{"id":53674,"date":"2026-04-06T07:14:07","date_gmt":"2026-04-06T07:14:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/53674\/"},"modified":"2026-04-06T07:14:07","modified_gmt":"2026-04-06T07:14:07","slug":"how-we-keep-misreading-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/53674\/","title":{"rendered":"How We Keep Misreading Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"


\n \"Print
\n <\/a><\/p>\n

Western analysis of Iran suffers from a persistent, almost comforting<\/a> delusion<\/a>: that the Islamic Republic is fundamentally irrational. It\u2019s easier that way. If Iran is driven by theology, fanaticism<\/a>, or some opaque revolutionary mysticism, then its behavior can be dismissed rather than understood. Strategy becomes pathology<\/a>. Policy becomes moral posture.<\/p>\n

But what if the opposite is true? What if Iran is not irrational<\/a>\u2014but rational<\/a> in a way we refuse<\/a> to take seriously? Because once you grant that premise<\/a>, the last four decades<\/a> of Iranian behavior stop looking erratic. They start looking disturbingly coherent.<\/p>\n

Note that this is not an argument for sympathy. The Islamic Republic isn\u2019t<\/a> benign, and its leadership is not misunderstood in any charitable sense. But the prevailing story is analytically lazy. It replaces strategy with caricature.<\/p>\n

If you actually listen\u2014really listen\u2014to how Iranian leadership understands itself, a different picture emerges. Not a nicer one. A more dangerous one, precisely because it is coherent. At its core, the Islamic Republic does not think of itself as a religious project. It thinks of itself as the end of a historical condition: a century of humiliation, intervention, and subjugation. That\u2019s the starting point. Miss that, and everything else looks like madness.<\/p>\n

Like China\u2019s 1949<\/a> revolution and the search for justice and retribution for a century of humiliation\u2014communism, like Islamism\u2014isn\u2019t simply a cover, but the very lens through which sovereignty, independence<\/a>, and great power ambitions are framed.<\/p>\n

We fixate on Islam because that\u2019s the most visible layer. The slogans, the clerics, the symbolism\u2014it\u2019s all there. But the behavior<\/a>? That\u2019s not explained by religion. It\u2019s explained by something far more familiar: a state convinced it is locked in a generational struggle for sovereignty<\/a> against a more powerful adversary.<\/p>\n

In this telling, 1979<\/a> wasn\u2019t just a revolution\u2014it was a correction. A historical reset after the 1953<\/a> coup<\/a>, after the long 19th century<\/a> and early 20th century<\/a> of British and Russian interference, after what is perceived as the systematic denial of Iranian agency. And once you accept that premise, everything else starts to click into place.<\/p>\n

The hostility toward the United States isn\u2019t ideological\u2014it\u2019s structural.
\nThe obsession with deterrence isn\u2019t paranoia\u2014it\u2019s doctrine.
\nThe willingness to absorb pain\u2014sanctions, isolation, war\u2014isn\u2019t irrational\u2014it\u2019s strategic endurance.<\/p>\n

You don\u2019t have to agree with any of it. But you do have to understand that Iran has a grand strategy<\/a> and that it is internally consistent.<\/p>\n

Persian Proxies and Partners\u2014from Hezbollah to Sparta<\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s proxy<\/a> warfare<\/a> strategy is often misunderstood as purely ideological. In practice, it is far more flexible. The so-called \u201cAxis of Resistance,\u201d<\/a> is less an alliance of shared identity than an axis of convenience<\/a>. While these actors have operated under the umbrella of the \u201cAxis of Resistance,\u201d their differences outweigh their similarities, making their political, economic, and security cooperation rather peculiar. For instance, Iran is a Persian-dominated Shia theocratic republic, while Hezbollah, though Islamist, is an Arab armed political group within the state of Lebanon. Former allies in Syria, on the other hand, portrayed themselves as a secular state and a chief defender of Arab nationalism.<\/p>\n

