{"id":98221,"date":"2026-05-05T04:20:08","date_gmt":"2026-05-05T04:20:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/98221\/"},"modified":"2026-05-05T04:20:08","modified_gmt":"2026-05-05T04:20:08","slug":"americas-hate-hate-affair-with-iran-a-collision-course-for-the-ages","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/iran\/98221\/","title":{"rendered":"America\u2019s hate-hate affair with Iran: A collision course for the ages"},"content":{"rendered":"

Two months after the U.S. and Israel<\/a> attacked Iran<\/a> on February 28, a tense standoff prevails. There is no active warfare, but no signs of a diplomatic breakthrough either. <\/p>\n

The war is a culmination of a 47-year trajectory which set the U.S. and Iran on this collision course. Mutual hostility was the norm since 1979, and even rare openings, such as the cooperation in a post-Taliban Afghanistan in 2002, or a landmark nuclear pact in 2015, failed to change that path to a more functional relationship.<\/p>\n

Serious questions remain: what are the principal drivers of this poisoned state of affairs that ultimately led us to the war? What are the limits of Iran\u2019s strategic autonomy and how can it maneuver its relationships with other great powers, such as Russia<\/a>? What about Israel?<\/p>\n

To dwell on these issues, Responsible Statecraft spoke with Dr. Shireen Tahmaseeb Hunter, a rare voice in Iranian and Middle Eastern affairs. She is a former Iranian diplomat under the Shah; she later built a distinguished academic career in the United States, notably at the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. <\/p>\n

An author of numerous books on Iran\u2019s history<\/a>, identity, relations with South Caucasus and Central Asia<\/a>, her latest summarizes these decades of diplomatic experience and scholarship in \u201cThe Great Powers, and Iran’s Social and Political Evolution: A Memoir<\/a>\u201d<\/p>\n

We spoke to her about the current war, Washington’s refusal to engage Iranian moderates, and the danger of Iran\u2019s fragmentation, among other topics.<\/p>\n

Responsible Statecraft: From the 19th century Russo-British “Great Game” to the Cold War, Iran’s strategic value to Western powers was largely as a buffer against Russia, not a true ally. Did the Islamic Republic break free from that buffer role, or merely swap one set of constraints for another?<\/p>\n

Shireen Hunter: None of the great powers saw Iran as essential to their interests. Sir Dennis Wright wrote that Britain never considered Iran worth colonizing, unlike India. The U.S. also did not see Iran as an essential ally – the way it did see Turkey (a NATO ally) and Saudi Arabia<\/a>. Great powers tried to keep Iran weak and dependent. Even the U.S., despite nominally close relations with the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, did not contribute much to Iran’s industrialization. Ironically, the first steel mill in Iran was built by the Soviet Union.<\/p>\n

So a degree of suspicion of all great powers has been a feature of Iranian politics. However, there have also been sympathizers of foreign powers. A major divide has always been between those who from the 19th century to today have preferred Russia\/USSR and those who preferred the West \u2014 first Britain, then the U.S. Despite its claims, the Islamic Republic has not broken decisively with this pattern. There are still supporters of Russia in Iran and those who want a more mature relationship with the West. The hardliners’ excessive hostility to the West has been highly damaging to Iran.<\/p>\n

RS: You have been critical of both the Islamic Republic’s excesses and Washington’s refusal to engage seriously with moderates like presidents Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Khatami, Rouhani, and Pezeshkian. Even the JCPOA was seen merely as an arms control agreement, not an opening for a new era. Did that refusal strengthen the hardliners in Tehran?<\/p>\n

SH: Two factors have been responsible for the deadlock in U.S.-Iran relations after the 1979 Revolution. First, the hardliners’ ideological hostility to America and the West. Second, the U.S. insistence on essentially subservient Iran. Even under the Shah, the U.S. was wary of his ambitions<\/a> for Iran, even though he was a modernist and pro-American. There can be no doubt that President Carter’s policies \u2014 including, together with Saudi Arabia, bringing the price of oil down, which caused an economic recession in Iran in 1977<\/a> \u2014 contributed to the success of the revolution.<\/p>\n

