\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0 TABLE OF CONTENTS<\/p>\n
I. Author’s Personal Note: An Indelible Bond<\/p>\n
II. Geographical, Demographic, and Sectarian Context<\/p>\n
III. Institutional Genesis: The 1926 Constitution and the 1943 National Pact<\/p>\n
IV. The Golden Age: Prosperity, Cultural Beacon, and Arab Nationalism<\/p>\n
V. The Palestinian Incursion and Black September 1970<\/p>\n
VI. The So-Called Lebanese “Civil War”: An Endless Series of Wars (1975-1990)<\/p>\n
VII. Khomeini’s Fatwa and the Legitimization of Alawite Heresy<\/p>\n
VIII. Lebanon as a Laboratory of International Terrorism<\/p>\n
IX. Taif Agreement (1989) and Unfinished Reconstruction<\/p>\n
X. The Ruthless Trio of Iran, Assad, and Hezbollah: Political Assassinations and State Capture<\/p>\n
XI. Hezbollah Today: Proxy of the Jihadist Oligarchy, Iranian Parasite on Lebanese Soil<\/p>\n
XII. The Final Poll: A Lebanese Majority Against Hezbollah<\/p>\n
XIII. The Thorny Israeli Issue: Legitimate Self-Defense and Unacceptable Collateral Damage<\/p>\n
XIV. The Roadmap for Genuine Peace in the Middle East<\/p>\n
XV. Author’s Conclusions<\/p>\n
Appendix I. Annotated Chronology (1516-2026)<\/p>\n
Appendix II. Glossary of Actors and Acronyms<\/p>\n
I. A PERSONAL NOTE FROM THE AUTHOR: AN INDELIBLE BOND<\/p>\n
Rarely will I have occasion to write about something that touches me so closely, that holds such meaning for the person who signs these pages, and to which my family is so deeply and affectionately bound. Lebanon is not, for me, a distant object of analysis: it is living flesh, living memory, and an open wound.<\/p>\n
In Lebanon, the Al Assad regime murdered my father, his father-in-law — the ambassador and writer Tofic Yousef Aouad — and his sister-in-law Samia Toutounji. I have Lebanese brothers, and their family is also, by mutual choice and by the weight of shared affection, my own family. My son is married to a Lebanese woman, and our bond with that extraordinary country is — and will remain — indelible.<\/p>\n
This text does not aspire to the academic asepsis of the outside observer, but to the intellectual honesty that any serious analysis demands. The author writes with direct knowledge, verified data, primary and secondary sources, but also with the conviction — born of decades of intimate relationship with Lebanon — that there exists a historical truth that tolerates neither lazy relativism nor the complacency of correspondents who confuse rigour with equidistance.<\/p>\n
II. GEOGRAPHIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND CONFESSIONAL FRAMEWORK<\/p>\n
In the recent history of the Middle East, no other country has suffered as much, for as long, as Lebanon. A country of 10,452 km2 — a figure sacred to every Lebanese patriot –, roughly the size of Spain’s Principality of Asturias, is home to between 5.5 and 6 million people distributed across eighteen officially recognized religious communities grouped into three broad blocs: Muslims (Sunnis, Shiites, Alawis, Ismailis), Christians (Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek-Catholic Melkites, Armenian Apostolics, Armenian Catholics, Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholics, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Coptic Orthodox, Latins, and Evangelical Protestants), Druze, and the tiny surviving Jewish community.<\/p>\n
The deep cause of Lebanon’s conflicts is not confessional diversity but the systematic will of foreign powers — the Al Assad regime in Syria first, and Iran afterwards — to instrumentalize that diversity to deny Lebanon its national identity. The murderous Al Assad regime attempted, unsuccessfully, to erase Lebanon’s powerful national personality from the political map.<\/p>\n
III. INSTITUTIONAL GENESIS: THE 1926 CONSTITUTION AND THE 1943 NATIONAL PACT<\/p>\n
Lebanon’s founding texts — the Constitution of 23 May 1926, inspired by the French Third Republic but adapted to the confessional balance, and the unwritten National Pact of 1943 between President Bechara El Khoury and Prime Minister Riad Solh — sealed independence on 22 November 1943. The National Pact established the formula of six Christian deputies for every five Muslims, corrected to strict parity by Taif in 1989, and the doctrine of ‘double negation’: neither union with Syria nor alignment with the West; an Arab but independent Lebanon. Both texts were a remarkable example of institutional management of religious, civil, and family diversity.<\/p>\n
