{"id":85399,"date":"2026-04-27T08:30:10","date_gmt":"2026-04-27T08:30:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/85399\/"},"modified":"2026-04-27T08:30:10","modified_gmt":"2026-04-27T08:30:10","slug":"how-the-iran-war-is-redrawing-europes-energy-map","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/85399\/","title":{"rendered":"How the Iran war is redrawing Europe&#8217;s energy map"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"has-medium-font-size\">Maya\u00a0Ikene\u202fargues that the Iran war is\u00a0not just\u00a0disrupting gas markets, but redrawing Europe&#8217;s energy alliances. As Italy and Spain both rushed to buy Algerian gas, the scramble reveals an uncomfortable truth: the green transition is underway, but not fast enough to prevent the next crisis\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>When the Iran war sent shockwaves through global energy markets in late February 2026, Europe&#8217;s response was swift and geographically telling. Gas prices surged by over 50% within weeks. Storage levels, already unusually low for the season, offered little buffer. And within 24 hours of each other, Italian <a href=\"https:\/\/www.governo.it\/en\/articolo\/president-meloni-s-press-statement-president-tebboune-algeria\/31404\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni<\/a> and Spanish <a href=\"https:\/\/www.exteriores.gob.es\/fr\/Comunicacion\/NotasPrensa\/Paginas\/2026_NOTAS_P\/Albares-impulsa-en-Argel-las-excelentes-relaciones-de-Espana-con-el-pais.aspx\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">Foreign Minister Jos\u00e9 Manuel Albares<\/a> both landed in Algiers.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Whatever their domestic political differences, Rome and Madrid converged on the same address when the gas ran short. That convergence reveals something important about where European energy geopolitics is heading.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>An asymmetric shock\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The immediate trigger was the disruption to Qatari liquid natural gas (LNG) flows through the Strait of Hormuz, after\u00a0QatarEnergy\u00a0said it needed to declare <a href=\"https:\/\/www.qatarenergy.qa\/en\/MediaCenter\/Pages\/newsdetails.aspx?ItemId=3894\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">force majeure<\/a> on some LNG contracts. For Europe, the consequences were real but unevenly distributed.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Italy bore the brunt. Qatari LNG had accounted for <a href=\"https:\/\/www.trade.gov\/country-commercial-guides\/italy-natural-gas-renewable-energy\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">roughly 10% of Italy&#8217;s annual gas needs<\/a>, a significant exposure for a country that also relies heavily on gas-fired power generation. The macroeconomic consequences are not trivial: rising energy costs could push Italian inflation up by close to a percentage point by year-end. Spain entered the crisis in a\u00a0relatively stronger position, with a more diversified supply and higher reserves than many peers.<\/p>\n<p>Spain and Italy are looking at the same external energy shock through very different structural lenses. Heavily reliant on Middle Eastern gas, Italy is bearing the brunt<\/p>\n<p>This divergence is visible in electricity markets too. So far in 2026, gas has influenced the price of electricity in Spain during only around <a href=\"https:\/\/ember-energy.org\/app\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Latest-energy-shock-reminds-Europe-of-its-risky-gas-reliance.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">15% of hours; in Italy, that figure has been closer to 89%.<\/a> The\u00a0two countries are looking at the same external shock through\u00a0very different structural lenses.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Why Algiers was a pivot point\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>What makes this moment geopolitically significant is not the emergency diplomacy itself, but what it reveals about Algeria&#8217;s growing centrality to southern European energy security and the layered politics surrounding it.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Algeria is already a major supplier to both countries. It delivered around 20 billion cubic metres to Italy in 2024, approximately 30% of Italian consumption, with flows running through the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.transmed-spa.it\/about-us.php?lg=2\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">Transmed<\/a> pipeline via Tunisia. For Spain, Algeria is the primary pipeline supplier via the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.medgaz.com\/en\/home\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">Medgaz<\/a>, the direct submarine link to Almer\u00eda. Both governments went to Algiers seeking more.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Meloni&#8217;s visit produced commitments to deepen cooperation between Italy\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eni.com\/en-IT\/home.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">Eni<\/a> and Algeria\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/sonatrach.com\/en\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">Sonatrach<\/a>, including in offshore and shale gas exploration. The optics were clear: Italy, facing the steeper cliff, needed fast reassurance of supply. Albares arrived the following day with a slightly different posture. Spain, less exposed, was\u00a0consolidating\u00a0a strategic advantage \u2014 and a diplomatic relationship that had been badly frayed.