{"id":11023,"date":"2026-05-10T10:04:06","date_gmt":"2026-05-10T10:04:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/11023\/"},"modified":"2026-05-10T10:04:06","modified_gmt":"2026-05-10T10:04:06","slug":"north-korea-revises-constitution-mandates-automatic-nuclear-strike-if-kim-jong-un-is-assassinated-report","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/11023\/","title":{"rendered":"North Korea Revises Constitution, Mandates Automatic Nuclear Strike If Kim Jong Un is Assassinated: Report"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>\t\t\t\t\t11<\/p>\n<p>North Korea has reportedly made sweeping changes to its constitution, introducing a highly escalatory clause that calls for an automatic nuclear response if Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un is assassinated or the country\u2019s nuclear command system is threatened, according to multiple reports.<\/p>\n<p>If Kim Jong Un Is Killed, Nuclear Strike Would Be Triggered Instantly<\/p>\n<p>The revised framework is said to include a chilling clause: if Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un is assassinated or killed in an external attack, North Korea would respond with an immediate nuclear strike, with no delay in execution.<\/p>\n<p>Legal Clause Details Automatic Nuclear Launch Mechanism<\/p>\n<p>The updated provision reportedly states: \u201cIf the command-and-control system over the state\u2019s nuclear forces is placed in danger by hostile forces\u2019 attacks \u2026 a nuclear strike shall be launched automatically and immediately,\u201d as part of Article 3 of North Korea\u2019s nuclear policy law.<\/p>\n<p>\n                                You Might Be Interested In<\/p>\n<p>New Doctrine Targets \u201cDecapitation Strike\u201d Threats<\/p>\n<p>The policy appears designed to deter so-called \u201cdecapitation strikes\u201d\u2014military operations aimed at eliminating top leadership to destabilise the regime. The move signals Pyongyang\u2019s intent to ensure any such attempt triggers catastrophic retaliation.<\/p>\n<p>Nuclear Command System Given Faster, Centralised Response Powers<\/p>\n<p>The constitutional update reportedly strengthens North Korea\u2019s nuclear command-and-control structure, enabling rapid decision-making during emergencies and tightening the leadership\u2019s direct control over nuclear forces.<\/p>\n<p>Broader Constitutional Changes Accompany Nuclear Clause<\/p>\n<p>The nuclear policy shift comes alongside broader constitutional revisions, including the removal of references to Korean reunification, strengthened territorial definitions of the DPRK, and a further emphasis on nuclear deterrence as a core element of national policy. Reports also indicate a shift in framing that treats North and South Korea as separate states.<\/p>\n<p>(The information is based on inputs from agencies)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"11 North Korea has reportedly made sweeping changes to its constitution, introducing a highly escalatory clause that calls&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":11024,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[8324,8325,141,31,5280,34,4425,8326,8327,8328],"class_list":["post-11023","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-north-korea","tag-asia-news","tag-dprk-news","tag-kim-jong-un","tag-korea","tag-korean-peninsula","tag-north-korea","tag-north-korea-constitution","tag-north-korea-update","tag-nuclear-deterrence","tag-nuclear-policy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11023","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11023"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11023\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/11024"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11023"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11023"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11023"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}