\n\tThe \u201cIndia-Japan joint declaration\u201d, issued during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to India during July 2-3, used a new formulation to define the partnership between the two countries. The \u201cstrategic salience\u201d of the partnership had been enhanced, it said, in \u201can increasingly volatile and uncertain geopolitical environment\u201d.<\/p>\n
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\n\tThis followed Takaichi\u2019s remarks in an article she wrote for the Times of India on the eve of her visit: \u201cOne of the areas I attach particular importance to is the strengthening of the strategic relationship between our countries. I wish to deepen cooperation in the field of security and strengthen our capacity to navigate the uncertain international landscape.\u201d<\/p>\n
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\n\tWhile there have been earlier references to a \u201ccommon strategic outlook\u201d, the latest formulation reflects a higher degree of strategic convergence and links this to the deteriorating geopolitical environment.<\/p>\n
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\n\tThe Joint Declaration also uses language that had applied to the ascendant phase of Indo-United States relations until recently \u2014 that of being \u201cnatural allies\u201d:<\/p>\n
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\n\t\u201cIndia and Japan are natural and indispensable partners in their efforts to realize their respective national interests.\u201d<\/p>\n
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\n\tRhetorically at least the leaders (Takaichi and Prime Minister Narendra Modi) of the two countries are signalling that there is a much higher and arguably an unprecedented level of strategic convergence between them, and that translates into a broad spectrum of bilateral cooperation, including cooperation in sensitive domains.<\/p>\n
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\n\tTo appreciate the range and depth of cooperation already in place and envisaged for the future, one should consider the outcome documents of two annual summits \u2014 the 16th, which is the latest, and the 15th. Several points of a political consensus and key decisions taken at the previous summit, when Modi visited Tokyo in August last year, were reaffirmed and expanded upon during Takaichi\u2019s visit. In some respects, the 15th summit was more consequential. It was, for the first time, much more pointed in identifying China, though not so far by name, as the main security challenge for both countries in the Indo-Pacific, and in expressing their opposition to its unilateral actions that endangered the safety and the freedom of navigation and overflights and its attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. There was also a reference to the \u201cmilitarization of disputed features\u201d. These were repeated in the latest Joint Declaration.\u00a0 The common threat from China is now clearly a major driver of the India-Japan partnership and their leaders are no longer inhibited in acknowledging this. Japan is deeply concerned about the recent signs of accommodation between the United States (US) and China. This casts doubts on the credibility of US commitment to the defence of its Asian allies. So is India but, not being an ally, it is less impacted.<\/p>\n
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\n\tOne could argue that it is not only China that is driving the closer India-Japan partnership. The unreliability and unpredictability of the US as an Indo-Pacific security anchor is a contributing factor though this is not articulated explicitly.<\/p>\n
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\n\tIndia pursued a policy of goodwill and support to Japan in the early post-Second World War years, when it was relatively isolated as a defeated power and which suffered US military occupation till 1952. It was an Indian judge, Radha Binode Pal, who delivered a dissenting judgment at the Tokyo War Crimes trial in 1948, exonerating Japanese military officers of war crimes. His memory is revered in Japan to this day. Jawaharlal Nehru, as Prime Minister, was the first world leader to visit Hiroshima in 1957 and criticise the loss of life and destruction caused by the use of nuclear weapons against a hapless population. Indian cotton led to the revival of Japan\u2019s war-ravaged textile industry. But the Cold War and the transformation of Japan into a treaty ally of the US in 1951 created a widening distance between the two countries. When the US established a de facto alliance with China in 1971 to oppose the Soviet Union, Japan, like other US allies, followed suit in establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing and becoming a major aid donor, investor and technology provider to China. There is little doubt that Japan\u2019s capital and technology played a significant role in the emergence of China as a major economic power.<\/p>\n
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\n\tUp until the end of the Cold War in 1991, India hardly ever entered Tokyo\u2019s scheme of things. The only relationship which seemed to define India-Japan relations during these years was the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), which Japan extended to India regularly. India\u2019s refusal to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was a constant irritant.<\/p>\n
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\n\tJapan had its brief moment in the sun in the 1980s, when it emerged as a frontranking manufacturing and trading power. The imposition of the Plaza Accord by the US in 1985 led to the appreciation of the Japanese yen by 50 per cent. In order to stay competitive, Japanese companies began to invest massively in other countries, and Southeast Asia and China were the chief beneficiaries. The more labour-intensive segments of Japanese industry began to migrate to these countries. Japan assumed the role of the principal driver of economic growth in Asia. The late Saburo Okita, who was an economist and Japanese foreign minister, popularised the well-known \u201cflying geese theory of development\u201d, with Japanese investment triggering growth in stages to a second layer and a third layer of Asian countries. South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong belonged to the first layer benefiting from a large flow of Japanese capital and technology, followed by Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. Japan was described as the leading goose, followed in a staggered formation by the other geese in Asia. China was also a major beneficiary of Japanese outward flows, and capital and technology but was not included in the hierarchical \u201cflying geese\u201d formation. It was regarded as a separate category in its own right. There was no interest in India. In a conversation this writer had in 1987 with Okita, the latter was dismissive of India as an investment destination, claiming that its culture of doing business was very different from the rest of Asia. He added that for Japan Asia stopped at the borders of Myanmar, and Asia, thus defined, would remain its principal political and economic theatre. It is remarkable that within two decades, a Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, would stand in the Indian Parliament in 2007 and speak of the \u201cconfluence\u201d of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and India\u2019s centrality in this Indo-Pacific space.<\/p>\n
