South Korea’s Unification Minister Chung Dong-young declared at a press briefing on July 23 that the Lee Jae-myung administration has abandoned the previous government’s policy of demanding North Korean denuclearization first―the so-called CVID (complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement) standard―in favor of a “peace first” approach.
He went so far as to claim that “even the superpowers, the United States and China, have effectively abandoned the demand that North Korea denuclearize first.”
There is truth to this. During his visit to Pyongyang in June, Chinese President Xi Jinping made no mention whatsoever of the nuclear issue.
Even US President Donald Trump, who has openly stated that the ultimate goal of the strikes on Iran was to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons, has shown a striking tolerance toward North Korea’s arsenal.
Beijing Reassesses Pyongyang’s Value
There is a reason China has stopped raising the issue of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Following Xi’s visit to Pyongyang in June, Beijing appears to be fundamentally reconsidering its North Korea policy. This may stem from a reassessment within the Chinese government of North Korea’s troop deployment to Russia.
Initially, China neither openly endorsed nor criticized the move, feigning ignorance by claiming it “was not aware of any such deployment.”
Beijing likely judged that the deployment signaled an expansion of the war, and that North Korea’s deepening military ties with Russia would ultimately harm China’s own geopolitical interests.
The estrangement between China and North Korea appears to have given way to renewed closeness around the time of last September’s commemoration of the anniversary of victory over Japan in World War II.
It seems Beijing has come to recognize anew the value of a North Korea whose founding generation fought alongside it against Japan. China may well view North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as a useful instrument for holding in check what it calls Japan’s “new militarism.”
North Korea also possesses several natural deep-water ports along its eastern coast, which faces the Sea of Japan. In the event of a Taiwan contingency, China may seek to use North Korea to provoke Japan―and may even find use for North Korean ports.
Signs of Russian Submarine Assistance
China is not the only power emboldening North Korea. According to a Bloomberg report dated August 7, Kim Jong Un has amassed a massive $22 billion in foreign currency by evading sanctions. While this figure requires further verification, a former senior North Korean official has suggested that the profits Pyongyang has reaped from aiding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are difficult to even estimate.
With China and Russia increasingly shielding Pyongyang at the Security Council, the United Nations has become constrained in its ability to condemn North Korea, let alone press for its denuclearization.
Kim is exploiting this opening to press ahead, unrelenting, with the reinforcement of his nuclear forces. Even as he expands his stockpile of nuclear warheads at an exponential rate, he has unveiled new destroyers as well as an 8,700-ton nuclear-powered strategic guided-missile submarine currently under construction.
US and South Korean intelligence authorities appear to believe that North Korea is likely receiving submarine technology assistance from Russia, a view referenced at an August press briefing by South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense.
CNN reported this past May that in December 2024, a Russian-flagged cargo ship carrying components for two small nuclear reactors intended for submarines sank near Spain while en route to North Korea.
Should North Korea come to possess nuclear-powered submarines, it would be a nightmare scenario for both Japan and South Korea.
Yet Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, maintains that the North Korean nuclear issue is a matter that has already been settled, according to a record of the June Extended Deterrence Dialogue between Japan and the United States.
China, too, while publicly listing “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” as one of the pillars of its Korean Peninsula policy, has quietly begun taking an ambiguous stance behind the scenes even as it continues to support North Korea. Yet when it comes to Japan’s own nuclear question, Beijing reacts with what can only be described as hysteria.
In January of this year, a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Commerce stated plainly that Beijing’s strict controls on rare earth exports to Japanese companies were aimed at “blocking Japan’s remilitarization and its scheme to possess nuclear weapons.”
Japan has not even begun a substantive domestic debate on the matter, yet China has already accused it of “scheming to possess nuclear weapons”―a clear sign of just how wary Beijing is of any prospect of Japan acquiring nuclear arms.
One of the main reasons for China’s absolute opposition to Japan possessing nuclear weapons stems from a simple calculation: if Japan were to go nuclear, South Korea, and eventually Taiwan, would follow suit.
That, in turn, would make unification with Taiwan―a cherished ambition and what Beijing calls a “core national interest”―far more difficult to achieve, and would cost China its hegemonic standing in East Asia.
Do What China and Russia Fear Most
If Japan has an effective way to break through this difficult situation, it is to do precisely what China and Russia fear most. In other words, Japan should declare that if China and Russia continue to tolerate North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons, it will have no choice but to revisit its own nuclear policy.
Jeong Seong-jang, deputy director of South Korea’s Sejong Institute, who advocates for “simultaneous nuclear armament by Japan and South Korea,” argues that if the two countries were to move together, neither the international community nor the United States would be in a position to object.
This author has likewise long argued that if China and Russia continue to tolerate North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, Japan and South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons in the same quantity as North Korea―and pledge that both would disarm the moment North Korea does.
The argument for simultaneous nuclear armament by Japan and South Korea is no mere fantasy. It carries real practical significance. It would have the effect of pressuring China into seriously working toward North Korea’s denuclearization.
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, speaking at this year’s Hiroshima Peace Memorial Ceremony, stated that “our country upholds the Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” while also acknowledging, in Diet testimony last November, that these principles are not a matter of formal “national policy.”
The question of what Japan should do about nuclear weapons is not one that allows for leisurely deliberation. What is required of Japan now is a bold and fundamental solution.
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(Read the article in Japanese.)
Author: Sotetsu Lee
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