On October 4, 2025, Japan\u2019s ruling Liberal Democratic Party will elect a new party president, following Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba\u2019s decision earlier this month to step down.<\/p>\n
While\u00a0five LDP members<\/a>\u00a0have entered the race, the contest is effectively a battle between two key figures: Sanae Takaichi and Shinjiro Koizumi, who lead substantially in comparison to the others, according to recent polls.<\/p>\n Although they belong to the same party, the two candidates represent sharply contrasting visions for Japan\u2019s future. One risks returning the country to the era of \u201crevolving door\u201d premierships that plagued earlier decades, while the other could push Japan into a deeper ideological confrontation and trigger a \u201crace to the bottom\u201d with the country\u2019s rising alt-right movement.<\/p>\n The outcome of this leadership election will therefore shape not only the LDP\u2019s future but also Japan\u2019s political trajectory for years to come.<\/p>\n Polarizing Takaichi threatens to shift Japan farther right<\/p>\n A nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Japanese newspaper Mainichi Shimbun on September 20-21 found that Takaichi was leading all candidates with 25% of the votes.<\/p>\n Takaichi is a well-known but highly controversial politician who has been a mainstay within the LDP for a number of years. Her status as an\u00a0extreme right-wing individua<\/a>l<\/a>, even within the LDP, and her associated policy stances raise concerns about the potential for heightened political and economic uncertainty.<\/p>\n The LDP\u2019s declining fortunes in\u00a0recent elections<\/a>, particularly in the upper house, have partly been driven by voter defections from its conservative base to hard-right parties such as\u00a0Sanseito<\/a>. These voters, dissatisfied with what they see as the party\u2019s abandonment of \u201cconservative values\u201d since the Abe era, have sought more uncompromising alternatives.<\/p>\n Many within the LDP believe that installing Takaichi as leader could win these voters back. Her controversial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines Japan\u2019s war dead as well as Class-A war criminals, and her openly anti-foreigner rhetoric are in line with these disgruntled voters\u2019 desires.<\/p>\n However, such notions operate under the potentially flawed assumption that Japanese voters are fickle and will easily forgive the LDP for its growing list of corruption scandals if Takaichi is elected. This assumption risks underestimating voters\u2019 anger and overestimating their ideological loyalty.<\/p>\n In reality, Takaichi is more likely to find herself competing directly with Sanseito and opposition parties by amplifying their key messages, particularly those related to immigration and national identity.<\/p>\n We have already seen\u00a0early signs<\/a>\u00a0that this is occurring, as evident in Takaichi\u2019s remarks at press conferences on the campaign trail. During these sessions, Takaichi has taken a\u00a0hawkish stance<\/a>\u00a0toward concerns about over-tourism by saying that \u201cJapanese people are extremely tolerant, so everyone is swallowing their words\u201d regardig foreign-related issues. Takaichi has promised to mitigate this threat by revising immigration policies \u201cfrom scratch.\u201d<\/p>\n However, if the LDP adopts policies that mirror those of Sanseito \u2013 centered on anti-immigration sentiment, populist rhetoric and anti-establishment posturing \u2013 it risks entering a downward spiral of seeing which party can be more extreme.<\/p>\n Sanseito is unlikely to relinquish its newly acquired electoral gains easily and will likely double down on its increased wage, anti-immigration and anti-establishment rhetoric. In turn, Takaichi, who has shown little hesitation in positioning herself as the party\u2019s most hardline voice, could find herself continuously escalating her policy promises, in order to stay ahead of the far-right.<\/p>\n This tit-for-tat cycle threatens to undermine one of Takaichi\u2019s central pledges to revitalize Japan\u2019s economy. Takaichi is running on\u00a0claims<\/a>\u00a0that she stands \u201chere today to lead Japan back to the pinnacle of the world\u201d and that \u201cI will resolutely pursue economic growth.\u201d<\/p>\n Takaichi has shown signs that her premiership will likely shift back to the Shinzo Abe-style policies of old, given her close relations with the former prime minister and his allies, such as former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.<\/p>\n However, Abenomics\u2019 success rests on the\u00a0three arrows<\/a>\u00a0of 1) aggressive monetary policy, 2) flexible fiscal policy, and 3) structural reforms. Any hawkish immigration policies would be likely to impact its success negatively. In particular, the first and third arrows would be hindered by her heightened anti-immigration sentiment.<\/p>\n Abe\u2019s third structural reform arrow aims to, among other things, boost labor force participation by creating jobs via infrastructure projects funded through the first arrow and encouraging underutilized sections of society to participate in the workforce. Yet Japan\u2019s working-age population made up only 59% of Japan\u2019s population in 2024, according to data released by the\u00a0Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications<\/a>. This is far lower than the\u00a065%<\/a>\u00a0Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average.