{"id":95350,"date":"2026-05-03T09:36:38","date_gmt":"2026-05-03T09:36:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/95350\/"},"modified":"2026-05-03T09:36:38","modified_gmt":"2026-05-03T09:36:38","slug":"irans-guards-seize-wartime-power-weakening-supreme-leaders-role","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/95350\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran’s Guards seize wartime power, weakening Supreme Leader’s role"},"content":{"rendered":"

Khamenei\u2019s death ends one-man rule; no clear arbiter remainsMojtaba elevated, but reduced to assent, not commandIRGC and security chiefs now drive war and strategyNo fractures: unified hardline core sets terms, resists pressureIRGC hold leverage on Hormuz, nuclear file, stall talks with USDUBAI, April 28 (Reuters) – Two months into a war with the U.S. and Israel, Iran no longer has a single, undisputed clerical arbiter at the pinnacle of power \u2014 an abrupt break with the past<\/a> that may be hardening Tehran\u2019s stance as it weighs renewed talks with \u200bWashington.Since its creation in 1979, the Islamic Republic has revolved around a supreme leader with final authority on all key matters of state. But the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei<\/a> on the first day of the war, and the \u200celevation of his wounded son, Mojtaba<\/a>, have ushered in a different order dominated by commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and marked by the absence of a decisive, authoritative referee.<\/p>\n

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Mojtaba Khamenei remains at the apex of the system, but three people familiar with internal deliberations say his role is largely to legitimize decisions made by his generals rather than issue directives himself.<\/p>\n

Wartime pressure<\/a> has concentrated power into a narrower, harder-line inner circle rooted in the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the Supreme Leader\u2019s office and the IRGC, which now dominates both military strategy and key political decisions, Iranian officials and analysts say.\u201cThe Iranians are painfully slow in their response,\u201d said a \u200bsenior Pakistani government official briefed on peace talks between Iran and the United States<\/a> that Islamabad has been mediating. \u201cThere is apparently no one decision-making command structure. At times, it takes them 2 to 3 days to respond.”<\/p>\n

Analysts said the obstacle to a deal is \u200bnot internal infighting in Tehran, but the gap between what Washington is prepared to offer and what Iran\u2019s hardline Guards were willing to accept.<\/p>\n

The diplomatic face of Iran at the talks with the U.S. has \u2060been Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi<\/a>, more recently joined by parliament speaker Mohammed Baqer Qalibaf<\/a> — a former Guards commander, Tehran mayor and presidential candidate — who has emerged during the war as a key conduit between Iran\u2019s political, security and clerical elites.<\/p>\n

On the ground, however, the central interlocutor has been IRGC \u200bcommander Ahmad Vahidi, according to a Pakistani and two Iranian sources who identified him weeks ago as Iran’s pivotal figure, including on the night a ceasefire was announced.<\/p>\n

Mojtaba, who was severely injured in the opening Israeli and U.S. strike that killed his father and other relatives and \u200bleft him disfigured with serious leg wounds, has not appeared publicly and communicates through IRGC aides<\/a> or limited audio links because of security constraints, two people close to his inner circle said.<\/p>\n

There was no immediate reply from the Iranian foreign ministry to a request for comment on the issues raised in this article. Iranian officials have previously denied any divisions over negotiations with the United States.<\/p>\n

REAL POWER WIELDED BY WARTIME LEADERSHIP, INSIDERS SAYIran submitted a new proposal<\/a> to Washington on Monday, which according to senior Iranian sources envisions staged talks, with the nuclear issue to be set aside at the start until the war ends and disputes over Gulf shipping are \u200bresolved. Washington insists the nuclear issue must be addressed from the outset.<\/p>\n

\u201cNeither side wants to negotiate,\u201d said Alan Eyre, an Iran expert and former U.S. diplomat, adding that both believed time would weaken the other — Iran through leverage over Hormuz and Washington through economic pressure and a \u200bblockade.<\/p>\n

For now, neither side can afford to bend, Eyre said: Iran\u2019s IRGC is wary of appearing weak to Washington, while President Donald Trump faces midterm election pressure and little room for flexibility without political cost.<\/p>\n

“For either, flexibility would be seen as weakness,” Eyre said.<\/p>\n

That caution reflects not just the pressures of \u200cthe moment, but \u2060the way power is now exercised inside Iran.While Mojtaba is formally Iran’s ultimate authority, he is a figure of assent rather than command, insiders say, endorsing outcomes forged through institutional consensus, rather than imposing authority. Real power, they say, has moved to a unified wartime leadership centered on the SNSC.<\/p>\n

\u201cImportant deals probably pass through him,\u201d Iranian analyst Arash Azizi said, \u201cbut I can\u2019t see him overruling the National Security Council. How could he go against those running the war effort?\u201d<\/p>\n

Hardline figures such as former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and a cluster of radical MPs have raised their profile using forceful rhetoric during the war, but they lack the institutional clout to derail decisions or shape outcomes.<\/p>\n