IV. THE GOLDEN AGE: PROSPERITY, CULTURAL BEACON, AND ARAB NATIONALISM<\/p>\n
In the 1950s and 1960s, Lebanon became the Switzerland of the Middle East: regional financial capital, a leading banking center — with banking secrecy codified in 1956 –, international tourism hub, publishing paradise, and intellectual capital of the Arab world. Its universities — the American University of Beirut (AUB, f. 1866) and the Jesuit Saint Joseph University (USJ, f. 1875) — trained the elites of the entire region.<\/p>\n
A fact that superficial historiography systematically overlooks: contemporary Arab nationalism — Baathism, Nasserism, all Pan-Arab currents of the twentieth century — finds its origins in Christian intellectuals from Lebanon and Syria. Michel Aflaq, founder of the Baath party, was a Greek Orthodox from Damascus; Antoun Saadeh, founder of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, was a Lebanese Orthodox; Constantin Zureiq was also a Greek Orthodox from Damascus. Arab nationalism is not confessional: it is of Christian origin. The paradox is that the ideologies forged by Christian intellectuals later served regimes that would persecute the very Christians of the East. Whoever does not understand this founding paradox understands nothing about the Middle East.<\/p>\n
V. THE PALESTINIAN INCURSION AND BLACK SEPTEMBER 1970<\/p>\n
King Hussein I’s operation in September 1970 was an act of legitimate self-defense by a young state led by a remarkable monarch, who reconquered his country’s independence in the face of Yasser Arafat’s pretension to dethrone him. Those who do not call things by their name fail the test of historical truth.<\/p>\n
Palestinians, not Lebanese Muslims. This distinction is capital: what lazy analysts erroneously call “the Lebanese civil war” was in reality an interminable rosary of wars\u00a0in\u00a0Lebanon, not wars of Lebanese against one another. The distinction is not academic: it is ethical and political.<\/p>\n
VI. THE MISNAMED LEBANESE CIVIL WAR: AN INTERMINABLE ROSARY OF WARS (1975-1990)<\/p>\n
Every imaginable combination of conflict has played out in this martyred country since 1975. Key fracture lines included: Muslims versus Christians (foundational axis 1975-1976); Druze and Muslims versus Christians (Mountain War, Chouf, 1983); Palestinians against Lebanese of all confessions (Karantina, Tel al-Zaatar, Damour, 1976); Shiites versus Sunnis; and the intra-Lebanese Forces civil war between Samir Geagea and Elie Hobeika, who formed the ‘Tripartite Alliance’ with Syria against Lebanese Forces commander Fouad Abu Nader — a close friend of our entire family — forced to resign and saved by my father when literally surrounded and about to be liquidated.<\/p>\n
The most brutal attack struck the rotating presidency of the European Community Troika: the Spanish Embassy in the Christian neighborhood of Hadath. Syrian forces fired six 240mm Soviet-made mortars from Chouf positions, with fire control improved by the German Democratic Republic. Five of six shells struck the compound, one hitting the residence reception rooms dead-on, instantly killing Ambassador Tofic Yousef Aouad — my adoptive grandfather, writer and statesman –, his sister-in-law Samia Toutounji, and mortally wounding my father, Spain’s Ambassador to Lebanon. They were correcting their aim with surgical precision. The intentionality was undeniable, and the institutional silence that followed, unforgivable.<\/p>\n
Table 3. Human and Material Costs of the Wars of Lebanon (1975-2025)<\/p>\n
Period \/ Conflict<\/p>\n
Deaths (estim.)<\/p>\n
Displaced<\/p>\n
Material Damage<\/p>\n
Civil Wars 1975-1990<\/p>\n
120,000-150,000<\/p>\n
approx. 1 million<\/p>\n
approx. 25bn USD (1990 val.)<\/p>\n
Syrian Occupation 1976-2005<\/p>\n
—<\/p>\n
—<\/p>\n
Incalculable opportunity cost<\/p>\n
Israeli Occupation of the South 1978-2000<\/p>\n
approx. 25,000<\/p>\n
approx. 500,000<\/p>\n
Sustained<\/p>\n
Israel-Hezbollah War 2006<\/p>\n
approx. 1,200 (LB) \/ 165 (IL)<\/p>\n
approx. 1 million<\/p>\n
