The dispute over the Kuril Islands has once again moved beyond the realm of diplomatic rhetoric. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Iturup Island on 13 August sent a powerful symbolic message to Tokyo: Moscow considers the issue of sovereignty over the Southern Kuril Islands settled. Japan, in turn, responded with a strong protest, prompting a further escalation in tensions. On 18 August, Russia summoned the Japanese ambassador and warned of possible retaliatory measures.
Yet behind the exchange of sharp statements lies a far more complex question. Why is a dispute that has persisted for more than 80 years once again becoming increasingly acute? To what extent is Tokyo’s current position shaped by historical memory, and how much is driven by contemporary geopolitical considerations? And is there still room for dialogue between Russia and Japan at a time when the territorial dispute has effectively become part of a much broader international confrontation?
To gain a deeper understanding of the issues beyond the official rhetoric, News.Az spoke with Dr Akira Matsunaga, a political scientist and specialist in regional affairs, who serves as a visiting professor at Kaishi Professional University.
— Mr Matsunaga, Tokyo’s reaction to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Iturup was particularly strong. Japan lodged a firm protest, while Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi described the trip as incompatible with the country’s position on the “Northern Territories”. In your view, why did the Japanese government consider it necessary to react so sharply to the Russian president’s visit at this particular moment? Is this solely about the territorial dispute, or are there broader strategic calculations behind Tokyo’s diplomatic rhetoric?
— I think it is important to distinguish between the symbolic and strategic dimensions.
For the Japanese government, Iturup is more than simply an island. In Japan’s political consciousness, it is part of the so-called “Northern Territories”, which means that any visit to the islands by Russia’s top leadership is perceived as a demonstration that “the issue is closed”. That is precisely what Tokyo cannot accept.
But there is also a deeper factor. Japan today operates in a completely different international environment from 10 or 20 years ago. Relations with Russia have deteriorated sharply, the Japan-US alliance has become even more important from a security perspective, and Tokyo increasingly views Russia not only through the prism of bilateral relations but also in the broader context of strategic competition in East Asia.
Therefore, the Japanese government’s reaction is not directed only at Moscow. It is also intended for a domestic audience. Tokyo has to demonstrate to Japanese society that the state is not abandoning its historical position.
— If we look at the situation more broadly, the Kuril dispute has existed for decades and has survived changes of government, international crises and entire eras in Russian-Japanese relations. How is the historical foundation of this dispute perceived in Japan today?
— History carries enormous weight here. Sometimes perhaps too much. For older generations of Japanese, the Northern Territories issue is connected to very specific memories: the end of the war, the loss of homes, the displacement of residents and the severing of human ties. For many Japanese, therefore, this is not an abstract line on a map. It is the history of real families.
The younger generation, however, perceives the situation differently. For a young Japanese person, Iturup is no longer the place from which his or her grandfather’s family was displaced. It is a disputed territory on a map, something they learn about at school or through the media.
And this creates an interesting paradox. The further we move away from 1945, the stronger the political symbolism of the issue becomes, while the direct emotional experience becomes weaker.
Japan’s position is based on a particular interpretation of international agreements and historical documents. The Russian side offers a different interpretation of the outcome of the Second World War. I do not think we can honestly say that one side simply “understands international law” while the other ignores it. In territorial disputes of this kind, legal arguments are almost always intertwined with history and politics.
In my view, therefore, this issue has long ceased to be purely legal. It is about historical memory, national dignity and political identity. And that is precisely why it is so difficult.
— Moscow argues that the Southern Kurils became part of the Soviet Union as a result of the Second World War and that Russian sovereignty over them is grounded in international law. Tokyo, by contrast, continues to regard Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai islets as its “Northern Territories”. Are we now in a situation where both sides speak the language of international law but use it to justify opposite political conclusions? Where, in your view, does the core of this contradiction lie?
— This is exactly where the heart of the problem lies. In international relations, law rarely exists in a vacuum. States interpret documents through their own historical and political perspectives. This is not unique to Russian-Japanese relations.
