{"id":23370,"date":"2026-05-16T07:34:52","date_gmt":"2026-05-16T07:34:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/23370\/"},"modified":"2026-05-16T07:34:52","modified_gmt":"2026-05-16T07:34:52","slug":"japan-is-moving-to-expand-defense-exports-constitutional-revision-is-a-bigger-ask-the-diplomat","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/23370\/","title":{"rendered":"Japan Is Moving to Expand Defense Exports. Constitutional Revision Is a Bigger Ask. \u2013 The Diplomat"},"content":{"rendered":"

On February 25, a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) panel approved proposed changes to the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology\u2019s implementation guidelines<\/a> that regulate the export of lethal weapons to third-party countries. The changes eliminate a restriction that limited defense exports to rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping equipment. The export of weapons developed with other nations \u2013 like the next-generation fighter jet being jointly developed<\/a> by Italy, Japan, and the U.K. \u2013 to third-party states will now be allowed. Japan may also export to nations engaged in war by government approval under special circumstances.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Defense equipment will be broadly categorized<\/a> into weapons (e.g., tanks, howitzers, destroyers, missiles) and non-weapons (e.g., bulletproof vests, surveillance radars). The export of weapons is only allowed to 17 nations<\/a> with which Japan has defense equipment transfer agreements. These include the United States, other Quad members (Australia and India), European partners for high-tech defense cooperation ( the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden), Southeast Asian partners that Japan has been helping shore up their deterrent capability against China (Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand), and the United Arab Emirates.<\/p>\n

There is no need for Cabinet approval of weapons exports, though the National Security Council<\/a> will consider the appropriateness of weapons to be exported for the first time. For defense equipment categorized as non-weapons<\/a>, the decision will be cleared through working-level consultations within the government.\u00a0<\/p>\n

The ruling coalition will submit the proposal to the government after the party\u2019s internal procedures, and the changes can be implemented without Diet approval. The proposal recommended that the government improve explanations of future exports to the Diet and public, but decided against including any specific role for the Diet in the process.\u00a0<\/p>\n

At a Diet session also on Wednesday, Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae<\/a> stressed the need to promote Japan\u2019s transfer of defense equipment abroad.\u00a0<\/p>\n

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)<\/a>, Japan\u2019s top defense firms\u2019 sales rose 40 percent year-on-year in 2024. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi Electric, and NEC\u2019s combined revenue from arms sales rose to $13.3 billion.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Although the government hopes that lifting the restrictions will increase Japan\u2019s defense exports and technological innovation, there will still be many barriers, including Japanese researchers\u2019 hesitation to conduct research and development for military purposes.<\/p>\n

In addition to revising the defense equipment exports guidelines, Takaichi is determined to revise the Japanese Constitution<\/a>. Following the February 8 election, the LDP has the two-thirds supermajority in the 465-seat lower house that is required to propose a constitutional amendment. Proposing a constitutional amendment would be a hugely symbolic first for Japan, but passing it will be more difficult.<\/p>\n

For a constitutional amendment to pass, it must be approved by a two-thirds supermajority in the lower and upper houses, as well as a majority of voters in a public referendum. In the upper house, the LDP controls only 101 of the 248 seats, and their coalition partner, Nippon Ishin no Kai, has 19 seats \u2013 for a combined 48 percent of the upper house seats.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Whether a constitutional amendment passes \u2013 and who supports it \u2013 will depend on the specifics of the amendments proposed. During the campaigning, Takaichi focused on amending the constitution to specify the status of the Self-Defense Forces<\/a>.<\/p>\n

There is growing desire among the political class to revise the constitution. Since 2003, the Asahi Shimbun and University of Tokyo<\/a> have conducted surveys of the winners of the upper house and lower house elections. This year, 430 of the 465 winning candidates responded for a response rate of 92.5 percent.\u00a0<\/p>\n

And 93 percent of the winners of the February 8 election \u201csupport\u201d or \u201csomewhat support\u201d the statement that \u201cthe current Constitution needs to be revised.\u201d This is a new record, and a marked increase from 67 percent of successful candidates in the 2024 election. <\/p>\n

However, as the figure below shows, support changes dramatically depending on what revisions are proposed. Overall, 80 percent of the winners from this election cycle agreed with the need to \u201cexplicitly state the existence of the Self-Defense Forces\u201d in the constitution, an increase from 51 percent in 2024. But support varies by party.<\/p>\n

\ufeff<\/p>\n

Other proposed constitutional amendments include: extending lawmakers\u2019 terms during emergencies (64 percent of all respondents), improving education (39 percent), allowing Cabinet orders to function as laws during emergencies (34 percent), stipulating each prefecture have at least one upper house representative (34 percent), explicitly stating that Japan possesses the right of collective self-defense (22 percent), strengthening local government authority (18 percent), creating a new provision on environmental rights (18 percent), and restricting the prime minister\u2019s authority to dissolve the lower house (12 percent).\u00a0<\/p>\n

An amendment cannot realistically be proposed until at least the next upper house election in 2028. To reiterate, whether the constitution is amended at that point in the future will depend on heavily on the specific issues that are raised for amendment. Though there is a cluster of amendments related to security and emergencies, likely reflecting growing concerns about China, support for the other amendments vary widely by party.<\/p>\n

In short, though there is a lot of excitement about constitutional revision, it is likely to be a slow-moving process. The relaxation of rules governing Japan\u2019s defense exports, by contrast, is all but set.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"On February 25, a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) panel approved proposed changes to the Three Principles on Transfer…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":23371,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[176],"tags":[374,8,9671,18471,18472,8997,18473,18474,177,179,180,178,18475],"class_list":{"0":"post-23370","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-politics","8":"tag-east-asia","9":"tag-japan","10":"tag-japan-constitution","11":"tag-japan-constitutional-amendment","12":"tag-japan-defense-exports","13":"tag-japan-defense-industry","14":"tag-japan-security-policy","15":"tag-japan-security-reform","16":"tag-japans-politics","17":"tag-japanese-politics","18":"tag-politics","19":"tag-politics-of-japan","20":"tag-three-principles-on-arms-exports"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23370","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=23370"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23370\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/23371"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=23370"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=23370"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=23370"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}