In this view, such partnerships represent a strategic realpolitik response to Iran\u2019s comparatively constrained conventional military strength, constituting a significant aspect of its regional security policy. A group\u2019s Islamic credentials (or lack thereof) matter less than its willingness to converge with the Iranian leadership\u2019s aim at self-preservation. In this way, for many decades Iran, a self-styled Islamic Shia republic, has supported a variety of secular, leftist, Christian, and Sunni Islamist groups<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This is not new. Long before<\/a> the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Shah\u2019s Iran cultivated proxies and partners for similar reasons. The Shah made use of his secret service\u2014the SAVAK\u2014which, like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard today, specialized in external operations and internal repression to build up potential allies and undermine the state\u2019s opponents. SAVAK delivered weapons to Lebanese Christian Maronites and\u00a0CIA archives<\/a>\u00a0demonstrate knowledge aiding and abetting Israel<\/a>i military aid to Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga. Its support of the Lebanese Shia was channeled through the Pahlavi Foundation (Bonyade Pahlavi), and continued, as the Alavi Foundation, after the revolution.<\/p>\n

The Shah also channeled money to Lebanese Shia through Iranian Ayatollahs, local Arab ayatollahs, and religious schools. He funded these and other groups strategically, in hopes that they could be useful to challenge Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser\u2019s pan-Arabism. Note that the justifications are\u00a0virtually identical<\/a>: \u201cWe should combat and contain the threat [of Nasserism] in the East coast of the Mediterranean [Lebanon] to prevent shedding blood on the Iranian soil.\u201d<\/p>\n

History offers a useful parallel. During the Peloponnesian War<\/a>, Sparta<\/a>\u2014locked in existential struggle with Athens\u2014found an unlikely ally in the form of Persia. A decade earlier, Persia, a sprawling empire, fought against Sparta. The Sparta-Persia alliance was not ideological. It was strategic. And it proved decisive. The war remained undecided until the intervention of Persia. Led by the Spartan leader Lysander, the Spartan navy\u2014funded by Persian aid\u2014ultimately defeated Athens, marking the period of Spartan hegemony across Greece.<\/p>\n

A Radicalized Future<\/p>\n

Cut off from conventional military power, Iran has built something else: a distributed, asymmetric defense architecture. Cut off from conventional military procurement, unable to build a modern air force or compete symmetrically, Iran built something else: an\u00a0 innovative<\/a>, distributed<\/a>, and asymmetric defense architecture<\/a>. Call it what you want\u2014\u201cAxis of Resistance,\u201d proxy warfare, regional destabilization, a mosaic defense<\/a>\u2014it is all of those things. But it\u2019s also something else: a low-cost deterrence system. Iran\u2019s defense budget<\/a> is a mere $10 billion compared to the trillion-dollar one of the United States (something like 60 times greater).<\/p>\n

Faced with overwhelming conventional inferiority, Iran substitutes militias for divisions, geography for fleets, and denial for dominance. It\u2019s crude, it\u2019s often brutal, but it\u2019s not stupid. And here\u2019s where the irony bites: what looks like expansionism from the outside is experienced, from Tehran, as forward defense<\/a>. A buffer against encirclement. A way to keep the war away from Iranian soil, until it didn\u2019t.<\/p>\n

But even before<\/a> the current war, the Islamic Republic was in trouble<\/a>, and the system was at risk of a legitimacy collapse<\/a>. Widespread protests, a population increasingly indifferent\u2014or openly hostile\u2014to the revolutionary narrative. Some reports suggest that at least eighty percent<\/a> were angry, with maybe only fifteen percent loyal. The rest, likely, exhausted.<\/p>\n

And then the war came, and it altered that trajectory. External threat compressed<\/a> internal divisions\u2014not because the population embraced the regime, but because survival reordered priorities. People rallied around the country, even if not the state. That distinction matters. But in wartime, it often doesn\u2019t matter enough.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the war did something else\u2014something far more consequential in the long term. It resolved, almost overnight, what should have been a prolonged internal struggle over succession.<\/p>\n

More consequentially, the conflict appears to have accelerated elite consolidation. So, no Deng Xiaoping moment<\/a>. No gradual pivot. Instead: a consolidation of the hardest-line elements. Older, arguably more restrained, more pragmatic generals were assassinated<\/a> and replaced by younger generals and colonels\u2014commanders eager to prove themselves during a crisis<\/a>. Iran\u2019s chief security officer, Ali Arashir Larijani,<\/a> an author of multiple books and a Kantian philosopher with decades of diplomatic service was killed and then replaced by a hardline ex-Revolutionary Guard commander, Mohammad Zolghadr<\/a>, whose chief experience comes from his experiences of the bloody Iran-Iraq War<\/a>. In this way, the current war didn\u2019t just stabilize the system\u2014it actually may radicalize its future. If sustained, this shift could narrow the regime\u2019s strategic flexibility for years to come.<\/p>\n

