As the week progressed, it became clear that this was not a reopening, but a supervised pause. Transit conditions remained undefined, proposals for tolls and inspection requirements began to emerge, and no agreed legal or diplomatic framework was established.<\/p>\n
At the same time, insurance constraints, unresolved enforcement conditions and the continued absence of mainstream operators indicated that the market did not view the ceasefire as a return to normal commercial operations.<\/p>\n
By the second half of the week, the operating picture shifted further. US mine-clearance operations began inside the Strait, followed by a blockade targeting traffic linked to Iranian ports. The result was a two-layer environment: Iranian control continued to shape routing and access, while US enforcement increasingly influenced vessel behaviour.<\/p>\n
The first week of the ceasefire therefore did not produce normalization.<\/p>\n
Instead, it created a more complex maritime regime in which access remained controlled, movement continued selectively and trade flows<\/a> stayed constrained even as enforcement expanded. The central trend remains that the Strait of Hormuz is active, but not open.<\/p>\n Gulf trade has adapted instead of waiting<\/p>\n While transit through Hormuz remained constrained,\u00a0regional trade flows continued to adapt through alternative networks.<\/p>\n By this point, the diversion architecture built during the conflict is no longer a temporary workaround. It is a functioning logistics system.\u00a0Direct calls into in-Gulf ports\u00a0such as Jebel Ali, Dammam, and Hamad\u00a0have been replaced by a five-node structure centered on Salalah, Sohar, Khor Fakkan, Fujairah, and Jebel Ali.<\/p>\n Salalah has become the primary Gulf land-bridge hub. It recorded\u00a026 port-of-destination changes\u00a0during the week, below the March peak but still far above pre-war norms, and\u00a091 transshipment-changed cases, indicating\u00a0large-scale rewiring of onward cargo connections.\u00a0 This reflects a\u00a0shortage of viable alternatives, compounded by Fujairah\u2019s already weakened bunkering role, following earlier\u00a0drone strikes\u00a0and\u00a0force majeure\u00a0conditions. The port is now operating under\u00a0dual strain\u00a0as both an impaired energy hub and an emergency container gateway, functioning as a safety valve rather than a stable long-term solution.<\/p>\n Jebel Ali remains central, but no longer as an ocean-side gateway. With\u00a018 destination-change events\u00a0during the week, it is increasingly serving as the\u00a0inland redistribution endpoint for cargo arriving via upstream diversion nodes.<\/p>\n
\nSohar has stabilized as the secondary land-bridge hub. Its\u00a048 destination-change cases, roughly three times the pre-war baseline, suggest that\u00a0diverted cargo has settled into a higher steady state. The absence of major delay or rollover spikes indicates that\u00a0Sohar is handling its elevated role within capacity.
\nKhor Fakkan has become the UAE\u2019s principal east coast intake point. With\u00a085 destination changes\u00a0in a single week, it is clearly functioning as\u00a0a preferred discharge point for UAE-bound cargo\u00a0that would previously have called Jebel Ali directly. But\u00a0the\u00a0April 5 projectile incident\u00a0introduced a new variable. What had been a mainly operational and commercial calculation may now also include\u00a0security exposure.
\nFujairah is functioning as an overflow point under strain. The terminal recorded\u00a06 rollovers and 10 delay cases\u00a0during the week, while\u00a086 destination changes show that carriers are increasingly terminating voyages there\u00a0despite the resulting friction.<\/p>\n
![\"One](\"https:\/\/safety4sea.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/gulf-trade-windward.avif\")
<\/a>The U.S. added a second layer of control<\/p>\n