume. By March 31, Reuters reported that Hezbollah had launched 5,000 projectiles<\/a> at Israel since the conflict restarted\u2014attacks that have also become more deadly. At least eight<\/a> Israeli soldiers have been killed<\/a> in the renewed war so far, with five severely injured and three lightly injured on April 3. On March 24<\/a>, a Hezbollah rocket attack near Mahanaim Junction in northern Israel killed a 27-year-old woman. A March 26<\/a> Hezbollah rocket attack on Nahariya in northern Israel killed one man and wounded 14 people.<\/p>\n At least<\/a> four waves of attacks have been coordinated<\/a> with attacks by Iran\u2019s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) against<\/a> Israel, per IRGC claims<\/a>. Additionally, on April 3, IDF troops discovered<\/a> a cache of Hezbollah first-person view (FPV) drones. Hezbollah\u2019s use of these weapons would make its battlefield threat<\/a> cheaper, more precise, and harder to suppress\/intercept than rockets, especially against armor and exposed troop positions. The discovery dovetails with reports<\/a> that the group\u2019s regeneration efforts during the ceasefire<\/a> focused on drone<\/a> procurement and production, precisely because of these factors.<\/p>\n Hezbollah has shown no intention of halting its attacks. In his most recent<\/a> statements, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem<\/a> continued to frame the group\u2019s decision to attack Israel as an act of self-defense on behalf of Lebanon. He also insisted<\/a> that diplomacy has failed, and Israel and the United States pose an existential threat to Lebanon. Qassem argued that, therefore, only resistance\u2014not disarmament or concessions\u2014can protect the country.<\/p>\n Hezbollah also continues to reject the government\u2019s March 2 decision proscribing the group\u2019s military activities. Wafic Safa, Hezbollah\u2019s former liaison official with Lebanese security agencies, and who the latest reports<\/a> indicate is the assistant chairman of Hezbollah\u2019s Political Council, called<\/a> the decision a \u201cgrave mistake.\u201d<\/p>\n Safa insisted that Hezbollah would never be disarmed, \u201cnot during the battle, not before it, not after it,\u201d and said that in the post-war phase, the group would prioritize the government\u2019s reversal of its March 2 decision. \u201cThis government will recant,\u201d he said, \u201cjust as Fouad Siniora\u2019s government before,\u201d an implicit reference to Hezbollah\u2019s use of force on May 7, 2008, in response to Beirut\u2019s decision to dismantle the group\u2019s telecommunications system. Safa also said that Hezbollah \u201cmay have to regain its prestige by force,\u201d suggesting the group could engage in possible coercion against the Lebanese state or its opponents if anti-Hezbollah decisions are not reversed.<\/p>\n Global resignation over the Lebanon conflict <\/p>\n The international community has not offered any new off-ramps from the conflict in recent weeks. The French diplomatic track remains theoretically active<\/a>, but only passively. Meanwhile, the United States has continued to decline to act as a mediator between Jerusalem and Beirut. Some reports suggested Washington\u2019s new approach may be to bypass the Lebanese entirely, with one report<\/a> indicating the US had encouraged Syria to consider helping disarm Hezbollah in eastern Lebanon. US Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack later denied this report.<\/p>\n