\t\t\t\tEditor’s note:<\/p>\n
This is the 16th essay of Assessing China\u2019s<\/a>\u00a0\u201cLost in translation: Decoding Chinese strategic narratives\u201d series. The full collection of essays can be found\u00a0here<\/a>.<\/p>\n China-Japan relations have come under renewed strain. Last fall, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told the Diet that a contingency in the Taiwan Strait could amount to a \u201csurvival-threatening situation\u201d for Japan\u2014potentially triggering the conditions for exercising collective self-defense. In the months since, Beijing has responded forcefully, condemning the comments as crossing a political red line, sustaining a steady drumbeat of diplomatic protests, and rolling out a series of punitive economic and political measures against Japan.<\/p>\n To assess the origins, dynamics, and possible trajectories of the current diplomatic impasse, two leading scholars\u2014Professor Akio Takahara of Japan and Professor Ren Xiao of China\u2014were invited to offer parallel analyses from their respective vantage points for the Assessing China Project\u2019s Lost in translation<\/a> series. Their exchange lays bare the profound perception gaps dividing Tokyo and Beijing, while also identifying the conditions under which stabilization might eventually occur. Their exchange follows below:<\/p>\n Akio Takahara<\/p>\n A Japanese perspective<\/p>\n Some say the current state of Japan-China relations is at its worst since their normalization in 1972. Two other comparable cases were 2010 and 2012, when the two countries clashed over the Senkaku\/Diaoyu islands. This time, however, there seems to be some dynamic that makes it difficult for China to change course and let up on Japan.<\/p>\n To begin with, China is misinterpreting Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi\u2019s remarks at the Diet. She did not say that Japan would exercise its right of collective self-defense and protect Taiwan. \u00a0She said the use of force in \u201csurvival-threatening situations\u201d is restricted to a limited exercise of collective self-defense, which means it is strictly permitted only as an unavoidable and minimum necessary measure of self-defense, intended exclusively for the protection of Japan. Nevertheless, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated<\/a> at the Munich Security Conference that her remarks directly challenged China\u2019s sovereignty and that Japan\u2019s ambitions to invade and colonize Taiwan remained unabated. Why did Wang, China\u2019s top expert on Japan, make such a groundless remark?<\/p>\n Xi Jinping possibly was not told the whole content of Takaichi\u2019s statement and was angered by one line: that a Taiwan contingency could turn into a \u201csurvival-threatening situation\u201d for Japan. China then started to cancel almost all the exchanges with the Japanese side, even those of academics, students, sister cities, singers, and top business representatives. The refusal of communication is at an unprecedented level, although the Chinese side used to reflect on the experiences in 2010 and 2012 and say that, whatever happens, mutual exchange should never be stopped again.<\/p>\n Domestic political affairs seem to partially explain why the criticisms and sanctions against Japan have been unusually severe. Just like in 2012, when the Japanese government purchased<\/a> three islets of the Senkaku islands from a private landlord, there is an understanding by some in Beijing that Japan is a lover of the status quo, and that this time, it does not intend to proactively intervene in cross-Strait affairs. However, with Xi enjoying paramount authority, every part of the party-state machinery must express its loyalty by reacting devotedly to his sentiments. Once Xi defines the line, no one can strike a different chord\u2014only amplify it.<\/p>\n China seems to be aiming at pressuring Takaichi, a well-known pro-Taiwan figure, to stay away from cross-Strait issues. China is now super-sensitive to security. It has tightened export restrictions on dual-use products and placed 20 Japanese enterprises and universities on its entity list. Namely, China now regards Japan as a security concern, and that partly explains why Beijing has adopted an especially hostile attitude and attempted to isolate Japan diplomatically.<\/p>\n It is likely that such sensitivity is related to China\u2019s preparations for unification with Taiwan, by force if necessary. Unification is part of the \u201cgreat rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.\u201d It is also strategically important for China to advance into the Pacific Ocean. In an internal speech to People\u2019s Liberation Army Navy officers in 2017, Xi acknowledged China had a disadvantage of being half-contained by the first island chain. If unified with the mainland, Taiwan will prove to be an effective bridgehead. Winning over Taiwan without fighting is ideal. However, in any case, foreign intervention must be prevented\u2014especially from Japan, the former colonizer that today is actually the Taiwanese people\u2019s favorite country<\/a>.<\/p>\n China\u2019s tough measures have angered the Japanese public, which responded by presenting Takaichi with the biggest victory ever for her party in the snap election she called in February. China\u2019s decision to ban group tours to Japan has hurt not only Japanese department stores but also Chinese airlines and tourist businesses. As was the case after Japan released the treated water<\/a> from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the ocean, China eventually should calm its anger and halt its futile protest.