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\n\tBut Japan\u2019s moment in the sun in the 1980s was shortlived. To prevent the loss of competitiveness due to the high yen, the central bank cut interest rates, flooding cheap money into the economy, which led to a massive asset bubble. When this speculative bubble collapsed in 1990, Japan entered a prolonged period of deflation, which it has still not been able to fully recover from. From constituting 18 per cent of the global economy in 1994, Japan\u2019s share has consistently gone down and is now 3-4 per cent, about the same as India.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
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\n\tJapanese perceptions of India began changing when the latter adopted economic reforms and liberalisation in 1991-92 and announced its \u201cLook East policy\u201d in 1992. But its priority to China never diminished. India remained an afterthought. Like other Asian countries, Japan sought economic benefits through a closer economic relationship with China, while continuing to rely on US security assurances. It is this \u201chave-your-cake-and-eat-it-too\u201d syndrome which is no longer sustainable. Economic reliance on China has now become an acute vulnerability and it is in this context that India becomes a partner in Japan\u2019s search for economic security and a hedge against Chinese power and US unreliability.<\/p>\n
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\n\tThe transformation in India-Japan relations is most visible in their defence and security ties. During the 15th summit last year, a joint declaration on security cooperation was issued. Compared to a similar declaration adopted in 2008, the latest version reflects a much more extensive and deeper bilateral cooperation in defence and security.<\/p>\n
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\n\tThe 2008 document and its Action Plan adopted in 2009 put in place a number of consultative and dialogue mechanisms between the defence and security establishments of the two countries. In contrast, the 2025 Declaration has a number of significant operational elements. The objective now is to \u201ccontribute to each other\u2019s defense capabilities and readiness, by promoting inter-operability and synergy between their defense forces …\u201d<\/p>\n
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\n\tThe relationship has moved from consultation to collaboration.<\/p>\n
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\n\tIndia\u2019s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Japan\u2019s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) are engaged in the co-development and co-production of defence platforms. The first joint project is the Unified Complex Radio Antenna (UNICORN), a stealth communication system for ships, which will be manufactured by Bharat Electronics. The two countries are also discussing the acquisition of Japan\u2019s advanced US-2 amphibian aircraft.<\/p>\n
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\n\tJapan is the only foreign country that has been allowed to undertake projects in India\u2019s Northeast, a sensitive area, and in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. It has been engaged in developing cross-border infrastructure in the Northeast and transforming the offshore islands into \u201csmart islands\u201d, with advanced port handling and communication facilities. China has expressed concern over Japanese involvement in both these areas.<\/p>\n
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\n\tThe documents released during the visit referred to the ongoing cooperation between them as partners in the Quadrilateral (Quad), composed of the US, Australia, Japan and India. These include critical supply chains, strategic minerals, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing. Japan is also a participating member of the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region, which is in Gurugram. It provides round-the-clock maritime domain awareness in the Indian Ocean. This is part of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Marine Domain Awareness, under the Quad. During the latest visit, the two countries also adopted \u201cdeclarations\u201d \u2014 on \u201ceconomic security\u201d and on \u201ccooperation in artificial intelligence\u201d. Another agreement relates to cooperation on energy security, including on the maintenance of strategic petroleum reserves. While these are ambitious in scope, there are doubts over India\u2019s capacity to deliver on its side of the bargain. The record shows that it is defence and security cooperation, driven as it is by a shared concern over China, which may yield the most tangible results.<\/p>\n
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\n\tTakaichi brought a large and influential business delegation with her and the two prime ministers addressed the India-Japan Business Forum. Despite the high-level political commitment on both sides and a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (Cepa) already existing between the two countries, the level of economic and commercial engagement remains modest. Bilateral trade is only $27 billion and cumulative Japanese investment in India stands at $48 billion.<\/p>\n
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\n\tTakaichi\u2019s visit resulted in 16 landmark outcomes, the important ones relating to AI, semiconductors and a commitment to promote Japanese investment of $62 billion in India over the next 10 years. Memorandums of understanding \u2014 129 of them in all \u2014 were signed between Indian and Japanese companies during the visit. How many of these projections materialise remains a question.<\/p>\n
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\n\tTakaichi\u2019s first visit to India as Prime Minister took place against the background of heightened tensions between Japan and China. The Japanese leader had made a statement in her country\u2019s Parliament on November 7 last year that a naval blockade of Taiwan would create an \u201cexistential crisis\u201d for Japan, and under Japan\u2019s current peace and security laws it (the blockade) would permit Japanese military forces to take action in collective self-defence. There was a fierce reaction from China and demands that Takaichi withdraw her remarks. This she has refused to do and Japan has been subjected to an array of punitive commercial measures, including restrictions on the supply of rare earths and metals.\u00a0 Chinese naval manoeuvres around the disputed Senkaku islands have increased. Instead of supporting its treaty ally, US President Donald Trump has asked the Japanese leader to avoid provoking the Chinese, lest his d\u00e9tente with his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, be affected. The impressive outcome of Takaichi\u2019s visit owes much to Chinese aggressiveness.<\/p>\n
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\n\tThe visit has been followed by Modi\u2019s own series of visits to Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. One may discern a clear trend of key Indo-Pacific countries responding to Chinese assertiveness and US unreliability by strengthening security and economic cooperation among themselves. India is emerging as a key player in this coalition building.<\/p>\n
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\n\t(The author is a former foreign secretary (2004-06). Views expressed are personal)<\/p>\n
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