Overview

Despite decades of diplomatic efforts and shifting policy, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) has continued to expand its nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities. The policy tools that the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) have relied upon across multiple administrations have failed to halt, let alone reverse, this trajectory. The geopolitical landscape has grown considerably more complex since the last major period of U.S.-DPRK leader-level diplomacy, with North Korea’s deepening strategic partnership with Russia, intensification of U.S.-China strategic competition, the codification of North Korea’s nuclear status in a revised constitution, and its growing array of conventional, cyber, and missile capabilities.

Against this backdrop, the Asia Society Policy Institute, through the Korea Foundation-Mia & Spencer Kim Endowment, convened a private roundtable to examine the future of North Korea policy on May 28, 2026. The discussion ranged across the prospects for renewed diplomacy, the evolving military balance on the Korean Peninsula, the role of China and Russia, U.S. institutional capacity, and the long-term risk of nuclear proliferation.

Main TakeawaysThe strategic environment in 2026 differs fundamentally from the previous era of U.S.-DPRK leader-to-leader engagement in 2017–2018. Pyongyang has codified a “two-state” policy in its revised constitution, renouncing peaceful unification and designating South Korea a hostile foreign state. The regime has steadfastly refused to engage with Seoul. Combined with its deepened relationship with Moscow and advanced cyber capabilities, North Korea’s leverage over Washington and Seoul has increased substantially, and the incentives for Pyongyang to return to denuclearization talks have diminished accordingly.North Korea’s new constitution and desire for two-state recognition may open the door for limited diplomatic engagement, but Washington needs to identify what it wants to discuss if denuclearization is not on the table. Washington’s inability to achieve clarity on its own endgame has been a failure for six administrations. In contrast, Pyongyang’s objectives remain clear: recognition as a nuclear weapons state and relief from sanctions.North Korea’s battlefield experience in Ukraine is reshaping its military doctrine. Participants noted a discernible shift in the DPRK’s five-year military modernization plan toward modern warfare concepts, naval expansion, and electronic warfare. Lessons absorbed from the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East are feeding operational sophistication back to the DPRK.Geopolitical circumstances are working against negotiations. All P5 signatories are engaged in nuclear expansion, and a proliferation cascade is already underway in the Indo-Pacific. Erosion of confidence in U.S. extended deterrence commitments is visible in the domestic political debates in both Japan and South Korea. Any deal that accepts a nuclear North Korea without a reconfigured and credible set of assurances risks accelerating a trend that has already begun.Structural Drivers 

There are several structural factors shaping the plausibility of U.S.-DPRK nuclear negotiations in President Trump’s second term. First, Trump retains his desire to pursue high-profile nuclear diplomacy as an unfinished piece of his first-term agenda. Ukraine was not solved on day one as promised and Trump’s war with Iran has not resulted in regime change or major concessions from Tehran, leaving nuclear diplomacy with North Korea the next big opportunity for his “Nobel Prize push.” Kim Jong Un knows this, but the conditions that made the 2017–2018 summits possible have largely dissipated. A Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and the DPRK has provided Kim with economic assistance, diplomatic cover, and military technology assistance, giving him considerably less reason to accept meaningful concessions on denuclearization.

North Korea’s revised constitution, which codifies a two-state policy of the Peninsula and enshrines the country’s nuclear status, may paradoxically open a narrow diplomatic window. If Kim is seeking formal international recognition, that could provide a basis for limited engagement—though participants urged caution about what such a negotiation would entail and how Seoul would respond to Washington engaging Pyongyang on these terms.

Inhibiting such engagement is the fact that U.S. institutional capacity for sustained North Korea diplomacy is severely degraded. Normal channels of policy coordination have broken down, strategic planning functions within the National Security Council (NSC) have atrophied, and Congress is abdicating its oversight role. These structural deficits will constrain any administration’s ability to conduct effective negotiations. Pyongyang recognizes this and is therefore skeptical of the ability of the U.S. to sign deals that last beyond one presidential term.