<\/p>\n<p>The Western Sahara dispute between Spain and Algeria has not been resolved. But energy urgency is quietly reshuffling its diplomatic weight<\/p>\n<p>That diplomatic subtext matters. Spain and Algeria had fallen out sharply in 2022, after Madrid backed a Moroccan autonomy plan for the Western Sahara, a position Algiers views as support for its regional rival. The relationship cooled sharply, and energy ties became politically strained. The current crisis has accelerated a thaw that was already underway. During Albares&#8217; visit, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune <a href=\"https:\/\/embmoscow.mfa.gov.dz\/news-and-press-releases\/the-president-of-the-republic-reactivates-the-treaty-of-friendship-good-neighbourhood-and-cooperation-with-spain\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">confirmed<\/a> he would reactivate the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.boe.es\/boe\/dias\/2003\/11\/11\/pdfs\/A39752-39755.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">2002 Treaty of Friendship<\/a> between the two countries, suspended during those years of strain. The Western Sahara dispute has not been resolved. But energy urgency is quietly reshuffling its diplomatic weight.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Energy infrastructure and its limits\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The physical picture deserves some nuance. The\u00a0Medgaz\u00a0pipeline, Algeria\u2019s direct submarine link to Spain, has limited headroom; talks are focused on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.oilandgasadvancement.com\/news\/spain-boosts-gas-imports-from-algeria-amid-market-turmoil\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\">an increase of up to 10%<\/a>. A second route, the old Maghreb-Europe pipeline, which once carried Algerian gas through Morocco to Spain, has sat idle since 2021 when Algeria shut it down after its diplomatic rupture with Rabat. That route is not coming back anytime soon.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>On the Italian side, the Transmed corridor via Tunisia has been more stable, and Algeria has signalled willingness to increase volumes. But whether Sonatrach can deliver substantially more\u00a0gas in the near term\u00a0remains\u00a0uncertain.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Algeria is also planning larger infrastructure plays, including the long-discussed Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline designed to eventually channel Nigerian gas northward through existing Algerian corridors to Europe. It is part of Algeria&#8217;s attempt to position itself not just as a supplier but as a continental transit hub. Even if revived, the pipeline\u00a0remains\u00a0a long-term ambition rather than a solution for Europe\u2019s immediate gas shortages.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The reckoning deferred\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>There is an uncomfortable pattern here. After Russia&#8217;s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Europe scrambled to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, pivoting toward US LNG, Norwegian pipeline flows, and North African suppliers, including Algeria. Now,\u00a0with Qatari LNG disrupted, the same logic is playing out again, pushing harder into the same Algerian corridors. The geography shifts; the underlying dependency does not.<\/p>\n<p>Spain&#8217;s faster renewable deployment and diversified energy mix have strengthened the country&#8217;s resilience to current energy shocks<\/p>\n<p>Spain&#8217;s relative resilience\u00a0to\u00a0this shock is partly a product of deliberate policy: faster renewable deployment and a more diversified electricity mix have reduced the country&#8217;s structural exposure to gas price volatility. Italy&#8217;s acute vulnerability reflects the cost of moving more slowly down the same path. That contrast is not incidental; it is the structural argument that EU energy policy has been making for years, now illustrated in real time.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>The diplomatic choreography around Algiers was necessary. Algeria is a serious partner, and the Medgaz and Transmed\u00a0pipelines are real infrastructure delivering real volumes. But Europe has now absorbed multiple energy shocks in four years. Each time, the emergency response is the same: find a new supplier, deepen bilateral ties, and defer the structural reckoning. Algeria is a serious partner, but so was Qatar, until it\u00a0wasn&#8217;t. At some point, Europe&#8217;s real pivot will have to be away from this cycle of reactive pivots altogether.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Maya\u00a0Ikene\u202fargues that the Iran war is\u00a0not just\u00a0disrupting gas markets, but redrawing Europe&#8217;s energy alliances. As Italy and Spain&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":85400,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[30477,2025,154,6805,897,3894,30478,34,48,384,22855,6414,271,1218,101,30479,30480],"class_list":{"0":"post-85399","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-iran","8":"tag-abdelmadjid-tebboune","9":"tag-algeria","10":"tag-energy","11":"tag-energy-crisis","12":"tag-gas","13":"tag-giorgia-meloni","14":"tag-green-transition","15":"tag-iran","16":"tag-israel-iran-conflict","17":"tag-italy","18":"tag-jose-manuel-albares","19":"tag-morocco","20":"tag-qatar","21":"tag-spain","22":"tag-strait-of-hormuz","23":"tag-trans-saharan-gas-pipeline","24":"tag-western-sahara"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116475738703489197","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/85399","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=85399"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/85399\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/85400"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=85399"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=85399"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=85399"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}