After the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the U.S. refused to deal with moderates like Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who offered<\/a> a contract to a U.S. oil company, Conoco. This was followed by the Iran-Libya-Syria sanctions act<\/a> in 1996.<\/p>\n

The same happened in 2001 with Khatami. After Iran helped the U.S. in Afghanistan<\/a> and offered to cooperate, the U.S. called Iran part of an “Axis of Evil.”<\/a> In 2003, Iran sent a letter suggesting it was ready to discuss all issues between the two countries, including the issue of the Lebanese Hezbollah.<\/p>\n

All of these overtures were rebuffed. No doubt there was opposition to these policies in Iran. But had the U.S. had responded positively, the moderates would have been strengthened and they could have resisted the hardliners’ opposition more effectively.<\/p>\n

RS: From your vantage point in Washington, how did pro-Israel lobbying morph from simply defending Israel to actively pressuring the U.S. to solve the “Iran question” by force?<\/p>\n

SH: It is hard to pinpoint a specific date, but the Clinton presidency especially favored Israel and pro-Israel personalities. He appointed many of them \u2014 Martin Indyk<\/a> is an example \u2014to key foreign policy positions. Meanwhile, many rich pro-Israel personalities and some Israeli-American dual nationals<\/a> spent more money on U.S. elections. Thus many aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East<\/a> reflected Israel’s views and aspirations. <\/p>\n

During the presidency of George W. Bush, pro-Israeli neoconservatives pushed policies<\/a> such as invading Iraq in 2003. They were poised to go to Tehran<\/a> immediately afterward but got bogged down in Iraq. Israel pressured the U.S. to use its power to eliminate its rivals. Now it is Iran’s turn. Who knows who will be next.<\/p>\n

RS: So far, Iran has shown no sign of internal disintegration. But if Israel’s goal is to render Iran a failed state (through economic strangulation, fomenting ethnic or sectarian tensions, etc.), could that become a real danger down the road? And specifically, could external actors weaponize pan-Turkism, Kurdish separatism, and other ethnic identities to fragment Iran?<\/p>\n

SH: Those who have tried to weaken and dominate Iran have always exaggerated its ethno-linguistic differences. Yet Iran, in that sense, is not much different from Britain, Spain, or France, just to name a few. All Iranians have more in common culturally than they do with any other country. If they separate from Iran, they must join some other country with which they have less in common. None of Iran’s minorities have the resources to form viable independent entities.<\/p>\n

For example, since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, forces in Turkey and Azerbaijan, including, occasionally, the highest-ranking<\/a> officials have been promoting <\/a>the secession of the so-called \u201cSouth Azerbaijan\u201d (Dr.Hunter is a native of Tabriz, the main city of the Iranian Azerbaijan – RS), the north-western areas of Iran with a significant Turkish-speaking population. Israel in particular has cultivated<\/a> close ties with Baku as a leverage to break-up Iran among the ethnic lines. The U.S.\/Israel war, however, failed to ignite any Azeri uprising against Tehran. The idea has been exposed as bankrupt. <\/p>\n

However, if the U.S. continues to pound Iran or actively tries to create several mini-Irans, Iran’s territorial and political unity<\/a> would be severely threatened.<\/p>\n

RS: You have noted that Moscow actively worked against U.S.-Iran reconciliation. Is Russia’s goal simply to keep the U.S. bogged down in the Middle East, or does Russia see a strong, independent Iran itself as a threat to its own Caucasus and Central Asian interests?<\/p>\n

SH: Russia does not want U.S.-Iran reconciliation. Russia sees Iran more as a rival than an ally, despite the rhetoric of strategic alliance. Russia has benefited from Iran’s isolation, especially in energy. Russia is pleased by the current war because it hurts the U.S. economically, keeps it bogged down in the Middle East and acts as a brake on a more aggressive U.S. policy toward Moscow, for example regarding Ukraine. A strong Iran could be a rival for Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, in these areas, Moscow is already losing the game to the West and China<\/a>.<\/p>\n

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