However, it is critical to sustain momentum for implementation of these plans, given that challenges remain in terms of both domestic institutional changes by each country and bilateral coordination. At the broadest level, there is a need for robust dialogue about the division of roles, missions, and capabilities in the U.S.-Japan alliance and how this will translate into an effective bilateral decisionmaking architecture. Initial plans are important steps in the correct direction, but greater clarity is needed regarding how the new command and control structure will operate in practice. For example, moving operational command authority closer to the front line of the theater is intended to mitigate potential delays associated with having a command in Hawaii, but questions remain about the extent to which the new U.S. Joint Force Headquarters will be empowered vis-\u00e0-vis U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and how exactly the decisionmaking and response process will work in practice.<\/p>\n
The ability of the United States and Japan to expedite response times and facilitate more effective operations across military domains will depend on how well they can integrate their respective decisionmaking architectures, so it is necessary to have both a roadmap and continual consultation about the implementation process. An initial step could be to identify the key missions that will benefit the most from leveraging the integrated assets of both countries and to build the coordination architecture from there. Discussions such as these have traditionally been spearheaded through forums such as the Security Consultative Committee (2+2), which has not met since 2024.10\u00a0Integrating command and control functions sends an important signal about interoperability, which is foundational to strengthening alliance deterrence and response capabilities.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Deterrence and Response Capabilities<\/p>\n
Japan has taken important actions to enhance its defense capabilities in recent years, including boosting its overall level of defense spending to 2 percent of its gross domestic product (see Figure 1) and acquiring a number of new assets, including long-range counterstrike weapons, that augment its deterrence and response capabilities. Notable legal and political constraints remain on the use of such capabilities by Japan, but they serve to bolster U.S. extended deterrence. Under the Trump administration, the United States has repeatedly reaffirmed its commitment to the defense of Japan, using the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear.11\u00a0However, the U.S. government has simultaneously made it clear that it expects allies and partners to do more for their own defense, and its growing military engagement in the Middle East has raised questions about the U.S. capacity to maintain effective extended deterrence in Asia.<\/p>\n
Although investments in defense are positive and necessary developments, there is a risk that the arrival of new capabilities may precede the construction of mechanisms necessary to use these capabilities effectively in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance. For example, in the case of Japan\u2019s new counterstrike capabilities, further discussion is necessary to clarify how they will be integrated with the United States in terms of information sharing, targeting, real-time decisionmaking, and operational division of labor. Similarly, discussions in Japan regarding potential acquisition of next-generation submarines and other exquisite systems sometimes seem to precede serious discussion of the cost and strategic value of these assets.12\u00a0Instead, the goals should lead, and the capabilities should follow. For example, the war in Ukraine has clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of sophisticated systems and the strategic value of low-cost, high-volume assets.<\/p>\n
Similarly, strengthening extended deterrence requires a serious consideration of what the nuclear landscape will look like in 10 years and beyond if the nuclear arsenals of China and North Korea continue to grow. In addition to ongoing efforts such as the U.S.-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue, new initiatives may be necessary to reassure Japan and other allies about U.S. commitments. In contrast to South Korea, where there has been an active public debate about acquiring nuclear weapons, discussion of this topic in Japan has been relatively muted. NATO-style nuclear sharing was briefly debated and generally dismissed in Japan in 2022, but an anonymous quote from a Japanese government official in December 2025 suggesting that Japan should discuss the nuclear option stimulated a debate about potentially revising its three nonnuclear principles.13<\/p>\n
Expectations for Japan\u2019s leadership role will likely continue to increase in the face of multiple security challenges, further amplifying the importance of bilateral coordination on Japan\u2019s plans for acquiring advanced defense capabilities and how these capabilities could be used in specific contingencies. For example, the conflict in Iran has prompted debate about Japan\u2019s legal constraints with respect to the use of military force and the conditions under which Japan could dispatch its Self-Defense Forces to support U.S. operations by exercising collective self-defense based on a series of defense policy reforms instituted in 2015.<\/p>\n
Defense Industrial Base Cooperation<\/p>\n
The Trump administration has identified bolstering the U.S. defense industrial base as a core priority in both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, and it has called upon allies and partners to enhance their own defense industrial bases to strengthen collective self-defense. This is another area where Japan\u2019s strategic direction demonstrates complementarity with U.S. objectives. Japan has been strengthening its own defense industrial base over the past decade, resulting in its most consequential defense sale to date in August 2025 when Japan\u2019s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was selected for a $6.5 billion deal to build warships for the Royal Australian Navy. Under Prime Minister Takaichi, the Japanese government plans to scrap existing restrictions limiting Japan\u2019s defense exports to five nonlethal categories (rescue, transport, reconnaissance, surveillance, and minesweeping) and instead classify defense equipment into two categories (lethal and nonlethal).14 Although there will likely be limitations on the transfer of lethal equipment, the change will enable Japan to deepen security partnerships with the United States and other like-minded countries.<\/p>\n
These trends point to ways that both the United States and Japan can strengthen their respective defense industrial bases while also bolstering their mutual security. For example, at the March 2026 summit in Washington, Prime Minister Takaichi and President Trump agreed to further strengthen alliance deterrence and response capabilities, namely the codevelopment and coproduction of missiles, including scoping Japan\u2019s future role in supporting Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) production capacity and the accelerated production of Standard Missile 3 Block IIA missiles in Japan to bolster missile defense cooperation.15<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"However, it is critical to sustain momentum for implementation of these plans, given that challenges remain in terms…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":23020,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[176],"tags":[177,179,180,178],"class_list":{"0":"post-23019","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-politics","8":"tag-japans-politics","9":"tag-japanese-politics","10":"tag-politics","11":"tag-politics-of-japan"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23019","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=23019"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23019\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/23020"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=23019"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=23019"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=23019"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}