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The first fuel was loaded into the reactor building at the Russian-built Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran in 2010. The 210 tons of spent fuel in the storage pool at Bushehr contain more than 2,000 kilograms of plutonium, enough to make more than 200 nuclear weapons. (Credit: FARS News Agency)<\/p>\n
Two days after Vice President JD Vance tried to get Tehran to give up its nuclear program in Pakistan earlier this month, Iran offered to suspend<\/a> its uranium enrichment activities for five years. Vance demanded 20. The Iranians said no. Vance left.<\/p>\n Now, President Donald Trump says nothing less than a permanent ban<\/a> will do. That certainly would be desirable for the United States. But even if the President got this injunction, it would leave a major nuclear weapons loophole: Iran still could make a significant number of bombs from the plutonium<\/a> that sits at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.<\/p>\n Whatever final agreement the Trump administration reaches with Iran, it should eliminate this option. The United States should demand increased inspections and the routine removal of spent fuel from Bushehr.<\/p>\n More than 200 plutonium bombs.\u00a0Russian state-owned nuclear conglomerate Rosatom\u00a0built Bushehr and has helped operate it\u00a0for 15 years.\u00a0Rosatom\u2019s Director General Alexey Likhachev says that 210 tons of spent nuclear fuel<\/a> are now stored at Bushehr. The International Atomic Energy Agency\u2019s (IAEA) Power Reactor Information System<\/a> indicates Bushehr has produced a total of 7,851,750 megawatt-days of thermal power (MWd-thermal). Using an average plutonium production rate\u00a0of\u00a00.25 grams of plutonium produced per MWd-thermal<\/a>,\u00a0the plant has produced\u00a02,000 kilograms\u00a0of plutonium.<\/p>\n The very first batch of uranium fuel loaded into Bushehr, however, was not as enriched as subsequent batches and was unloaded much sooner. As a result, it produced more plutonium\u20140.4 grams of plutonium per MWd-thermal. Also, it produced plutonium containing a higher percentage of\u00a0plutonium 239,\u00a0which is optimal for building the most efficient plutonium bombs. (The Energy Department concluded in the 1990s that all reactor-grade plutonium<\/a> is usable for weapons.)<\/p>\n Adjusting for the plutonium\u00a0from\u00a0this initial fuel loading,\u00a0Iran probably has\u00a0roughly 2,100 kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium. Assuming\u00a0Tehran needs 10 kilograms of this plutonium\u00a0per bomb (although an advanced weapon design would require\u00a0much\u00a0less), that\u2019s enough to make more\u00a0than 200 bombs\u2014more than twice as many nuclear weapons as experts believe\u00a0Israel possesses<\/a>.<\/p>\n Iran has the chemistry. Why is nobody talking about Iran\u2019s plutonium at Bushehr? The technical difficulty and time required to convert uranium hexafluoride into an insertable bomb core isn\u2019t all that different from what\u2019s required to make bomb cores out of plutonium.<\/p>\n To make a uranium bomb core, one needs to turn the hexafluoride into an oxide, then into a metal<\/a>, cast it, and machine it. The same is true to make a plutonium bomb core. The key difference is that plutonium initially is contained in spent fuel rods with other radioactive materials. To get at the plutonium, one needs to cut open the zirconium-clad fuel rods and chemically strip out the plutonium. Iran mastered this chemistry<\/a> 30 years ago with gloveboxes at their Tehran Nuclear Research Center. Iran could cheaply and quickly scale up this process again.<\/p>\n In 1977, the US General Accounting Office (renamed since then as the US Government Accountability Office) examined<\/a> how such a facility could be built within a relatively small warehouse of 130 feet long (39.6 meters) by 60 feet wide (18.3 meters) by 30 feet high (9.1 meters). The design examined would take no more than six months to build and would require technology no more advanced than that needed to produce dairy or pour concrete. Once built, it could separate a bomb\u2019s worth of plutonium after only 10 days of operation. After that, the plant could separate a bomb\u2019s worth of plutonium every day.<\/p>\n After all of the facilities noted are in place, the timelines for making a uranium or plutonium bomb core are essentially the same\u2014two<\/a> to three<\/a> weeks. We don\u2019t know if Iran has all of these facilities, but these uncertainties are the same for making uranium or plutonium bombs.<\/p>\n Addressing Iran\u2019s plutonium problem. Whereas the IAEA believes a significant amount of Iran\u2019s most-enriched uranium is stuck under the rubble<\/a> at facilities damaged by US and Israeli strikes, almost all of Iran\u2019s plutonium is above ground in an accessible spent fuel storage pool at Bushehr. This plutonium can make at least an order of magnitude more bombs than the uranium Iran has on hand.<\/p>\n As President Trump is pushing to reopen talks<\/a> with Iran, the US negotiators should make four minimal demands to reduce the proliferation risks of military diversions of this plutonium:<\/p>\n First, require the IAEA to impose near real-time surveillance at Bushehr. Currently, IAEA cameras run for 90 days<\/a> before inspectors can access the footage. Three months is enough time to divert the spent fuel and make it into a plutonium bomb. The last time the IAEA inspectors were at Bushehr<\/a> was eight months ago. To eliminate such inspection gaps, near real-time surveillance cameras should be installed to send images securely back to Vienna or some other safe location every 5 or 10 minutes. If there\u2019s a blackout at the plant or if the camera\u2019s view is otherwise obscured, the IAEA will know immediately and be able to send inspectors to the site.<\/p>\n The United States failed to demand<\/a> near real-time surveillance of Bushehr when it negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran in 2015. The IAEA sought such surveillance after the fact. Iran said no. This time around, the United States should insist on such scrutiny. This would not only keep Iran from misbehaving and the United States and the rest of the world from worrying, but would set an example for the region and beyond. Near real-time surveillance should be a requirement for all large reactors under IAEA safeguards.<\/p>\n Second, the United States should insist on the routine removal of the spent fuel from Bushehr. In 2005, Russia agreed to fuel Bushehr<\/a> and promised to take back the spent fuel. But it never did. Now, the spent fuel has piled up. The fix is to get Saudi Arabia or another Gulf Cooperation Council member to assume responsibility, including the cost of routinely shipping this material back to Russia. After the spent fuel has cooled for 36 months, it should be shipped out. Likewise, removing spent fuel at Bushehr would set a useful precedent for reactors outside of Iran. When the IAEA was first created, the United States proposed<\/a> that the agency take back spent fuel. That idea is worth revisiting.<\/p>\n