These developments would become particularly perilous when paired with uncertainty\u00a0regarding\u00a0how the United States would respond to North Korea\u2019s limited use of nuclear weapons and\u00a0a\u00a0simultaneous dual contingency<\/a>\u00a0involving China and North Korea. Consequently, the central challenge facing South Korea extends beyond deterring an all-out nuclear attack. It must also\u00a0ensure\u00a0Pyongyang does not conclude that limited nuclear use\u00a0is\u00a0controllable, survivable, or politically successful.\u00a0<\/p>\n A larger nuclear inventory affords greater operational flexibility to North Korea. While a small nuclear stockpile would have to be preserved for regime survival and strategic retaliation, a much larger arsenal would enable Pyongyang to\u00a0allocate\u00a0a subset of\u00a0warheads to American targets, others to Japan, and still others to South Korean military targets. North Korea could reach the tipping point when Kim Jong-un believes he\u00a0possesses\u00a0sufficient nuclear capacity to use them for tactical purposes while preserving a survivable nuclear reserve to deter further escalation.\u00a0<\/p>\n To achieve doctrinal legitimacy for early use of nuclear weapons, North Korea\u2019s 2022 nuclear doctrine authorizes the use of nuclear weapons not only in response to a nuclear attack but also when the leadership, nuclear command structure, or valuable strategic targets are threatened. Pyongyang could argue that a South Korean attack against its missile bases, command centers, and underground facilities is an attempt to neutralize North Korea\u2019s nuclear deterrent. In that case, a tactical nuclear strike could be portrayed as a defensive measure to halt allied operations and\u00a0terminate\u00a0Western aggression.\u00a0<\/p>\n This creates a dangerous interaction with South Korea\u2019s\u00a0Three-Axis System<\/a>. The\u00a0Kill Chain<\/a>\u00a0is intended to destroy North Korean launchers and command facilities before missiles are fired.\u00a0Korean Air and Missile Defense<\/a>\u00a0(KAMD) is intended to intercept the remaining missiles, and\u00a0Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation<\/a>\u00a0(KMPR) is intended to pose a threat to the North Korean leadership.\u00a0From Pyongyang\u2019s perspective,\u00a0these strikes\u00a0may\u00a0be interpreted as an\u00a0integrated operation aimed at destroying North Korea\u2019s nuclear forces and decapitating its leadership. Ironically,\u00a0increased\u00a0South Korean preemptive-strike capability\u00a0may result\u00a0in\u00a0\u00a0greater\u00a0North Korea\u2019s incentive to disperse authority, shorten decision times, and launch its forces before they could be destroyed.\u00a0<\/p>\n North Korea\u2019s\u00a0lessons learned from the Russo-Ukrainian war<\/a>\u00a0could make this posture even more dangerous. Russia has repeatedly combined or integrated\u00a0drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles<\/a>\u00a0with other measures. North Korea could\u00a0apply<\/a>\u00a0similar methods on the Korean Peninsula. Beginning with cyberattacks and GPS jamming, followed by reconnaissance drones toward missile-defense batteries, airfields, ports, and command centers. An\u00a0additional\u00a0wave could include decoys, one-way attack drones, low-altitude cruise missiles, ballistic missiles including\u00a0KN-23<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0KN-24<\/a>, and hypersonic systems.\u00a0<\/p>\n Nuclear-tipped missiles could be mixed with conventionally armed weapons\u00a0to\u00a0generate attack uncertainty\u00a0like\u00a0a \u201chaystack attack.\u201d South Korean operators might not be able to discern which incoming objects are decoys, which carry conventional warheads, and which are armed with nuclear warheads. As a result, Seoul would be compelled to consume\u00a0their stock of\u00a0interceptors against\u00a0numerous\u00a0targets. North Korea does not need hundreds of drones to neutralize the KAMD. It would instead need drones that could damage radar, communications vehicles, generators, reloading systems, or command hubs long enough for ballistic missiles to penetrate successfully.\u00a0<\/p>\n The\u00a0Atlantic Council\u2019s Guardian Tiger tabletop exercises<\/a>\u00a0explicitly revealed\u00a0this\u00a0problem. In one scenario, North Korea employed a low-yield nuclear weapon against ROK Navy facilities. In response, the United States chose to conduct strong conventional strike operations instead of opting for nuclear retaliation, partially because of concerns about escalation with China.\u00a0<\/p>\n
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