A conventional narrative holds that China–North Korea relations have declined as Russia–North Korea ties deepened. However, this view mischaracterizes the Russia–North Korea partnership as the cause of weakening China–North Korea relations. In fact, the dynamic may be running in the opposite direction: Pyongyang’s frustration with Beijing likely preceded and motivated its efforts to strengthen ties with Moscow as an alternative.
First, at the bilateral level, Beijing appears to have increased economic pressure on North Korea. In 2023, Chinese authorities began cracking down on Chinese vessels illegally fishing in North Korean waters, a practice Beijing had tolerated for years.3 These vessels paid access fees to Pyongyang, suggesting that fishing rights constituted a meaningful source of foreign currency earnings for North Korea. China’s crackdown therefore likely disrupted a steady revenue stream for the regime. Beijing also restricted imports of North Korean seafood, further tightening economic enforcement against Pyongyang.4 Similarly, China’s Ministry of Commerce has intensified inspections aimed at preventing illegal ship-to-ship oil transfers to North Korea in or near Chinese waters, which often involve Chinese, Russian, and third-country vessels.5 In 2024, Chinese authorities confiscated smuggled goods and seized North Korean speedboats used for maritime smuggling.6 China is also believed to have pressured Pyongyang to recall its overseas workers en masse, although North Korea reportedly preferred a gradual withdrawal, as these workers generate valuable foreign currency.7
At the trilateral level, China has appeared less committed to its relationship with North Korea than Russia has. Table 1 summarizes major developments in North Korea–Russia relations alongside periods of relatively cool China — North Korea relations. From Pyongyang’s perspective, Russia seems to place greater value on strategic cooperation with North Korea than China does. This contrast was most vividly illustrated during the 70th Armistice Anniversary in Pyongyang in July 2023. China sent Li Hongzhong, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, while Russia dispatched Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. The disparity in rank was widely interpreted as signaling Beijing’s lower degree of strategic prioritization.8
In addition, while Russia has consistently defended North Korea’s position in the United Nations, China’s diplomatic support has been more limited. Most notably, in 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explicitly stated that Moscow “respects” North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and “understands” the rationale behind its nuclear development.9 By contrast, Beijing has avoided statement that could be interpreted as recognizing or legitimizing Pyongyang’s nuclear status.
These developments raise an important question: why did China adopt a more distant posture toward Pyongyang throughout 2023 and 2024? Notably, the cooling of China–North Korea ties coincided with a period in which Beijing expanded high-level dialogue with the United States.10 For China, North Korea is not merely a bilateral issue but also a variable — and often times a source of friction — in China’s broader relationship with the West. Following the summit between President Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden at the APEC Leaders’ meeting in November 2023, Beijing appeared determined to stabilize U.S.–China relations in order to minimize further strain on the Chinese economy.11 China has likewise sought to preserve economic exchanges with European countries, as access to European markets, technology, investment, and export destinations remains important for sustaining China’s economic growth amid rising strategic competition with the United States.12 In this context, North Korea’s belligerent behavior became a liability for China’s efforts to stabilize relations with the West.
Western scrutiny of China’s enforcement of sanctions on North Korea also increased during this period, complicating Beijing’s efforts to stabilize relations with the United States and Europe. In November 2023, U.S. ambassadors and their counterparts at the United Nations — including the EU envoy — sent a letter to China expressing concern over satellite imagery showing oil tankers in Chinese ports and territorial waters in violation of sanctions on North Korea.13 Beijing responded with its usual claim that it “strictly implements sanctions and fulfills international obligations.”14 To sustain credibility, however, Beijing needed to ensure that its actions matched its rhetoric, prompting intensified crackdowns on illicit activities linked to North Korea. As noted above, Beijing strengthened sanctions enforcement against North Korea by tightening controls on illicit oil transfers, fishing activities, and North Korean labor arrangements, thereby exposing the growing divergence between Chinese and North Korean interests.15
From North Korea’s perspective, China’s distancing was likely particularly painful in the post-COVID era. The North Korean economy had already been severely strained by the triple shock of international sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and chronic economic mismanagement. Compared to 2016, North Korea’s exports fell by 94.3% and its imports by 61.5% in 2022.16 At a time when Pyongyang urgently needed external support, China moved in the opposite direction and intensified sanctions enforcement. Uncertain about Beijing’s intentions, North Korea turned to Russia for economic assistance, diplomatic backing, and military cooperation. Yet the closer North Korea aligns with Russia, the more likely China may tighten its enforcement measures — creating a vicious cycle of growing divergence and mistrust between Beijing and Pyongyang.
China’s ambivalent stance toward Russia–North Korea military cooperation is likely to have further deepened Pyongyang’s distrust of Beijing. In 2024, rather than promoting trilateral coordination with Russia and North Korea, Beijing resumed a trilateral summit with South Korea and Japan after a five-year suspension.17 Notably, on the same day that President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang in June 2024, Beijing held a security dialogue with Seoul.18 From the perspectives of both Pyongyang and Moscow, such moves may have reinforced doubts about China’s willingness to deepen their military cooperation. It would not be surprising if Moscow shared a similar sense of frustration regarding Beijing’s apparent preference to keep its distance.