{"id":55422,"date":"2026-04-07T09:24:07","date_gmt":"2026-04-07T09:24:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/55422\/"},"modified":"2026-04-07T09:24:07","modified_gmt":"2026-04-07T09:24:07","slug":"week-five-of-the-iran-conflict-transit-through-hormuz-increases","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/55422\/","title":{"rendered":"Week five of the Iran conflict: Transit through Hormuz increases"},"content":{"rendered":"

Five weeks into the conflict, the maritime system is no longer defined by simple restriction\u2014it is being actively managed, Windward analysis highlights.<\/p>\n

Transit through the Strait of Hormuz increased over the past week, continuing under a permission-based model.<\/a> This system now incorporates both the IRGC-controlled northern corridor and an emerging southern route along the Omani coastline.\u00a0<\/p>\n

At the same time, new visibility into Bandar Abbas offers a clearer picture of how this framework operates in practice. Energy exports have continued, food imports are being prioritized and China-linked container trade remains active.<\/p>\n

Much of this activity is conducted under AIS-dark conditions, closely tied to controlled access through Hormuz.<\/p>\n

Other key developments\u00a0<\/p>\n

Iranian crude and refined product exports remained active, supported by dark loading activity at\u00a0Kharg Island, Bandar Abbas, and sanctioned tanker movements.
\nIranian cargo on water rose from roughly 174.2 million barrels\u00a0to approximately\u00a0184 million barrels\u00a0within the week\u2019s reporting.
\nRussian exports remained active, but Ust-Luga\u2019s disruption deepened, with only one shipment recorded in seven days after repeated\u00a0UAV attacks.
\nRussian flows continued adapting through sanctioned and\u00a0dark fleet\u00a0routes, including\u00a0resumed crude deliveries to Cuba\u00a0and legal ambiguity around other shipments.
\nJet fuel supply tightened sharply following refinery strikes, with tanker availability dropping significantly and exposing aviation markets to supply risk.
\nGulf security risk escalated beyond chokepoints, with consecutive attacks on laden tankers near\u00a0Dubai and off Ras Laffan.
\nPort disruption remained elevated across Gulf and external hubs, reinforcing continued rerouting pressure and scheduling instability.
\nThe maritime system is still functioning, but through\u00a0controlled access, dark operations, infrastructure disruption, and growing exposure\u00a0across multiple critical nodes.<\/p>\n

Hormuz throughput rises under control<\/p>\n

As explained by Windward, the clearest shift this week was the increase in confirmed crossings through the Strait of Hormuz.<\/a><\/p>\n

On\u00a0March 29, only\u00a0two\u00a0AIS-transmitting vessels exited the Gulf and\u00a0one\u00a0entered. By\u00a0March 30, confirmed crossings rose to\u00a0six. By\u00a0March 31, they reached\u00a011. On\u00a0April 1, transits climbed again to\u00a016, marking a\u00a0third consecutive daily increase.<\/p>\n

This is not a return to open transit. Throughout the week, the dominant model remained the same. Vessels primarily moved through the\u00a0Iranian-controlled corridor north of Larak Island,\u00a0hugging Iranian territorial waters\u00a0rather than using the standard commercial lanes.\u00a0SAR imagery\u00a0repeatedly showed vessels staged north of Larak, likely awaiting or preparing for controlled transit.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\"Week<\/a>SAR imagery of the Strait of Hormuz, March 28, 2026. Source: Windward Remote Sensing Intelligence.<\/p>\n

At the same time,\u00a0a second transit corridor emerged along the southern side of the Strait, with vessels moving along the Omani coastline. Between\u00a0April 2\u00a0and\u00a0April 5, multiple vessels transited this route, beginning with\u00a0three Omani-operated vessels\u00a0\u2014 two VLCCs and one LNG carrier \u2014 marking the first confirmed use of the southern pathway and the first LNG transit since the war began.<\/p>\n