3.6-4bn USD<\/p>\n
Israel-Hezbollah War 2024-2025<\/p>\n
approx. 4,000 (LB)<\/p>\n
approx. 1.2 million<\/p>\n
approx. 10bn USD<\/p>\n
Source: UNHCR, World Bank, Lebanese and Israeli governments, humanitarian NGOs; own elaboration.<\/p>\n
VII. KHOMEINI’S FATWA AND THE LEGITIMATION OF THE ALAWI HERESY<\/p>\n
The bloody Amal-Hezbollah confrontation (1988-1990) ended with Amal’s near-total elimination as an autonomous force. Hafez Al Assad negotiated with Iran: Imam Khomeini legitimized the Alawi or Nusayri heresy — not to be confused with Morocco’s Alaoui dynasty — through a religious fatwa recognizing it as a legitimate branch of Shiism, which it neither is nor has ever been. That theological-political pact has bound Damascus and Tehran for half a century, explaining why the fate of the Al Assads was inseparable from the fate of Hezbollah.<\/p>\n
VIII. LEBANON AS LABORATORY OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM<\/p>\n
Lebanon was the laboratory of modern terrorism. The suicide truck bomb technique — perfected in Beirut — subsequently traveled to Algiers, Madrid, London, Baghdad, and Kabul. It was there that the archetype of ‘state-sponsored’ terrorism, executed through proxies and non-state actors, was invented.<\/p>\n
18 April 1983: US Embassy bombing in West Beirut, 63 dead, including 17 Americans and nearly the entire CIA analytical corps in the region. 23 October 1983: simultaneous double suicide bombing against the US Marines (220 dead) and French paratroopers (58 dead), attributed to Hezbollah on direct orders from the Iranian regime per the 1987 CIA declassification. 14-30 June 1985: TWA Flight 847 hijacking by Hezbollah; murder of US Navy diver Robert Stethem.<\/p>\n
My father, Ambassador Pedro de Aristegui, mediated the TWA hijacking with remarkable effectiveness, shuttling between US Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew and Beirut airport — a high-risk zone — to meet his contacts, then visiting Grand Ayatollah Fadlallah, considered Hezbollah’s spiritual guide, to convey relevant messages. He never once agreed to meet any of Hezbollah’s secretaries-general — and least of all the one just appointed by Tehran: the bloodthirsty fanatic Hassan Nasrallah, who turned Hezbollah into the monster it is today. His position was always unwavering: ‘I neither negotiate with nor meet terrorists and murderers.’<\/p>\n
The Dirani Affair, Moussa al-Sadr, and My Father’s Kidnapping<\/p>\n
Following the arrest in Madrid of two members of an ‘Alwiyat Al Sud’ commando — which had attacked a Libyan diplomat in Spain — a group close to Hezbollah threatened Spain’s Ambassador to Lebanon. The story has deeper roots: AMAL’s founder, Imam Moussa al-Sadr, had disappeared during an official trip to Libya, where Gaddafi — at the instigation of mega-terrorist Abu Nidal, who maintained close ties with Tripoli — ordered his elimination as a favor to Syrian dictator Hafez Al-Assad. This occurred before the Al Assad regime became Tehran’s vassal: at that stage, Damascus still operated with an autonomy that Iran would progressively neutralize.<\/p>\n
The organization ‘Alwiyat Al Sud’ had been created and led by the sinister Moustafa Al Dirani — former AMAL security chief, later the creator of a satellite organization of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, the ‘Al-Muqawama al-Mu’mina’ — which later kidnapped Israeli soldier Ron Arad to ‘sell’ him to the Revolutionary Guard.<\/p>\n
Dirani directly threatened my father with kidnapping, torture, and ‘disappearance’ if his men were not freed. My father adopted every precaution he could: changing routes, going armed, and driving himself — first because he was trained in evasive driving techniques, and second and primarily to avoid having his driver killed, who is always the first target to stop a car. Knowing precisely who Dirani was, he obtained through his contacts in the turbulent Shiite world the addresses of the three safe houses where he was convinced he would be taken. Spain’s was the only Western embassy without a security team or armored car, due to the stubborn refusal of Under-Secretary Gonzalo Puente Ojea.<\/p>\n