<\/p>\n As such, Tokyo would be unable to rely purely on the domestic workforce to staff these projects fully. Therefore, without immigration to supplement the labor force, Japan would struggle to execute large-scale projects or meet the demands of Takaichi\u2019s structural reforms. The result could be stalled infrastructure plans, spiralling costs and delayed economic initiatives, all of which would weaken the effectiveness of Abenomics 2.0 at addressing Japan\u2019s current economic concerns.<\/p>\n The scenario above could result in higher government spending and an even more burdensome debt-to-GDP ratio. It could threaten a deflationary spiral and stagnating wage growth. All that would feed into public frustration. Such frustrations would likely be particularly palpable among younger voters, who are already disillusioned with the LDP.<\/p>\n Therefore, far from stabilizing the party\u2019s position, a Takaichi premiership could accelerate its decline and deepen the fragmentation of Japan\u2019s political landscape.<\/p>\n Limited leadership experience could thwart Koizumi\u2019s economic policies<\/p>\n A Koizumi premiership presents a different outlook. The 44-year-old, two-time cabinet minister is the son of a former prime minister and has been groomed his entire life for leadership. Despite his having failed in his previous attempt to become Japan\u2019s prime minister, his renewed campaign has seen him secure a 21% approval rating during the aforementioned\u00a0Mainichi Shimbun<\/a>\u00a0poll.<\/p>\n While Koizumi is also an\u00a0advocate<\/a>\u00a0of reimplementing Abe-style economic policies, his more progressive view mitigates the economic uncertainty that a Takaichi premiership would present. In contrast to Takaichi, Koizumi has said that \u201cJapan\u2019s economy is in a transition phase from deflation to inflation\u201d and that Tokyo\u2019s economic policy should also reflect this change.<\/p>\n One of his key policy\u00a0promises<\/a>\u00a0is to ensure that wage growth accelerates \u201cat a pace exceeding inflation, so consumption becomes a drive of growth.\u201d While Koizumi has not given overtly concrete details on how he plans to achieve this goal, some clues may be found in his foreign policy agenda.<\/p>\n Koizumi has distanced himself from more conservative LDP traditions, such as visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. This decision has kept the door open for him to advocate for the continuation of Tokyo\u2019s current foreign policy stance on US-Japan relations and deepening economic cooperation with neighboring countries, such as South Korea.<\/p>\n In the case of South Korea, relations with Japan hit a\u00a0tipping point in 2019<\/a>\u00a0after South Korea initiated an informal trade ban on Japanese goods in response to disputes linked to Japanese colonial occupation of Korea. However, relations between the two countries have softened in recent years, opening the door for a more progressive Prime Minister Koizumi to initiate deeper economic cooperation with liberal South Korean President Lee Jae Myung.<\/p>\n The deepening of economic ties with countries such as South Korea would likely be in pursuit of his\u00a0goal<\/a>\u00a0of enhancing Japan\u2019s domestic supply and production capabilities, expanding exports of agricultural, forestry,and fisheries products and increasing security cooperation with like-minded countries.\u00a0<\/p>\n Despite these ambitions, Koizumi\u2019s political history and shortcomings present the risk he would become a lame duck prime minister, similar to Yoshihide Suga. Chief among these shortcomings is his relative inexperience and lack of political success in the cabinet positions he has held. Despite his being a two-time minister, his outspokenness has caused concerns amongst Japan\u2019s business elites. More specifically, his\u00a0comments<\/a>\u00a0about making the fight against climate change \u201ccool\u201d and \u201csexy\u201d led Japan\u2019s voters and businesses to believe he was still too inexperienced to take on important governmental roles.<\/p>\n As such, there is a heightened risk that both Koizumi\u2019s lack of actual leadership experience and the perceptions surrounding him will limit his ability to implement his policies under a minority government. While Koizumi seems to aim to mitigate these concerns by calling for \u201cbroad policy discussions\u201d with opposition parties, parties such as Sanseito are unlikely to heed his calls. Indeed, Koizumi\u2019s status as a legacy politician runs counter to parties such as Sanseito\u2019s anti-establishment messaging, limiting their willingness to engage in fruitful policy discussions.<\/p>\n Japan at a political crossroads<\/p>\n As the LDP prepares to choose its next leader, the contrast between Takaichi and Koizumi reflects a deeper crossroads for Japan\u2019s political future. A Takaichi premiership risks dragging Japan into an escalating ideological contest that seeks short-term populist gains over long-term economic resilience and diplomatic stability. By contrast, a Koizumi-led government could sign a continuation of the status quo by taking a more moderate policy path, focusing on wage growth, foreign cooperation and the continuation of pragmatic economic policies.<\/p>\n Yet success via the Koizumi path is not guaranteed. His limited governing experience, occasional missteps, and reputation as a legacy politician risk undermining his authority among opposition parties.<\/p>\n Ultimately, the choice facing the LDP, and by extension Japan, is whether to pursue a politics of competition and confrontation under Takaichi or one of cooperation and renewal under Koizumi. The outcome will shape not only the party\u2019s fortunes but also Japan\u2019s role on the global stage, its ability to navigate demographic and economic challenges and the health of its democracy in the decades to come.<\/p>\n