The Japanese side argues that certain islands were not part of the territory that Japan renounced after the war. The Russian side, meanwhile, argues that the outcome of the Second World War determined the status of these territories and that the question of sovereignty is closed.
Both positions are internally logical from the standpoint of their respective national interpretations.
But there is another problem — a psychological one. To reach an agreement, a state must be prepared to acknowledge at least part of the other side’s argument. Yet when a territorial issue has been presented to society for decades as a matter of national justice, any compromise begins to look like capitulation.
For a Japanese politician to say, “We are abandoning our historical position”, would be extremely dangerous.
For a Russian politician to say, “We are prepared to reconsider the question of sovereignty over Russian territory”, would be practically impossible.
This is why a legal dispute turns into a political trap.
In my view, a way forward may emerge only when the two sides stop focusing exclusively on the question, “Who owns the island?” and begin discussing a broader agenda: security, economic cooperation, the rights of former residents, fisheries, environmental issues and humanitarian contacts.
Sometimes the path towards resolving a territorial conflict begins with a conversation that is not about territory at all.
— There are also more pragmatic voices within Japan’s expert and political community. Some politicians regard Tokyo’s highly emotional reaction as counterproductive, while certain nationalist forces have even suggested using the current crisis as an opportunity to restore contacts with Moscow and move towards a peace treaty. How realistic is such an approach? Could the territorial dispute itself, paradoxically, become a reason for a new dialogue between Russia and Japan?
— I consider this approach more realistic than it may appear at first glance.
Japan and Russia are neighbours. Geography does not change because of sanctions, diplomatic statements or deteriorating political relations. Russia will not disappear from Japan’s map, just as Japan will not disappear from Russia’s.
That is why we need to think in the long term.
At present, it is very difficult in Japanese society to speak about normalising relations with Russia. Following the events of recent years, public attitudes have become considerably more critical. But diplomacy should not depend solely on the mood of the present day.
I would go even further: it is precisely when relations are in poor shape that channels of communication become particularly necessary.
At the same time, I do not believe Moscow and Tokyo can simply return tomorrow to the previous model of negotiations. That would be overly optimistic. We need to start with small steps: humanitarian contacts, fisheries, environmental projects, issues concerning former residents of the islands and academic exchanges.
Such mechanisms will not resolve the territorial dispute, but they can restore a minimum level of trust. And without trust, a peace treaty remains little more than an attractive phrase.
Japanese diplomacy has traditionally valued gradualism. Foreign observers sometimes see this as excessive slowness. But in relations with Russia, slow diplomacy may prove more effective than grand historical declarations.
— And finally, the most fundamental question. Following Putin’s visit to Iturup, Tokyo’s strong reaction and Moscow’s retaliatory statements, should we expect further escalation — stronger sanctions, new diplomatic démarches or an expansion of Japan’s military cooperation with the United States?
— In the short term, I expect relations to deteriorate rather than improve. Tokyo will continue to emphasise its position on the Northern Territories. Moscow will probably respond even more sharply. This is a diplomatic exchange we have seen many times before.
But I do not think this necessarily means an inevitable slide towards direct confrontation.
Japan will continue strengthening security cooperation with the United States and other partners. This is connected not only with Russia but also with the broader situation in East Asia.
However, it would be a mistake to turn every Russian-Japanese dispute into an exclusively military issue.
The greatest danger now is losing the ability to talk. Diplomacy, like human memory, has one unpleasant characteristic: what has been lost is much harder to restore than it is to destroy.
I would like the Japanese government to continue firmly defending its position while at the same time leaving the door open to dialogue. Firmness and dialogue are not opposites.
As for a peace treaty, I do not expect one to be concluded quickly. It is possible that the current generation of politicians will not be able to bring this issue to a final resolution at all.
But diplomacy should not work only for today’s result. It must also preserve room for the next generation.
Perhaps one day Russian and Japanese politicians who today cannot even imagine a compromise will sit at the same table and discover that enough time has passed for them to speak not about who won the dispute, but about how two neighbouring states can live alongside each other in the future.
And if that moment ever comes, today’s diplomacy must ensure that the door leading to it has not been permanently closed.