<\/p>\n Factors that could facilitate a rapprochement between Japan and China should include, first and foremost, time, as well as developments in the international environment and China\u2019s national economy that increase the benefit of mending relations with Japan, such as a downturn in U.S.-China relations. Takaichi could trigger such a move by, for example, elucidating her China policy in an interview given to some international media. However, since the issue this time is Taiwan, which constitutes the core of Chinese nationalism and is now a foundation of the Chinese Communist Party\u2019s legitimacy and Xi\u2019s legacy, we probably must brace ourselves for rough waters in a lengthy voyage that could last for another year or two.<\/p>\n Ren Xiao<\/p>\n A Chinese perspective<\/p>\n The current diplomatic crisis between China and Japan was caused by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi\u2019s remarks on Taiwan on November 7, 2025, at the Japanese Diet. Japan\u2019s first-ever female prime minister simply said what she truly believed, though she did not have to say so when responding to a question raised by an opposition party minister, Katsuya Okada. Looking back, she could have been more careful and calculating by saying something less explicit. It was unfortunate that Takaichi was not experienced enough as a politician to avoid this outcome.<\/p>\n China\u2019s strong reactions are understandable. For Beijing, the Taiwan question is the core of China\u2019s core interests. It is an utterly principled issue and nonnegotiable. China also resolutely opposes any foreign interference in the Taiwan question. In this sense, Beijing must react strongly. This was reinforced by the Sino-Japanese relationship\u2019s very nature. Given what happened during Imperial Japan\u2019s invasion of China and the Chinese people\u2019s painful historical memory, people in China can easily become emotional when Japan acts in certain ways.<\/p>\n This has repeated again and again over the past four decades. Japanese prime ministers\u2019 visits to the Yasukuni Shrine<\/a> are one example. The 2010 trawler clash<\/a> in the waters off the Diaoyu\/Senkaku islands was another. When the Japanese government announced the so-called \u201cnationalization\u201d of the Diaoyu\/Senkaku islands in 2012, it quickly sank the relationship to the lowest point since the normalization of relations in 1972. In this sense, the China-Japan relationship is fragile and has to be handled with care. It cannot afford repeated flip-flops, to say the least.<\/p>\n For China, given the absolute importance and sensitivity of the Taiwan question, Beijing must not leave any impression of \u201cflexibility\u201d on this particular issue. It wants to be crystal clear that it can pay any price to fight back when challenged by a foreign country. Lithuania\u2019s decision to allow a \u201cTaiwan Representative Office<\/a>\u201d to open is a clear example. Beijing\u2019s unprecedented announcement that it would not deal with the sitting Czech president, Petr Pavel, was also because of his provocation regarding Taiwan and his meeting with the Dalai Lama in India after his visit to Japan. Beijing wants all countries to be convinced of its unshakable position and resolute determination to safeguard its sovereignty over Taiwan. No country should have any doubt on this matter. Through its reactions, Beijing wants Japan\u2014and other countries\u2014to know about this as well. It should not be a surprise that any foreign country\u2019s military involvement in the case of contingency across the Taiwan Strait is absolutely unacceptable to China. Beijing has also called on Takaichi to publicly withdraw her comments on Taiwan, though this may be difficult to realize.<\/p>\n China overtook Japan as the world\u2019s second-largest economy in 2010. Over the years, the balance of power has shifted in China\u2019s favor. Japan remains an important neighboring country for China, yet China is becoming more willing to use the leverage it holds vis-\u00e0-vis Japan, such as rare earth exports. As a result of the recent crisis, many programs have been postponed or even cancelled. The Japan Self-Defense Force soldier\u2019s intrusion into the Chinese Embassy<\/a> in Tokyo further aggravated the negative perception. Moreover, the embassy released travel warnings to Chinese nationals with regard to their planned visits to Japan. In the foreseeable future, the political relationship will remain chilly, which will inevitably affect other aspects of the relationship.<\/p>\n Under those circumstances, it is time for think tankers to play a role. While it may be difficult for the Chinese and Japanese thinkers to get together and exchange views in either China or Japan, it can happen in a third country. The participants can try to make their voices or suggestions heard by their respective countries\u2019 policymakers. At the government level, there are a few things to watch. The indicators of improvement may include whether the leaders of China and Japan will meet face to face on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders\u2019 Meeting, scheduled to be held in November 2026 in Shenzhen, China, and\/or the G20 Summit in December in the United States. Also, the decision of when the China-Japan-South Korea trilateral summit will resume may be another indicator. And surely, a leader\u2019s official visit to the other country at the highest level may be seen as a signal that the relationship is normalizing once again, but it will take some time to happen.