{"id":69554,"date":"2026-04-17T06:18:32","date_gmt":"2026-04-17T06:18:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/69554\/"},"modified":"2026-04-17T06:18:32","modified_gmt":"2026-04-17T06:18:32","slug":"persian-gulf-security-puzzle-in-post-ramadan-war-order","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/69554\/","title":{"rendered":"Persian Gulf Security Puzzle in Post\u2013Ramadan War Order"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Persian<\/a><\/p>\n

Islam Times – An analysis of the Persian Gulf\u2019s security structure through concepts such as corporatocracy, \u201cnationless states,\u201d geopolitical anxiety, and fluid insecurity suggests that the region\u2019s power architecture extends beyond the traditional nation-state framework and requires strategic redefinition.The fourth session in the specialized \u201cRamadan War\u201d series, titled \u201cThe Persian Gulf Security Puzzle After the Ramadan War,\u201d was held by the Tin Shia Think Tank in cooperation with the Center for Economic Diplomacy and the House of Thinkers, featuring Dr. Hamidreza Fartoukzadeh, a faculty member at Malek Ashtar University of Technology.<\/p>\n

Corporatocracy and Geopolitical Coding of Region<\/p>\n

Dr. Fartoukzadeh outlined his views on corporatocracy and the geopolitical coding of the region. He emphasized that one of the key analytical frameworks for understanding power structures in the southern Persian Gulf is \u201ccorporatocracy\u201d\u2014a system defined as a complex network of corporations, banks, and financial institutions operating through layered informational, security, legal, and media cover, and, when necessary, backed by the US military.<\/p>\n

This network both feeds on and safeguards the petrodollar system. Crucially, it operates beyond the traditional nation-state model. Major oil companies, as producers of petrodollars, and large contractors in development and arms projects, as their consumers, form a cycle that simultaneously satisfies local rulers\u2019 ambitions and serves the interests of the North Atlantic power structure. The primary beneficiary of this system, however, is the US Treasury, which manages petrodollar recycling to contain inflation stemming from dollar issuance.<\/p>\n

Nature of \u201cNationless States\u201d in the Persian Gulf<\/p>\n

Dr. Fartoukzadeh also elaborated on the concept of \u201cnationless states\u201d to describe political units in the southern Persian Gulf. These entities, he argued, cannot be explained within the Westphalian nation-state model but are instead shaped by Anglo-Saxon geopolitical coding. Their sources of power are not endogenous, but rather tied to transnational corporate mechanisms.<\/p>\n

He cited Bahrain\u2014historically an integral part of Iran for over two millennia\u2014as an example of such geopolitical engineering. This artificially separated political unit, shaped under corporatocratic influence, simultaneously functions as a US military base for operations against Iran and as a political platform for pushing resolutions against Iran in the UN Security Council. He stressed that the overwhelming majority of Bahrain\u2019s population has no share in the ruling tribe\u2019s political power\u2014a tribe that rose to dominance through colonial-era arrangements. Other Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, he noted, exhibit similar patterns of corporatocratic capture.<\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s Geopolitical Anxiety: Historical Roots<\/p>\n

Dr. Fartoukzadeh used the term \u201cgeopolitical anxiety\u201d to describe the persistent pressures exerted on Iran\u2019s national power since the 19th century. This condition dates back to the arrival of the East India Company and was reinforced during the \u201cGreat Game\u201d between Britain and Russia, leading to the systematic weakening of Iran\u2019s national capabilities. At critical historical junctures, these pressures have been reproduced in new forms.<\/p>\n

He identified key drivers of Anglo-Saxon sensitivity toward Iran as:<\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s strategic geographic position controlling the northern Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman;

\nits territorial, historical, linguistic, and cultural depth;

\nits potential influence over the petrodollar system;

\nits independent relations with China;

\nand its opposition to the Israeli regime\u2019s security dominance in the region.<\/p>\n

Critical Junctures in Geopolitical Anxiety<\/p>\n

He outlined major historical turning points in this trajectory, including:<\/p>\n

The separation of Herat and the imposition of the 1857 Treaty of Paris;

\nThe 1907 St. Petersburg Agreement partitioning Iran;

\nThe 1908 D\u2019Arcy oil concession limiting Iran\u2019s share of revenues;

\nThe Great Famine during World War I (1914\u20131919);

\nObstruction of industrial development during the Pahlavi era;

\nThe 1953 coup overthrowing Prime Minister Mossadegh;

\nThe separation of Bahrain in 1971;

\nSupport for Saddam Hussein and anti-Iranian groups;

