Several recent changes to North Korea’s constitution, which the Supreme People’s Assembly adopted in March, have raised eyebrows and promoted considerable speculation and debate. The changes delete four articles from the previous version and amend 64 others.

Three amended articles in particular have attracted attention both in Seoul and internationally. The first change deletes all references to the reunification efforts of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Il — respectively Kim’s grandfather and father. It adds “national interest protection as an unwavering principle” to North Korea’s existing principles of “independence, peace and friendship.”

The new addition reflects Kim’s approach to foreign policy that increasingly balances the country’s longstanding dependence upon China with increasingly close ties to Russia.

The second change drops all previous references to “wartime pacification,” a staple of previous constitutions that were issued during the regimes of Kim’s father and grandfather and that envisaged reunification of the Korean peninsula based on common ethnicity. Instead, a 2024 amendment to the constitution termed South Korea a “hostile state” and dropped reunification as a North Korean objective.

The 2026 amended constitution reflects that view. It says nothing about unification and simply identifies the Republic of Korea as a separate state on its southern border and adds that North Korea “absolutely does not permit any encroachment upon its territory.”

The third change redefines Kim’s formal position as President of the State Affairs Commission from “Supreme Leader” to “Head of State.” For the first time, Kim is formally placed before the Supreme People’s Assembly in the order of state institutions. The amendment also transfers from the president of the assembly’s Standing Committee to Kim personally the authority to receive credentials and letters of recall from foreign ambassadors.  The change reflects the longstanding reality that only Kim, like his predecessors, represents the state.

The same amendment includes other changes that solidify Kim’s longstanding role as the country’s unchallenged leader. It specifies that only Kim, as president of the State Affairs Commission, can appoint or dismiss key officials, including the chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly and its deputies, as well as the premier of the Cabinet. Previously these powers had been assigned to the Supreme People’s Assembly.

The amendment deletes the provision that would have the president answerable to the Supreme People’s Assembly and removes the Assembly’s authority to recall the president. It grants Kim the ability to veto the Assembly’s decisions. Most importantly, for the first time, it not only codifies Kim’s leadership of the armed forces, but also it explicitly stipulates Kim’s sole authority over the use of nuclear weapons without reference to any other government body.

Changes in constitutional language can mean very little. The 1936 Soviet constitution, formulated under Stalin’s leadership went further than any similar document in its extensive guarantees of civil rights that did not at all exist in practice. Even as the Kremlin released this document, Stalin was launching what became known as the Great Terror, which resulted in the death of millions.

On the other hand, the language in the constitution that codifies Kim’s power, and especially his taking sole control of North Korea’s expanding nuclear weapons program with no checks on his decision-making, is far from meaningless. Simply stated, it increases the risk of a nuclear crisis. As a senior South Korean analyst has put it, “nuclear weapons are no longer simply a deterrent against the United States or a bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations. They are now an offensive instrument … with a lowered threshold for use.”

Moreover, North Korea has drawn upon its experience negotiating with the U.S. to advise Tehran how to manage its own talks with Washington. As a South Korean official indicated to me last week, North Korea is telling the Iranians, “No matter what, tell the USA that you will not give up nuclear weapons … the U.S. [negotiators] underestimate how much you can sacrifice the people’s life by having nuclear weapons. … Cheating the USA will be the first priority, easy to cheat.”

Not surprisingly, Seoul is evaluating the implications of the North’s constitutional amendments. Sung-lac Wi, South Korea’s national security advisor, informed me earlier this week that “we do take into account North Korea’s Constitution with notable revisions. It is my government’s position that we will continue to consistently pursue policies for peaceful co-existence on the Korean Peninsula.”

Whether the North also intends to pursue peaceful coexistence, having designated the South as a “hostile state,” and especially in light of its reported advice to Iran on negotiations with the U.S., is very much an open question. For that reason, and to ensure that Kim does not employ his nuclear arsenal pre-emptively, Washington’s commitment to South Korea’s security must remain ironclad.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.

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