Pedro de Aristegui passed the three locations to Nabih Berri, telling him plainly: ‘Nabih, either you send for me within the first twenty-four hours, or I end up in the Bekaa Valley and disappear forever.’ The inevitable day arrived. Four SUVs, twelve armed thugs with AK-47s and RPG-7 launchers blocked the official car from all sides. My father had his Sig Sauer P225 pistol in hand and surrendered it to the kidnapper. Before twenty-four hours had elapsed, an Amal special forces unit burst into the Burj el Barajneh apartment — ‘Little Tehran’ — and freed my father not without a fistfight with the guards. Throughout his captivity he had concealed a five-shot Freedom Arms mini-revolver in .22 Long Rifle caliber, prepared to take as many kidnappers as he could if they attempted to transfer him to the Bekaa Valley.<\/p>\n
Being who he was — and only he could have done this — a few days later he returned to his captors’ house to have lunch with the elderly lady and her daughter who had fed him, given him conversation and reading — Albert Camus’ The Stranger –, ‘to return the book and thank them for their hospitality.’ A crystal-clear message of indomitable resolve to Dirani and his accomplices. The rancorous Puente Ojea took many months — more than a year — to authorize the security team and armored car, dismissing my father’s conduct as ‘astonishing Jamesbondism’ — a smallness of judgment that borders, plainly and simply, on the criminal.<\/p>\n
The Kidnapping of the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, and GEO Officer<\/p>\n
Spain established full diplomatic relations with the State of Israel in January 1986. As a result, the Ministry sent a GEO (Grupo Especial de Operaciones — Spain’s elite anti-terrorist unit) team to all high-risk embassies — an operation mounted without consulting the embassy, with a degree of improvisation and incompetence worthy of better, the tragic consequences of which would soon become apparent. At the airport, terrorists armed with .50-caliber machine guns on open jeeps and RPG-7 rocket launchers intercepted the convoy. Three of the four GEO officers managed to escape. The terrorists seized embassy chancellor Assad Abdo, officer and later vice-chancellor Gaspar Abdo, and GEO officer Pedro Antonio Sanchez Anula.<\/p>\n
Thirty-two days of torture, simulated executions — with shots fired just above their heads –, beatings, sleep deprivation, and abysmal sanitary conditions followed. My father negotiated their release over weeks of relentless effort, leaving the GEO officers at the Green Line each time he crossed into West Beirut. He finally convinced the Secretary of State for Security to travel to Beirut and cross to the West without an escort — my father insisting and taking the wheel himself to go to the handover point. No kidnapping in Lebanon was ever resolved more quickly or without casualties. This was the only one. I wish to place on record the extraordinary resilience of the Abdo brothers — Assad served until his retirement; Gaspar remains active at Spain’s embassy. GEO officer Sanchez Anula broke psychologically and was permanently retired on grounds of total incapacity.<\/p>\n
IX. THE TAIF ACCORDS (1989) AND THE UNFINISHED RECONSTRUCTION<\/p>\n
The Taif Accords (22 October 1989, ratified 5 November) contained five key commitments: strict Christian-Muslim parity in Parliament (64 seats each); transfer of powers from the president to the Council of Ministers; firm commitment to disarm all militias and restore the monopoly of force to the Lebanese Army; gradual withdrawal of the Syrian Army; and aspiration to the progressive abolition of political confessionalism. The only militia that has not respected — and never intended to respect — the disarmament commitment is Hezbollah. The more President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam insist on applying Taif and UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004), the more brutal and direct the Iranian and Hezbollah threats become.<\/p>\n
X. THE RUTHLESS TRIO IRAN-AL ASSAD-HEZBOLLAH: POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS AND STATE CAPTURE<\/p>\n
The Al Assad-Hezbollah tandem, with Tehran as its conductor, assassinated two Presidents of the Lebanese Republic: Bachir Gemayel (14 September 1982) and Rene Moawad (22 November 1989, seventeen days after his election). The Special Tribunal for Lebanon confirmed that the murder of Rafic Hariri (14 February 2005) was planned and executed by Hezbollah’s Unit 121, with the knowledge and approval of Syrian intelligence and the blessing and inspiration of Iran.<\/p>\n
