While China has begun to put pressure on Iran to end its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, its statements have been carefully worded, experts say, showing how the prolonged conflict is testing Beijing\u2019s relationship with Tehran.<\/p>\n
President Xi Jinping told<\/a> Saudi Arabia\u2019s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman<\/a> last week that China wanted an \u201cimmediate and comprehensive ceasefire\u201d and explicitly demanded that the waterway \u201c remain open to normal passage\u201d, without naming Iran or the US.Speaking at the United Nations earlier this month, Chinese ambassador Fu Cong<\/a> was more explicit. While condemning the US and Israeli strikes on Iran as violations of the UN Charter, he pointedly declared that \u201cChina does not go along with Iran\u2019s attacks on Gulf states and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.\u201d<\/p>\n He added that China hoped \u201cpeace and stability will be restored to the strait as soon as possible and navigation will resume\u201d, while urging Iran to halt attacks on \u201crelevant facilities\u201d in the Persian Gulf and restore normal navigation.<\/p>\n These statements mark some of Beijing\u2019s most direct public distancing from Iran\u2019s retaliatory actions during the conflict. They show the delicate balance Beijing is striking between rhetorical solidarity with Tehran and its huge economic and energy interests in the region, according to observers.<\/p>\n Zhu Yongbiao, a Middle East expert and director of the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at Lanzhou University, said China\u2019s position remained \u201cconsistent and coherent\u201d, but Fu\u2019s remarks underlined Beijing\u2019s growing concerns about Iran\u2019s behaviour.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"While China has begun to put pressure on Iran to end its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz,…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":87722,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[26],"tags":[383,262,8947,714,102,31166,34,27306,49,6415,31167,39,50,101,69,31168],"class_list":{"0":"post-87721","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-persian-gulf","8":"tag-beijing","9":"tag-china","10":"tag-fu-cong","11":"tag-gulf-states","12":"tag-hormuz","13":"tag-international-institute-for-iranian-studies","14":"tag-iran","15":"tag-lanzhou-university","16":"tag-middle-east","17":"tag-mohammed-bin-salman","18":"tag-nadeem-ahmed-moonakal","19":"tag-persian-gulf","20":"tag-saudi-arabia","21":"tag-strait-of-hormuz","22":"tag-tehran","23":"tag-zhu-yongbiao"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116482957872874328","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/87721","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=87721"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/87721\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/87722"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=87721"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=87721"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=87721"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}