What Iran Actually Wants (Stripped of Rhetoric)<\/p>\n

There\u2019s an old line that is attributed to the Taliban<\/a>\u2014but actually goes back<\/a> at least to the Vietnam War<\/a>\u2014that should make policymakers uncomfortable: \u201cYou have all the watches, but we have all the time.\u201d This is not merely rhetorical but also a strategy. Iran is not trying to win quickly. It\u2019s trying to make winning too expensive for everyone else.<\/p>\n

Stretch the conflict.
\nStrain supply chains.
\nAgitate global energy markets.
\nTurn duration into leverage.<\/p>\n

This is insurgent logic applied at the state level. And it pairs perfectly with geography. The Strait of Hormuz is not just a chokepoint\u2014it\u2019s a bargaining chip. A reminder that even a weaker power can hold the global economy hostage without ever achieving traditional military superiority.<\/p>\n

In that sense, Iran may have stumbled into something more effective than its earlier reliance on proxies: proximity-based deterrence. It is cheaper, harder to neutralize, and immediately consequential.<\/p>\n

So, what does Iran actually want, stripped of rhetoric? If we can set aside the slogans, the maximalist demands, and the ideological packaging, what\u2019s left is surprisingly simple. Iran likely wants two things:<\/p>\n

Security \u2013 credible assurance that it will not be attacked.
\nEconomic access \u2013 the ability to function in the global economy.<\/p>\n

That\u2019s it. Everything else\u2014missiles, militias, maritime disruption\u2014is leverage toward those ends. This doesn\u2019t mean compromise is easy. In fact, it makes it harder. Because from Tehran\u2019s perspective, these are not negotiable preferences. They are existential requirements. The uncomfortable part the U.S. need understand is that the regime does not distinguish between itself and the state. To them, regime survival is national survival. You can reject that premise. But you can\u2019t ignore that they believe it.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s a final twist here, and it\u2019s that is rarely acknowledged. The more the United States uses a kind of modern-day Melian Dialogue<\/a>: a maximalist, even imperial language<\/a> in other contexts<\/a>\u2014the more it reinforces the very narrative Iran\u2019s leadership relies on. Every threat of war crimes<\/a>, every careless map<\/a>, every offhand remark about regime change, every nonchalant threat to its territorial integrity, and every rhetorical overreach\u2014all of it becomes evidence. Not fabricated propaganda or \u201cfake news,\u201d but a corroboration of the regime\u2019s darkest narratives.<\/p>\n

And in that sense, the conflict is not just military or economic\u2014it\u2019s narrative<\/a>. Competing stories about what this war is, and why it exists. Iran calls it anti-colonial and anti-imperial resistance. The U.S. calls it stabilization or spreading freedom. Both sides likely believe their version is obvious.<\/p>\n

The 1979 revolution, as a lived ideology, is already fading. The population is moving on\u2014even if the state is not. That tension didn\u2019t simply disappear because of the war, it likely only got postponed. And when the war ends\u2014whether in two years or ten\u2014it will likely come roaring back. That\u2019s because no amount of strategic coherence can indefinitely suppress a society that no longer believes in the story its leaders are telling. The real question then isn\u2019t whether the Islamic Republic survives this war. It\u2019s whether it can survive what comes after\u2014when the bombs stop falling, and the people start asking, again, what, exactly, was all of this for?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Western analysis of Iran suffers from a persistent, almost comforting delusion: that the Islamic Republic is fundamentally irrational.…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":53675,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[21395,34,21396,21397,1157,2429,224],"class_list":{"0":"post-53674","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-iran","8":"tag-grand-strategy","9":"tag-iran","10":"tag-rational-actor","11":"tag-rationality","12":"tag-strategy","13":"tag-us-foreign-policy","14":"tag-us-iran-war"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116356531162552927","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/53674","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=53674"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/53674\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/53675"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=53674"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=53674"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=53674"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}