The three assassinated prime ministers — Rachid Karame, Omar Karame, and Rafic Hariri — were all three personal friends of my father. And Rafic Hariri announced to Mariano Rajoy and to the author of these lines — in his suite at the Ritz Hotel in Madrid — that Rustum Ghazaleh, the murderous and sinister Syrian ‘viceroy’ in Lebanon, had threatened him with death. A month later he was killed by a bomb of more than one ton — yes, more than 1,000 kg of TNT — under his car.<\/p>\n
XI. HEZBOLLAH TODAY: PROXY OF THE JIHADIST OLIGARCHY, IRANIAN PARASITE ON LEBANESE SOIL<\/p>\n
Hezbollah’s terrorists are not Lebanese patriots: they do not teach their children the national anthem; they brandish only Hezbollah’s yellow flag with the green Kalashnikov. Their loyalty belongs exclusively to Iran’s oligarchic-jihadist regime — not a ‘theocracy’ but a dictatorial, mafia-like oligarchy that instrumentalizes Twelver Shiite theology to legitimize a cosmically corrupt power, grounded in the systematic looting of the country’s resources and the export of the revolution through armed proxies.<\/p>\n
Hezbollah manages a transnational criminal empire combining: systematic extortion of merchants in Shiite and border areas; captagon trafficking — the Syrian-Lebanese industrial methamphetamine, the Assad regime’s flagship product; cultivation and export of hashish in the Bekaa; cocaine trafficking through Latin American cells; Southeast Asian opium; money laundering through Lebanon and Francophone West Africa; and human trafficking across the Mediterranean. The DEA and US Treasury estimate Hezbollah’s annual criminal revenues at between 1 and 2 billion dollars, in addition to the direct Iranian subsidy.<\/p>\n
XII. THE DEFINITIVE POLL: A LEBANESE MAJORITY AGAINST HEZBOLLAH<\/p>\n
Between 73 and 80% of the Lebanese population is genuinely and massively tired of Hezbollah. The Gallup survey (23 June-16 July 2025, n = 1,010 adults) is devastating: 79% believe only the Lebanese Army should hold the monopoly on weapons; 86% oppose Lebanon entering into conflict with Israel to support the Palestinian cause. Trust in the national government jumped from 12% (2024) to 48% (2025), and approval of the country’s leadership rose 46 percentage points in a single year — one of the largest annual increases ever recorded by Gallup in any country in the world. Hezbollah terrorists who have taken refuge in Sunni or Christian neighborhoods — Saida, Tripoli, Achrafieh — have been literally kicked out by residents. This has no precedent in Lebanon’s post-war history.<\/p>\n
XIII. THE THORNY ISRAELI QUESTION: LEGITIMATE DEFENSE AND INADMISSIBLE COLLATERAL DAMAGE<\/p>\n
Israel’s right to defend itself against this brutal terrorist organization is not in question, but that right cannot be exercised at the cost of Lebanese civilians, who are Hezbollah’s first victims — not its accomplices. The Lebanese civilian in the south, the Bekaa Valley, or Beirut’s suburbs suffers twice: under Hezbollah’s yoke, which embeds itself in their neighborhood to use it as a human shield and cash box, and under Israeli bombs that destroy their home because an Iranian missile was hidden beneath it. Every indiscriminate Israeli bombardment hands Hezbollah the ‘rally around the flag’ — the expression coined by political scientist John Mueller in 1970 — that turns the perpetrator into a victim. Israel must act with strategy, not short-term operational tactics. The same historical error committed in 1982 — from which derived the Sabra and Shatila massacre and the rise and consolidation of Hezbollah — still weighs on the entire Levant.<\/p>\n
XIV. A ROAD MAP FOR TRUE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST<\/p>\n