The Military Balance

The DPRK’s conventional military competence has grown meaningfully through its deployment of soldiers to support Russian operations in Ukraine. North Korea is also drawing lessons from the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East about the nature of modern warfare: magazine depth and the attrition of cheap munitions matter more than expensive ballistic missiles, targeting intelligence is decisive, and the rules-based order governing armed conflict is increasingly contested.

Questions were raised about what “victory” looks like from Pyongyang’s perspective, and participants agreed that mirroring Western assumptions about warfighting onto North Korea’s strategic calculus may lead to flawed assessments. The resilience of weaker states against large adversaries in recent conflicts may have emboldened Pyongyang’s confidence in its deterrence posture.

Participants also raised concerns about allied resource allocation. Washington is already being forced to make difficult trade-off decisions across Ukraine, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East: military personnel, naval assets, and parts of THAAD have been moved from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East. Meanwhile, South Korea’s own procurement decisions—namely its pursuit of nuclear-powered attack submarines—were questioned in terms of their utility for a conflict on the Peninsula.

China, Russia, and Regional Dynamics

China’s relationship with North Korea has grown more complicated in recent years, as Beijing is visibly uncomfortable with the degree of intimacy between Pyongyang and Moscow. Participants noted that China is losing influence on North Korea, leaving it less able to shape DPRK behavior.

Russia has filled the vacuum left by China’s more ambivalent posture, providing North Korea with a more responsive partnership. Participants flagged the emergence of a broader alignment: in February, North Korea joined Russia, Belarus, Iran and Myanmar in signing a joint statement pledging to develop a new security framework for the Eurasian region. A participant noted a recent case of a Yakuza member caught smuggling nuclear material from Myanmar to Iran, raising concerns about networks of state and non-state actors leveraging this burgeoning alignment for proliferation purposes.

Beyond this, a regional arms race is already underway. Erosion of confidence in U.S. extended deterrence commitments is visible in the domestic political debates in both Japan and South Korea. Any deal that accepts a nuclear North Korea without a reconfigured and credible set of assurance commitments risks accelerating this buildup. Furthermore, P5 countries are expanding their nuclear arsenals, and, in the next handful of years, China will be approaching the U.S. in terms of the size of its nuclear weapons arsenal. Participants noted that the U.S. currently has no conception of how to manage trilateral nuclear stability and that any future negotiations with North Korea need to grapple with the China factor.

Policy Recommendations

Participants converged on the conclusion that resuming traditional denuclearization-focused negotiations is highly unlikely in the near term. Russia and China have essentially declared their acceptance of the DPRK as a nuclear state and, of the original parties to the Six-Party Talks, Japan is the only country that continues to publicly commit to denuclearization as an operational goal. Washington and Seoul will need to come to terms with this reality and reconcile it with their North Korea strategy.

North Korea has the government and Track II contacts it needs to reach out when it wants to negotiate. The question is how to compress its timeline and get Pyongyang back to the table. Sanctions can be an effective lever if enforced rigorously, though participants noted that U.S. sanctions were porous and largely inconsequential for much of the Obama administration. U.S.-ROK exercises remain a tool of pressure on Pyongyang’s system, and sabotage operations targeting the North Korean economy remain on the table.

In terms of what would force the U.S.’ hand in restarting negotiations, internal unrest, cyber heists targeting assets connected to the president or close allies, or any movement to proliferate nuclear materials abroad, were identified as potential triggers for a sharp change in U.S. policy.

Alliance prioritization and restoration were identified as preconditions for any diplomatic initiative. Washington and Seoul need to align on OPCON transfer, extended deterrence architecture, and institutionalized trilateral coordination with Tokyo. Confidence in U.S. commitments is the foundation on which any regional diplomatic structure must rest. If that foundation is uncertain, the risk of a proliferation cascade will continue to grow across Japan, South Korea, and beyond.

Participants expressed skepticism that progress on negotiations with North Korea will be made in Washington over the next two years, yet they emphasized the importance of retaining strategic patience without fatalism. The United States, South Korea, and their allies retain tools like sanctions enforcement, military pressure, and alliance investment that can affect Pyongyang’s calculus. The question is when the political will and capacity will emerge in both Washington and Seoul to strategically employ these levers.