Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s disclosure recently that Russia is seeking as many as 30,000 additional North Korean troops — nearly triple Pyongyang’s earlier troop commitment — should not be read simply as another data point in a grinding European war.
Rather, it should be seen as a warning shot for the Indo-Pacific as well. According to Zelenskyy, preparations to welcome the incoming contingent commenced in June in the Russian Voronezh area. Additionally, he claimed that North Korea is planning to deliver additional ballistic missile launchers to support Russian operations. If accurate, this will represent the largest increase in collaboration between Russia and North Korea beyond mere battlefield troops.
How should we read these moves? There has been ongoing debate among officials and analysts for three years about whether Europe and the Indo-Pacific are truly “interconnected theaters,” or if this description is an exaggeration. North Korea’s preparation for deployment to Russia should end the discussion.
When one authoritarian state at war provides troops and munitions to another warring authoritarian state in exchange for technical expertise (in areas such as missile guidance, submarine technologies, satellites and combat experience), then those two regions are not only interrelated in conceptually rhetorical terms. In fact, they are linked on many levels — hardware, personnel and strategic objectives.
There appear to be numerous examples of what North Korea gets in return for assisting Russia. As reported, since 2022, Pyongyang has received military and technological support from Moscow and presumably gained battlefield experience for its military units while working with Russian forces. Furthermore, an estimated 2,000 to 2,300 of Kim Jong Un’s soldiers were reportedly killed in battle with Ukraine.
Those numbers do not consider the wounded or missing-in-action personnel. Regardless of those statistics, Kim’s troops returned home with valuable combat experience fighting Western-made weapons, NATO-style tactics and drone warfare. Such experiential knowledge cannot be replicated regardless of domestic training exercises. Moreover, combined with the possibility of Russian assistance improving North Korea’s ability to accurately guide its missiles or improve its satellite reconnaissance capabilities or submarine-launched ballistic missile programs, the strategic calculus for Tokyo, Seoul and Washington’s other regional allies shifts dramatically.
It is for this reason that Zelenskyy’s assertion that the danger is “not only to Ukraine,” warrants serious consideration from leaders in the Indo-Pacific — not solely from Kyiv and Brussels. A bolstered and potentially better equipped North Korea with battle-hardened troops and enhanced military technology presents a direct threat multiplier against U.S. allies and partners throughout the Indo-Pacific at exactly the time when Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang are collaborating in ways that appeared unthinkable a decade ago.
All of this has changed the game. The older assumption that Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security could be treated separately — each requiring distinct international organizations and strategies — no longer holds true.
However, instead of panicking in response to this new reality, there should be deliberate institutional action. The Indo-Pacific “IP4” partner countries — comprised of Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand — have strengthened ties with NATO due to the realization by these four governments that decisions made in relation to Euro-Atlantic security have direct implications for the Indo-Pacific. These countries (Japan and Korea in particular) need to transition their summit-level participation into meaningful intelligence-sharing about Russian-North Korea military cooperation specifically — including troop movements; technology exchanges; ballistic missile testing activity; and logistical supply lines which support these activities.
It is also equally vital that Indo-Pacific allies listen more intently to Ukraine. As previously stated, Ukraine possesses an unparalleled opportunity to provide intelligence to Indo-Pacific countries about North Korean troops, tactics, equipment and more, due to Ukraine’s extensive operational experience fighting them. Ukrainian assessments regarding North Korean unit performance, morale and communication provide invaluable insight into how North Korea might operate within a regional contingency or on the Korean Peninsula supported by Russia.
Therefore, structured dialogue between Ukrainian officials and Indo-Pacific security planners will allow countries that do not possess this same firsthand experience access to information related to North Korea/Russian military collaborations. The next step is to formalize the ad hoc processes used to date. That includes developing joint intelligence scrutinizing North Korea/Russian technology exchanges, jointly issuing statements naming the linkages between the two more explicitly, and establishing a permanent channel whereby Ukrainian experts may share their experiences and knowledge with Indo-Pacific defense planners.
The overall trajectory between Russia and North Korea is clear. It represents a shift that forces recognition that the linkages between European and Indo-Pacific theaters are no longer abstract concepts, but real security risks that overlap and intersect in complex ways.
Jonathan Berkshire Miller is principal of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory and senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.