Moscow<\/a> on December 8, 2024. Until recently, theirs was one of the Syrian civil war\u2019s most entrenched alliances.<\/p>\nCurrent Syrian authorities, who assumed control of the country following Assad\u2019s fall, say their recent security operations, concentrated in Damascus and its surroundings, have led to the arrest of several individuals and the seizure of weapons and explosive materials. They also claim to have foiled plots involving rocket launches, drones, and assassination attempts.<\/p>\n
According to the official narrative, some of these cells received training abroad and were linked to a broader organizational structure, suggesting external support or direction. Still, these claims remain independently unverified amid ongoing restrictions on media access within Syria.<\/p>\n
On February 1, 2026, security agencies announced the arrest of a cell allegedly behind attacks targeting the vicinity of Mezzeh Airport in Damascus. Then, on April 11, a five-person cell was apprehended after authorities said they had thwarted an attempt to plant an explosive device near a religious site in the capital.<\/p>\n
![\"Syrians](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/ffe2d49263a898582bb03129c7ad05ef.jpeg\"\/)
<\/p>\n
Syrians gather to mark the anniversary of the 2011 uprising against the ousted President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, Syria March 15, 2026. (credit: YAMAM AL SHAAR\/REUTERS)<\/p>\n
Investigations indicated that its members had received training abroad with the aim of carrying out assassinations. Days later, on April 18 and 19, the Interior Ministry announced the dismantling of another cell, also composed of five members, reportedly linked to Hezbollah and planning to launch rockets across the border with the aim of destabilizing the situation.<\/p>\n
At least three main cells discovered in less than three months<\/p>\n
In total, authorities have announced at least three main cells in less than three months. According to official statements, their activities ranged from internal assassinations and explosive devices to cross-border rocket fire. Syrian authorities say this reflects a multi-objective operational pattern that extends beyond local activity to a broader regional scope.<\/p>\n
What gives these developments unusual weight is not only the nature of the accusations but also the identity of the accused party. Hezbollah was a key player in supporting the previous Syrian authorities during the years of war, participating in decisive battles that helped consolidate the balance of power in favor of Bashar Assad\u2019s regime. This history of close military cooperation makes the current accusations, placed in full context, a possible sign of a deep shift in the alliances formed over the past decade.<\/p>\n
For its part, Hezbollah has categorically denied the accusations, describing them as false, without providing further details. This brief denial aligns with the group\u2019s usual approach to such matters, as it often avoids engaging in open media disputes, especially when field information remains unclear. Even so, the absence of a detailed response leaves room for speculation, given the sensitivity of its relationship with Damascus.<\/p>\n
In this context, Syrian political analyst Mustafa al-Naimi told The Media Line that what is happening cannot be understood merely as a security campaign, but rather as \u201can indicator of a sovereignty struggle within the Syrian state itself.\u201d He explained that \u201cthe past years witnessed the emergence of something resembling multiple centers of power within Syria, where forces such as Hezbollah operated within semi-independent security and military networks.\u201d<\/p>\n
Naimi added that \u201cif the current authorities are moving against these networks, this means they are attempting to restore the legitimate monopoly over sovereignty, a profound structural shift, not merely a transient political tension,\u201d noting that \u201cany confrontation in this context will not be only with Hezbollah, but with the entire model of influence that took root during the war.\u201d<\/p>\n
At the regional level, these developments are difficult to separate from the broader network of balances involving actors such as Iran and Israel. Iran, considered the main supporter of both Damascus and Hezbollah, views the group\u2019s presence in Syria as part of its regional strategy. Israel, meanwhile, sees that presence as a direct threat and has intensified its strikes against related targets inside Syrian territory in recent years. Within this framework, the Syrian accusations may be seen as part of a broader repositioning, whether in bilateral relations or within more complex regional balances.<\/p>\n
Syrian researcher Shifa Sultan told The Media Line that \u201cthe issue goes beyond a dysfunction in the bilateral relationship between Damascus and Hezbollah, extending into the core of Iran\u2019s axis itself.\u201d She noted that \u201cHezbollah has not been merely a local actor, but part of an interconnected regional structure. Therefore, any friction between it and Syrian authorities may reflect a redistribution of roles within this axis, or even differences in priorities between Tehran and its allies.\u201d<\/p>\n
Lebanese political analyst Omar Salloum offers a reading focused on the internal dimension. He notes that \u201cany new or reconfigured authority in Syria will face the dilemma of redefining its relationship with the forces that contributed to prolonging the previous government.\u201d He added that \u201cHezbollah, having been an ally of the former Syrian regime, is now perceived more like an adversary, as millions of Syrians believe it was deeply involved in bloodshed and contributed to the fall of cities in favor of Assad\u2019s regime at the expense of the opposition that now controls the country. Therefore, Syria is moving toward eliminating any Hezbollah ambitions within its territory.\u201d<\/p>\n
Yet the overall picture remains incomplete. The lack of independent verification, conflicting narratives, and the difficulty of accessing accurate field information all make it hard to draw firm conclusions about the nature of what is happening. Even so, the mere act of Damascus directing such accusations at Hezbollah is a notable development in itself and, if its full dimensions are confirmed, may mark the beginning of a new phase in relations within Syria, and perhaps in the broader regional balance as well.<\/p>\n
Current developments appear to go beyond a temporary security campaign, touching on deeper questions about the shape of the Syrian state in its new phase, the limits of its sovereignty, and the nature of its relationship with nonstate actors that played a decisive role during the years of war. While some analyses focus on the internal dimension linked to rebuilding authority, others point to the overlap between this process and broader regional calculations, especially within the network of influence tied to Iran. Against that backdrop, the rupture between Damascus under its current authorities and Hezbollah may serve as an early indicator of the contours of the coming stage,not only within Syria, but across the region as a whole.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Damascus is moving against networks it says planned assassinations, bombings, and rocket fire, raising new questions about sovereignty…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":85833,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[887,670,100,95,6410,1196],"class_list":{"0":"post-85832","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-syria","8":"tag-bashar-assad","9":"tag-damascus","10":"tag-hezbollah","11":"tag-syria","12":"tag-syrian-authorities","13":"tag-syrian-civil-war"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116476976987860219","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/85832","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=85832"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/85832\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/85833"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=85832"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=85832"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=85832"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}