\u00a0A Theoretical Scaffold\u00a0<\/p>\n
\u00a0Three bodies of work help clarify the stakes. The first is\u00a0hedging\u00a0theory.\u00a0Author\u00a0Kuik Cheng\u2011Chwee\u00a0distinguishes<\/a>\u00a0hedging from balancing and band-wagoning by its deliberate ambiguity. Kuik, along with\u00a0scholars\u00a0J\u00fcrgen\u00a0Haacke<\/a>\u00a0and John D.\u00a0Ciorciari<\/a>, further argues that hedging spans a spectrum from \u201crisk\u2011contingency\u201d behavior,\u00a0insurance against low\u2011probability but high\u2011cost shocks,\u00a0to \u201creturn\u2011maximizing\u201d behavior, which is opportunistic diversification. Japan courting T\u00fcrkiye, within the continental\u2011connectivity logic\u00a0The Hudson\u00a0piece\u00a0outlines<\/a>, fits the latter: a bet on Eurasian corridor economics, not a hedge against U.S. abandonment.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0Secondly, the alliance security dilemma matters.\u00a0Researcher\u00a0Glenn Snyder\u2019s framework holds that allies constantly navigate fear of abandonment and fear of entrapment. For India, the risk is not that Japan abandons its alliance commitments, but that India becomes entangled indirectly. If Japan\u2019s connectivity partnership with T\u00fcrkiye deepens while T\u00fcrkiye\u00a0maintains\u00a0commitments<\/a>\u00a0to Pakistan,\u00a0defense\u00a0sales,\u00a0and\u00a0organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) positions on Kashmir,\u00a0India absorbs diplomatic externalities it did not generate and cannot easily price out. This is not entrapment in Snyder\u2019s original sense of being pulled into war; it is a softer but real version.\u00a0It is\u00a0reputational\u00a0and diplomatic drag transmitted through a third party.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0A third lens is the shift from hub\u2011and\u2011spokes to lattice architectures in Asian security.\u00a0Scholars\u00a0Michael Green, Daniel Twining<\/a>, and\u00a0Matteo Dian<\/a>\u00a0describe how the old American model of bilateral spokes is giving way to overlapping mini\u00a0lateral and bilateral ties. A\u00a0lattice<\/a>\u00a0is more resilient because redundancy and multiple pathways reduce dependence on a single node. But that resilience only holds if the strands are compatible. A Japan\u2011T\u00fcrkiye strand and an India\u2011Japan strand can coexist only if T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s other commitments do not corrode the trust the India\u2011Japan strand depends on.\u00a0Snyder<\/a>\u00a0and Victor\u00a0Cha<\/a>\u00a0both emphasize that compatibility of interests is foundational to alliance networking.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0Why Japan\u2019s\u00a0Transactionalism\u00a0Is Not the Problem\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0Japanese mercantile realism<\/a>, articulated by\u00a0researchers\u00a0Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels, explains why a Japan\u2011T\u00fcrkiye relationship is less risky than it appears. Japan\u2019s post\u2011war strategy has consistently\u00a0prioritized<\/a>\u00a0economic statecraft and technological leverage over ideological alignment. A T\u00fcrkiye partnership based on Eurasian connectivity and chokepoint economics is therefore shallow, transactional, and revisable. This logic underpins Japan\u2019s simultaneous engagement with Gulf states, China, and India without requiring\u00a0exclusivity. Because such commitments are elastic, Japan can recalibrate them if they begin to generate friction with higher\u2011priority partners such as India.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0Why T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s Non\u2011Transactionalism\u00a0Is the Actual Variable\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0The friction arises not from Japan\u2019s hedging but from the nature of the partner Japan may hedge toward. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s foreign policy under the\u00a0Justice and Development Party (AKP)\u00a0has been interpreted by\u00a0Ibrahim Kalin<\/a>\u00a0and scholars like\u00a0M. Hakan Yavuz<\/a>\u00a0through\u00a0a\u00a0neo\u2011Ottomanism\u00a0and strategic autonomy\u00a0lens\u00a0which\u00a0emphasizes\u00a0civilizational identity, Islamic leadership, and independent great\u2011power aspirations. