The summit scheduled in Beijing between President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping will be watched very closely in Tokyo and Seoul. For Japan and South Korea, the meeting is not just about China. It is also about Taiwan, North Korea, energy security, and the future of the U.S. alliance system in the Indo-Pacific.
Both countries want tensions between Washington and Beijing to be managed. Neither wants a crisis between the world’s two major powers. But both will be looking for signs that stability with Beijing is not being bought at the cost of softer language on Taiwan, reduced pressure on North Korea, or uncertainty regarding U.S. commitments.
Japan’s primary concern is Taiwan. A crisis in the Taiwan Strait would affect Japanese territory, U.S. bases in Japan, maritime routes, and the East China Sea. Tokyo has publicly supported stable relations between the United States and China, but the true test will be whether Washington maintains a clear deterrent and keeps its allies fully informed.
China’s perspective is different. Beijing is presenting the summit as an opportunity to stabilize the relationship, but it continues to treat Taiwan as a core sovereignty issue. For Japan, that means every word in the official statements from the United States and China will matter. An ambiguous phrase in Beijing could become a security concern in Tokyo.
South Korea views the summit through the lens of North Korea. Seoul relies on its alliance with the United States, trades heavily with China, and faces a nuclear-armed neighbor that is hardening its stance. North Korea has drifted even further from any serious path toward denuclearization, while portraying cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea as a hostile military bloc.
That makes any discussion between Trump and Xi regarding the Korean Peninsula a sensitive matter. If Trump seeks Chinese help on North Korea, Seoul will want to know the price. It will also want to avoid being sidelined by another direct channel between leaders that treats South Korea as an observer of its own security.
Then there is the Strait of Hormuz
Japan and South Korea are advanced industrial economies with a simple vulnerability: much of their energy comes from the Gulf. Japan relies on the Middle East for about 95 percent of its oil supplies, and nearly 70 percent of its oil imports typically pass through the Strait of Hormuz. South Korea is also exposed. More than 60 percent of its crude oil imports and about half of its naphtha imports passed through the Strait of Hormuz in 2025, according to the AP.
That makes Iran part of Northeast Asia’s story. South Korea recently condemned an attack on an HMM-operated cargo ship near the Strait of Hormuz, while Trump has pressed Seoul to support U.S.-led efforts to protect shipping lanes in the region, according to Reuters. Japan and the United Arab Emirates have also discussed expanding oil supplies and joint crude reserves, as Tokyo seeks to reduce its exposure to disruptions.
That is why, when Trump discusses Iran with Xi, Tokyo and Seoul will listen closely. China has ties to Tehran and major energy interests in the Gulf. If Beijing helps defuse the crisis, Japan and South Korea stand to benefit. If China uses its role to seek concessions on other issues, the Middle East dossier becomes an Indo-Pacific problem.
U.S. President Donald Trump meets with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C., on March 19, 2026 – REUTERS/EVELYN HOCKSTEIN
The issue of alliances takes precedence over everything else
Japan and South Korea are not secondary players in U.S. strategy. They are the pillars of the U.S. military posture in Northeast Asia. U.S. forces in both countries support deterrence against China and North Korea and help Washington project power throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Trump’s transactional view of alliances has already made allies more cautious. Tokyo and Seoul can handle the pressure to spend more on defense. What they cannot easily handle is the uncertainty over whether Washington views alliances as long-term strategic commitments or as negotiable costs.
That is why the best outcome for Japan and South Korea would not be dramatic. It would be restrained: clear U.S. language on Taiwan, no weakening of deterrence against North Korea, practical steps to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, and assurances that alliances remain central to U.S. strategy.
The worst-case scenario is also clear: a summit that generates headlines in Washington and Beijing but leaves U.S. allies wondering what was negotiated behind closed doors.
This is the second article in an ATN series on the global stakes of Trump’s visit to China. The first analyzed Taiwan, Iran, and the broader power competition between the United States and China. Upcoming articles will examine how the Middle East and North Africa view the summit through the lenses of Iran, oil, and strategic balance, and how Europe views Ukraine, trade, NATO, and policy toward China.
For Japan and South Korea, the Trump-Xi summit is not a single story. It is four: Taiwan, North Korea, the Strait of Hormuz, and the future of the U.S. alliance system in the Indo-Pacific. Any one of them could shake up the region. Together, they explain why U.S. allies will listen closely not only to what Trump says to Xi, but also to what he says to them after Beijing.
Ahmed Fathi is an international journalist, United Nations correspondent, global affairs analyst, and human rights commentator. He writes about diplomacy, multilateralism, power, civil liberties, and the policies shaping our global future.