Mojtaba owes his elevation to the Guards, who sidelined pragmatists and backed him as a reliable guardian of their hardline agenda. Already strengthened by war, the Guards\u2019 growing dominance signals a \u200bmore aggressive foreign policy and tighter domestic repression, sources familiar with \u200bthe country’s inner policy-making circles told Reuters.<\/p>\n

Driven by revolutionary Islamism \u2060and a security\u2011first worldview, the Guards see their mission as preserving the Islamic Republic at home while projecting deterrence abroad.<\/p>\n

That outlook, often shared with hardliners across the judiciary and the clerical establishment, prioritises rigid centralised control and resistance to Western pressure, particularly on nuclear policy and Iran\u2019s regional reach.<\/p>\n

POWER SHIFTS FROM CLERICS TO SECURITY SECTOR, ANALYSTS SAY<\/p>\n

In practice, the Guards’ ideology shapes strategy and decision\u2011making rests firmly in their hands. With the \u200bcountry at war and Ali Khamenei gone, no actor inside the system has the power or scope to resist them, even if they wished to, the people close to internal discussions said.<\/p>\n

The choice \u200bfacing Iran\u2019s leadership is no longer \u2060between moderate and hardline policy, but between hardline and even harder line. A small faction may argue for pushing further still, two Iranian sources close to power circles said, but even that impulse has so far been kept in check by the Guards.<\/p>\n

The shift marks a decisive reordering of power from clerical primacy to security dominance. \u201cWe\u2019ve gone from divine power to hard power,\u201d said Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. negotiator. “From the influence of the clerics to the influence of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. This is how Iran is being governed.\u201d<\/p>\n

While differences of opinion exist, decision\u2011making has consolidated around security institutions, with \u2060Mojtaba acting as \u200ba central convening figure rather than a lone decider, added Alex Vatanka, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute.<\/p>\n

Despite sustained military and economic pressure from the United States \u200band Israel, Iran has shown no signs of fracture or capitulation nearly nine weeks into the war.<\/p>\n

Nor, as Miller noted, is there evidence of fundamental rifts within the system or meaningful opposition on the streets.<\/p>\n

That cohesion suggests that command now sits with the Guards and security services, which appear to be driving the war rather than merely executing \u200bit. A strategic consensus has emerged \u2014 avoid a return to full\u2011scale war, preserve leverage, especially over the Strait of Hormuz<\/a>, and emerge from the conflict politically, economically and militarily stronger, Miller said.<\/p>\n

Additional reporting by Parisa Hafezi and Saad Sayeed in Islamabad; Writing by Samia Nakhoul, Editing by William Maclean<\/p>\n

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Shahzad is an accomplished media professional, with over two decades of experience. He primarily reports out of Pakistan, Afghanistan regions, with a great interest and an extensive knowledge of Asia. He also reports on politics, economy, finance, business, commodities, Islamist militancy, human rights <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Khamenei\u2019s death ends one-man rule; no clear arbiter remainsMojtaba elevated, but reduced to assent, not commandIRGC and security…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":95351,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[25107,33574,33572,488,14989,14976,33575,15002,33576,25135,14993,25142,25134,33577,14997,14996,15007,25137,14994,25132,15010,25140,25139,15011,25144,15012,29985,15013,15003,14998,15009,14995,15008,15006,33578,25131,25138,15005,14977,14988,14990,33573,14978,2118,34,14986,25108,14981,29986,15016,29981,14982,29969,15014,15015,29977,14985,14987,25130,25128,153,36],"class_list":{"0":"post-95350","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-iran","8":"tag-amers","9":"tag-anlins","10":"tag-anv","11":"tag-asia","12":"tag-asxpac","13":"tag-cwp","14":"tag-destabx","15":"tag-destafa","16":"tag-destbnx","17":"tag-destc","18":"tag-destcsa","19":"tag-destd","20":"tag-deste","21":"tag-destfun","22":"tag-destg","23":"tag-destgfn","24":"tag-destgns","25":"tag-destgro","26":"tag-destlby","27":"tag-destm","28":"tag-destmetop","29":"tag-destmtl","30":"tag-desto","31":"tag-destocatpm","32":"tag-destoil","33":"tag-destouktpm","34":"tag-destoustpm","35":"tag-destouswdm","36":"tag-destpsc","37":"tag-destrast","38":"tag-destrbn","39":"tag-destreulb","40":"tag-destrws","41":"tag-destrwsa","42":"tag-destseatp","43":"tag-destsof","44":"tag-destu","45":"tag-destucdptest","46":"tag-dip","47":"tag-emea","48":"tag-emrg","49":"tag-erep","50":"tag-gen","51":"tag-ir","52":"tag-iran","53":"tag-meast","54":"tag-namer","55":"tag-news1","56":"tag-packageus-top-news","57":"tag-packageworld-news","58":"tag-pk","59":"tag-pol","60":"tag-pxp","61":"tag-rulesiran","62":"tag-rulesiran-crisis","63":"tag-sasia","64":"tag-swasia","65":"tag-tglf","66":"tag-topcmb","67":"tag-topnws","68":"tag-us","69":"tag-war"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"","error":"Validation failed: Text character limit of 500 exceeded"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/95350","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=95350"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/95350\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/95351"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=95350"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=95350"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=95350"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}