\nExpanding sanctions, including CISADA (2010);

\nThe June 2025 (12-day) war;

\nAnd the February 2026 aggression<\/p>\n

Security Puzzle: Paradox and Fluid Insecurity<\/p>\n

A key feature of Dr. Fartoukzadeh\u2019s analysis was his depiction of the regional security environment as an \u201ciceberg,\u201d where visible events represent only a fraction of deeper, decisive layers. In such an environment, behavior often appears counterintuitive, shaped by conceptual inversions and linguistic distortions, increasing the risk of miscalculation.<\/p>\n

The mismatch between the \u201cregional fa\u00e7ade\u201d and the \u201cextra-regional reality\u201d of Persian Gulf political units creates significant room for strategic misperception. Similarly, the gap between nation-state appearances and corporatocratic realities can be misleading.<\/p>\n

He argued that Iran faces neighboring entities whose tangible and intangible assets\u2014land, airspace, coasts, ports, and infrastructure\u2014are effectively at the disposal of North Atlantic military actors, enabling operations against Iran across military, intelligence, security, and economic domains. These entities often justify their role by claiming neutrality, arguing that it is the United States\u2014not them\u2014that is at war with Iran. He challenged the validity of this claim, asking whether a political unit can allow its territory and infrastructure to be used in war without bearing responsibility\u2014and still be called a \u201ccountry.\u201d<\/p>\n

This, he concluded, constitutes the core of the Persian Gulf security puzzle, facilitating the injection of \u201cfluid insecurity\u201d into the region by external powers.<\/p>\n

12-Day War and Misinterpreted Signals<\/p>\n

Dr. Fartoukzadeh also analyzed the recent 12-day war within the framework of a 2001 Pentagon directive\u2014later revealed by General Wesley Clark\u2014aimed at destabilizing seven countries. He argued that the formation of the \u201caxis of resistance,\u201d under the guidance of Iran\u2019s leadership and General Qassem Soleimani, prevented the full realization of this plan.<\/p>\n

He noted that Iran\u2019s restraint in response to repeated Israeli actions\u2014particularly the attack on its consulate in Damascus in April 2024\u2014was interpreted by adversaries as weakness. While Iran refrained from retaliation to preserve regional stability, this restraint ultimately contributed to strategic miscalculation by its opponents.<\/p>\n

In contrast, he pointed to Soleimani\u2019s decisive response following the 2018 T-4 base attack, which deterred further escalation. He also cited remarks by Oman\u2019s foreign minister regarding the Muscat negotiations, suggesting that Iran had signaled willingness for concessions, including reducing enriched material stockpiles and allowing inspections. These signals, he argued, were interpreted in Washington as signs of weakness.<\/p>\n

He concluded that the \u201cwar of signals\u201d plays a critical role in deterrence, as misinterpreted signals can embolden adversaries and increase the likelihood of aggression. \n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Islam Times – An analysis of the Persian Gulf\u2019s security structure through concepts such as corporatocracy, \u201cnationless states,\u201d…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":69555,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[26],"tags":[3758,1609,592,25959,7675,621,11660,25955,25957,25963,25960,23986,10242,359,13508,595,25961,598,5121,25958,591,14929,597,39,7616,1605,25954,6217,25966,25962,25965,443,894,601,10721,20206,25956,19111,608,596,6515,599,25964,36],"class_list":{"0":"post-69554","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-persian-gulf","8":"tag-an","9":"tag-analysis","10":"tag-and","11":"tag-anxiety","12":"tag-architecture","13":"tag-as","14":"tag-beyond","15":"tag-concepts","16":"tag-corporatocracy","17":"tag-extends","18":"tag-fluid","19":"tag-framework","20":"tag-geopolitical","21":"tag-gulf","22":"tag-gulfs","23":"tag-in","24":"tag-insecurity","25":"tag-islam","26":"tag-nation","27":"tag-nationless","28":"tag-of","29":"tag-order","30":"tag-persian","31":"tag-persian-gulf","32":"tag-post","33":"tag-power","34":"tag-puzzle","35":"tag-ramadan","36":"tag-redefinition","37":"tag-regions","38":"tag-requires","39":"tag-security","40":"tag-state","41":"tag-states","42":"tag-strategic","43":"tag-structure","44":"tag-such","45":"tag-suggests","46":"tag-that","47":"tag-the","48":"tag-through","49":"tag-times","50":"tag-traditional","51":"tag-war"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116418596990073562","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69554","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=69554"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/69554\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/69555"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=69554"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=69554"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=69554"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}