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s\u00a0ties<\/a>\u00a0with Pakistan, expressed through\u00a0OIC solidarity<\/a>\u00a0and positions on Kashmir, are embedded in a normative framework costlier to revise than commercial relationships. In hedging\u2011theory terms, T\u00fcrkiye is a less suitable hedging partner because its commitments are identity\u2011anchored rather than return\u2011maximizing. Japan\u2019s transactional elasticity thus meets T\u00fcrkiye\u2019s strategic rigidity, and that rigidity can\u00a0transmit\u00a0across Japan\u2019s wider network,\u00a0including to India.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0Implications for Indo\u2011Pacific Architecture\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0If Japan deepens continental ties with T\u00fcrkiye, the consequence is not a rupture in the U.S.\u2013Japan alliance but a geographic bifurcation of Japan\u2019s strategic\u00a0focus,\u00a0\u00a0a\u00a0maritime Indo\u2011Pacific pillar anchored in the Quad, and a continental Eurasian\u2011connectivity pillar spanning Central Asia, the Caucasus, and T\u00fcrkiye. These tracks are not inherently incompatible, but they compete for Japan\u2019s finite diplomatic, industrial, and financial resources. That competition reduces the incentive to close the asymmetry in the India\u2011Japan relationship by elevating India from a developmental and manufacturing partner to a truly co\u2011equal strategic one.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0India\u2013Greece as the Assured Tier: An Ontological\u2011Security Argument\u00a0<\/p>\n Rather than contest Japan\u2019s choices, India should strengthen partnerships less vulnerable to transmitted strategic risk. Here, the constructivist concept of ontological security\u00a0as\u00a0developed by\u00a0scholars\u00a0Jennifer Mitzen<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Brent Steele<\/a>\u00a0is more useful than pure interest calculation. Ontological security concerns a state\u2019s need for a stable sense of identity and role; partnerships grounded in mutual recognition are therefore more durable than those based solely on shifting interests.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0India and Greece exemplify this on three counts. First, threat\u2011perception symmetry, for example\u00a0Greece\u2019s\u00a0concerns<\/a>\u00a0over Turkish revisionism and India\u2019s\u00a0concerns<\/a>\u00a0over Pakistani revisionism\u00a0which are\u00a0reinforced by Turkish support, are structurally parallel, creating durable strategic empathy. Second, institutional embeddedness, such as\u00a0Greece\u2019s\u00a0position<\/a>\u00a0within the EU\u2019s Common Security and Defense Policy and NATO providing\u00a0India indirect access to emerging European strategic\u2011autonomy debates. Third, low normative overhead,\u00a0unlike India\u2011Japan\u00a0ties<\/a>, which\u00a0retain\u00a0developmental asymmetries, or India\u2011T\u00fcrkiye\u00a0ties<\/a>.\u00a0The Pakistan and Kashmir issue and\u00a0India\u2011Greece\u00a0burden these\u00a0as\u00a0cooperation<\/a>\u00a0begins from a comparatively clean slate. In hedging terms, this is identity\u2011congruent alignment,\u00a0a stable foundation within India\u2019s diversification portfolio amid the more elastic, transactional relationships partners such as Japan will continue to pursue.\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0Conclusion: An Asymmetric Hedging Thesis\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0The argument is not that Japan is drifting from India or that T\u00fcrkiye is inherently problematic, but that transactional hedges can\u00a0transmit\u00a0risk when linked to partners with identity\u2011anchored commitments. India should interpret Japan\u2019s engagement with T\u00fcrkiye through the same multi\u2011alignment lens it applies to its own diplomacy. At the same time, it should treat the India\u2011Greece partnership as the stable anchor of its diversification strategy, grounded in ontological security and institutional embeddedness rather than relationships that may shift with changing strategic priorities.\u00a0<\/p>\n Dr. Yashwant Singh is a sociologist, served as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at GITAM (Deemed to be) University, Bengaluru Campus, Bengaluru, Karnataka, India. He holds an M.Phil. in Sociology from the University of Delhi and a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Hyderabad, India. His writings have appeared on several digital platforms, including\u00a0South\u00a0Asia Journal, Modern Diplomacy, World Geostrategic\u00a0Insights,\u00a0and\u00a0IA-Forum.\u00a0The views of the author are his own.\u00a0<\/p>\n
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