A six-point road map: (1) Immediate and verifiable ceasefire with Israeli withdrawal from five tactical positions south of the Litani. (2) Full deployment of the Lebanese Army south of the Litani per UN Security Council Resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1559 (2004), with conditioned funding from the US, EU, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. (3) Full disarmament of Hezbollah: public timetable, verifiable milestones, international monitoring mechanism; voluntary integration of combatants into the Lebanese Armed Forces. (4) Economic and banking reform: forensic audit of the Banque du Liban; debt restructuring; recovery of confiscated deposits; IMF program with governance conditionality. (5) Lebanon-Israel bilateral dialogue on land demarcation and the Sheba’a Farms. (6) Strategic isolation of Iran: maximum sanctions pressure; decisive support for Iran’s internal dissidence; definitive severing of the Tehran-Damascus-Beirut land corridor following Assad’s fall in December 2024.<\/p>\n
The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, after a blitzkrieg offensive by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham led by Ahmad Al-Sharaa from Idlib, has profoundly altered the geopolitical chessboard. For the first time in half a century, Hezbollah has lost its Syrian rear-guard, its logistical corridor, and its border sanctuary. The strategic opportunity to free Lebanon from the Iranian yoke is historic. Squandering it would be unforgivable.<\/p>\n
XV. THE AUTHOR’S CONCLUSIONS<\/p>\n
Lebanon is a martyr state, but not a failed state. Failed states are the product of the endogenous weakness of their institutions; Lebanon has spent a century as the victim of its neighbors’ predatory strength and of those who use them as instruments from Tehran.<\/p>\n
Lebanon’s confessional diversity is not a curse: it is a unique heritage in the Arab-Muslim world and an example — imperfect, painful, but real — that different religious communities can coexist under the rule of law. What has failed is not the consociational formula but its systematic parasitization by external agents.<\/p>\n
Hezbollah is not a legitimate Lebanese political actor among others. It is a terrorist organization in the service of a foreign power, with a documented record of political assassinations, international bombings, industrial drug trafficking, and human trafficking. To call it by any other name is complicity — voluntary or through intellectual laziness.<\/p>\n
Spain must live up to its history and its commitments. Our Multinational Brigade East of UNIFIL in Marjayoun — which I know very well, having visited Base Cervantes when the troops were still living in tents, being in fact the first Spanish politician to do so — is not a minor commitment: it is the most visible presence of our country in the Middle East and a chapter of honor for our armed forces. The current government’s forced equidistance between aggressors and the aggressed, more hostile toward the United States than toward the Iranian regime, is an act of profound political and moral irresponsibility.<\/p>\n
—————————–<\/p>\n
“A small country, great in martyrdom. Cradle of the first letters of the alphabet,<\/p>\n
home of the biblical cedars, beacon of Arab intellectuality, laboratory of modern horror.<\/p>\n
Lebanon will survive, as it has always survived, because its personality is indestructible.<\/p>\n
But it deserves, at last, to live — not merely to survive.”<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0<\/p>\n
Gustavo de Ar\u00edstegui y San Rom\u00e1n<\/p>\n
Diplomat; Former Ambassador; Writer; Geopolitical Analyst and Columnist<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":95491,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","_share_on_mastodon":"0"},"categories":[32],"tags":[33647,33646,93,4024,9687],"class_list":["post-95490","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-lebanon","tag-gustavo-de-aristegui","tag-le-liban","tag-lebanon","tag-libano","tag-portada"],"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@iran\/116510439679768524","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/95490","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=95490"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/95490\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/95491"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=95490"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=95490"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=95490"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}