<\/p>\n \t\t\tAkio Takahara<\/p>\n I was encouraged by Professor Ren\u2019s idea of dialogue. One serious problem between Japan and China today is the huge perception gap between the two peoples. Their views on the causes of the deterioration in their relations are always very different, largely because of the huge information gap between them. The Japanese and the Chinese should have dialogues at all levels to exchange views and information so that they understand why the other side is thinking differently. This actually was one agreement from the Takaichi-Xi meeting in late October, which I hope the Chinese authorities will remember and implement.<\/p>\n I am hopeful that Takaichi will gain experience in external affairs in due course. The concern is that she, or any Japanese leader, will be driven to take a tough attitude if China continues its strong measures against Japan. The Chinese bureaucracy has a built-in mechanism for \u201cstructural overreaction to the master\u2019s voice\u201d that caused such havoc during the Great Leap Forward and the zero-COVID policy, which is at work again.<\/p>\n As Ren says, the balance of power has shifted in China\u2019s favor, and China seems inclined to leverage its advantage over Japan. But that is a recipe for animosity and distrust that will not serve China\u2019s interests. Based on lessons learned from history, postwar Japan didn\u2019t do that when its power was superior, but rather, earnestly helped China develop. Should we not all benefit from \u201ctaking history as a mirror\u201d? Realistically speaking, the answer should be yes.<\/p>\n Ren Xiao\u00a0<\/p>\n I don\u2019t think the Chinese side misunderstood Takaichi\u2019s statement. Professor Takahara confirms that Takaichi is \u201ca well-known pro-Taiwan figure,\u201d thus it was unsurprising that she said what she believed. There may be some nuances in the statement, and Takahara, as a native Japanese speaker, knows that better than I. However, saying a \u201csurvival-threatening situation\u201d implies Japan\u2019s military involvement in a Taiwan Strait contingency in line with the Japan-U.S. security treaty. That is unmistakable and completely unacceptable to China, which is exactly the message that Beijing wants to convey to the outside world. Beijing is signaling that it would ruthlessly fight back in this kind of situation.<\/p>\n I hope people in Japan become more sophisticated when they deal with issues related to China. Because of Japan\u2019s invasion of China in the 20th century and the unspeakable atrocities committed against the Chinese people, anything like Takaichi\u2019s statement on Taiwan could easily touch upon China\u2019s sensitivities and make people there angry. Unfortunately, since the end of the Second World War, Japan has handled the history issue so badly that it remains unresolved and has repeatedly disrupted Japan-China relations, be they the Yasukuni Shrine visits by Japanese politicians or Taiwan-related words and deeds.<\/p>\n Of course, as the Chinese saying goes, \u201cone palm does not clap.\u201d Yet it is undeniable that Japan\u2019s often ambiguous attitude toward history has been one of the key reasons for the difficulties. For many years, I have tried to figure out why this is the case, but not very successfully. It was often futile to try to convince people in Japan to be more open and unambiguous on history. However, it is feasible that one tries to be more careful and not to provoke anything. That is the nature of the Sino-Japanese relationship, for better or worse.<\/p>\n The Brookings Institution is committed to quality, independence, and impact.
We are supported by a diverse array of funders<\/a>. In line with our values and policies<\/a>, each Brookings publication represents the sole views of its author(s).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Editor’s note: This is the 16th essay of Assessing China\u2019s\u00a0\u201cLost in translation: Decoding Chinese strategic narratives\u201d series. The…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":17864,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[185,784,14155,782,12,785,3025,486,783,779,2900,5194,780,8,14154,33],"class_list":{"0":"post-17863","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-japan","8":"tag-article","9":"tag-asia-the-pacific","10":"tag-assessing-china-examining-chinas-role-in-the-world","11":"tag-center-for-asia-policy-studies","12":"tag-china","13":"tag-commentary","14":"tag-conflict","15":"tag-democracy","16":"tag-foreign-policy","17":"tag-foreign-politics-elections","18":"tag-geopolitics","19":"tag-governance","20":"tag-international-affairs","21":"tag-japan","22":"tag-john-l-thornton-china-center","23":"tag-nihon"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17863","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17863"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/17863\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/17864"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17863"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=17863"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=17863"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}