Subsequent movements included additional eastbound crossings and a coordinated cluster of transits on\u00a0April 4, indicating\u00a0structured scheduling rather than isolated passage.\u00a0Iran and Oman have also initiated discussions to\u00a0formalize navigation rules, suggesting that this southern route is being integrated into a broader, permission-based transit framework rather than operating independently.<\/p>\n

A significant share of transits through Hormuz involved\u00a0sanctioned vessels,\u00a0falsely flagged\u00a0tankers, or operators tied directly or indirectly to Iranian trade.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Outbound movements were concentrated in cargoes that benefited Iran\u00a0directly or operationally.\u00a0Bulk carriers carrying agricultural commodities, containerized goods, and dry bulk\u00a0dominated the exits. Inbound movements were led by\u00a0sanctioned, Iran-linked tankers\u00a0and other cargoes aligned with the controlled system.<\/p>\n

This confirms that\u00a0throughput is rising, but\u00a0access remains filtered. Hormuz is operating as a\u00a0permission-based corridor that benefits approved cargoes, aligned operators, and sanctioned networks\u00a0already adapted to\u00a0reduced-visibility movement.<\/p>\n

Port friction remains elevated<\/p>\n

Port activity this week reflected continued operational strain rather than recovery.<\/p>\n

Inside the Gulf, disruption indicators remained elevated at\u00a0Jebel Ali, Port Khalid, Shuwaikh, and Khalifa Bin Salman. These included transshipment rollovers, delay cases, and port-of-destination changes, often far above seven-day averages.<\/p>\n

Outside the Gulf,\u00a0Karachi, Khor Fakkan, and Salalah\u00a0also showed ongoing friction. Karachi recorded both rollovers and destination changes above recent averages. Khor Fakkan saw a sharp jump in destination changes. Salalah\u2019s delay and rollover counts remained significant even where they were below recent seven-day averages, indicating that external hubs continue to absorb rerouting pressure.<\/p>\n

These patterns point to a wider operating environment in which routing decisions remain fluid, schedules are unstable, and secondary hubs are carrying more of the system\u2019s adjustment burden. Even where ports remain active, the network around them is becoming less predictable.<\/p>\n

Outlook<\/p>\n

Week five marked a clear shift from constrained closure to managed throughput.<\/p>\n

The emergence of a second, Oman-linked transit corridor suggests that access is no longer confined to a single route, but is instead evolving into a multi-lane system managed through a combination of control, coordination, and bilateral negotiation.<\/p>\n

At the same time,\u00a0Bandar Abbas showed that Iran has built a functioning maritime model\u00a0under conflict conditions. Energy exports continue, food imports are prioritized, and China-linked trade remains active. Much of it operates under dark or partial-visibility conditions.<\/p>\n

Iranian exports remain resilient, and\u00a0Russian exports remain active, but\u00a0Ust-Luga\u2019s disruption now appears material\u00a0rather than temporary. Alternative routes such as\u00a0Yanbu\u00a0are carrying more of the system\u2019s weight, which makes them more strategically important and more exposed. Jet fuel markets are already showing the effects of this disruption, with tightening supply translating into availability risk rather than price pressure alone.<\/p>\n

The week also expanded the threat picture. Consecutive tanker attacks near Dubai and Ras Laffan showed that maritime risk is spreading beyond chokepoints and into the wider Gulf operating environment. The system is still moving. But it is moving through a narrower set of routes, darker logistics patterns, and more exposed infrastructure.<\/p>\n

\u2026Windward highlights.\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Five weeks into the conflict, the maritime system is no longer defined by simple restriction\u2014it is being actively…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":55423,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[28],"tags":[102,196,143,4048,101,13383],"class_list":{"0":"post-55422","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-strait-of-hormuz","8":"tag-hormuz","9":"tag-iran-war","10":"tag-maritime-security","11":"tag-maritime-traffic","12":"tag-strait-of-hormuz","13":"tag-windward"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116362704613067735","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/55422","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=55422"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/55422\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/55423"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=55422"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=55422"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=55422"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}