{"id":56988,"date":"2026-07-12T12:44:07","date_gmt":"2026-07-12T12:44:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/56988\/"},"modified":"2026-07-12T12:44:07","modified_gmt":"2026-07-12T12:44:07","slug":"russian-spies-exploit-japan-as-transit-hub-to-send-military-components-to-russia-ukraine-news","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/56988\/","title":{"rendered":"Russian spies exploit Japan as transit hub to send military components to Russia | Ukraine news"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"font-style:italic;font-weight:500;font-size:18px;line-height:1.5\">Investigations point to organized networks obtaining Japanese parts and routing them through third countries. Tokyo\u2019s weak legal framework hampers rapid countermeasures.<\/p>\n<p>Russian spies are accelerating the transshipment from Japan of components for the Russian army, using the country as an important transit hub. The main reason cited is Japan\u2019s lax espionage-related legislation combined with the country\u2019s strong technological base.<\/p>\n<p>According to Western intelligence, government documents, and sources in several countries, after the start of Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, dozens of Russian intelligence officers who had been expelled from various territories relocated to Japan. In Tokyo, a division of the GRU military intelligence operates \u2013 the so-called 20th Directorate.<\/p>\n<p>Sources say that spies pose as diplomats or businessmen, buy or steal components that are then shipped through third countries to Russia. The operation is led by 49-year-old Maxim Filchenkov, who operates under cover as an employee of the Russian airline Aeroflot and is responsible for sourcing equipment.<\/p>\n<p>Also a network of intermediary companies is used to deliver goods to the Russian Federation. One of these companies is the Japanese Proco Air, which positions itself as a bridge between Japan and Russia. The company states that it transports only permitted goods.<\/p>\n<p>According to Ukrainian authorities, about 90% of Russia\u2019s missiles and drones contain Japanese components. Thus, after the Russian strike on a residential building in Kyiv in May, investigators found a Japanese computer module in an X-101 missile, which had been banned from export to Russia.<\/p>\n<p>Ukraine has repeatedly provided Japan with evidence that its components are used in Russian weapons. At the same time, Tokyo, while supporting Ukraine, reacts more slowly to the threat due to its own legislation  \u2013  Japan does not have a separate foreign intelligence service.<\/p>\n<p>Transit Chronology and Japan\u2019s Role in Deliveries<\/p>\n<p>An operations center in Tokyo coordinates the procurement of equipment, which is then routed through third countries to Russia. Such actions undermine not only regional security but also international efforts to control exports of high-tech products.<\/p>\n<p>Consequences and Responses of Countries<\/p>\n<p>Military and intelligence circles emphasize that the transit of Japanese components has become a serious challenge to global security. Experts advise strengthening coordination among allies, improving mechanisms for controlling exports of sensitive technologies, and increasing transparency in intelligence gathering and inter-country cooperation.<\/p>\n<p>Substantive conclusions point to the need for greater attention to the laws regulating espionage and export controls, in order to reduce Japan\u2019s use as a transit hub for deliveries of defense equipment and to prevent the leakage of critically important components.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Investigations point to organized networks obtaining Japanese parts and routing them through third countries. Tokyo\u2019s weak legal framework&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":56989,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3343,37399,8,37400,37398,37401,173,33,37402],"class_list":["post-56988","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-japan","tag-export-controls","tag-gru-operations","tag-japan","tag-japan-transit","tag-japan-transit-russian-espionage-military-components-gru-operations-export-controls","tag-military-components","tag-news","tag-nihon","tag-russian-espionage"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/56988","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=56988"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/56988\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/56989"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=56988"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=56988"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/japan\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=56988"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}