{"id":124976,"date":"2026-08-19T14:13:07","date_gmt":"2026-08-19T14:13:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/124976\/"},"modified":"2026-08-19T14:13:07","modified_gmt":"2026-08-19T14:13:07","slug":"why-kim-jong-un-is-terrified-of-peace-with-south-korea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/124976\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Kim Jong Un is terrified of peace with South Korea"},"content":{"rendered":"

South Korea<\/a> is once again extending a hand to North Korea<\/a>. Messages advocating the resumption of dialogue, the lowering of military tensions, and a path toward peaceful coexistence are being repeated.<\/p>\n

The current administration has formalized a policy centered on respecting the North\u2019s regime<\/a>, pursuing no unification by absorption, and committing to no hostile acts. Recently, Seoul even sought diplomatic space through third countries, with Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto revealing a request from President Lee Jae-myung to help mediate. Yet, North Korea is surprisingly refusing to take the hand. Instead, Pyongyang is explicitly widening the distance.<\/p>\n

Last February, during the 9th Congress of the Workers\u2019 Party, Kim Jong Un<\/a> signaled a complete rejection of Seoul\u2019s outreach, stating North Korea has nothing to do with the South. This highlights today\u2019s most fundamental inter-Korean dilemma: While Seoul attempts to reopen ties, Pyongyang is defining the relationship in a fundamentally different way. Failing to grasp this risks misinterpreting North Korea\u2019s silence as mere temporary frustration with a specific South Korean administration. Over the past few years, North Korea has fundamentally altered how it conceptualizes the South.<\/p>\n

In the past, even while denouncing South Korea, Pyongyang used terms like \u201ccompatriots\u201d or \u201cthe same bloodline.\u201d The logic of a single nation destined for unification was a core rhetorical tool. Today, that vocabulary is rapidly vanishing. North Korea now defines the South not as a special intra-national bond, but as a hostile, separate state. Institutionalized by constitutional<\/a> amendments in 2026, this \u201ctwo hostile states\u201d theory is no longer mere rhetoric; it is the central framework for Pyongyang\u2019s policy.<\/p>\n

This critical transformation fundamentally shifts the meaning of dialogue. For Seoul, dialogue builds peace and opens a future of unification. But if North Korea views the South solely as a \u201chostile state,\u201d the equation changes entirely. No matter how many times Seoul reaches out, Pyongyang sees fewer reasons to reciprocate.<\/p>\n

In fact, improving relations poses systemic risks to the North. For decades, North Korea has rigorously controlled the influx of external information. Expanding exchanges with the South would inevitably expose its citizens to South Korea\u2019s living standards, culture, and economic freedoms. From the regime\u2019s standpoint, this is a direct challenge to its legitimacy. While lowering tensions might ease\u00a0economic<\/a> pressure, expanding opportunities for North Koreans to directly experience the South poses an inherent threat to social control. Thus, reconciliation is not viewed as a net positive.<\/p>\n

What Pyongyang actually seeks is less traditional reconciliation with Seoul and more of a new relationship that recognizes its regime and nuclear arsenal \u2014 its core instrument of survival. Furthermore, North Korea prioritizes its relationship with the United States. The ultimate goal of its nuclear program is deterring U.S. military intervention to guarantee regime security. Consequently, Seoul is treated less as a core negotiating partner and more as a variable in U.S.-North Korea relations. As long as Pyongyang refuses to decouple South Korea from the United States, diplomatic space for inter-Korean dialogue remains severely constrained.<\/p>\n

Thus, the hardest problem today is not figuring out how to open the door to dialogue, but changing how each side perceives the other. South Korea views North Korea as a partner for dialogue, seeking peaceful coexistence and eventual unification. North Korea views South Korea as a hostile state, relying on nuclear might and distancing itself from the concept of unification. Two vastly different perceptions are colliding.<\/p>\n

This does not mean dialogue should be abandoned. However, foreign policy <\/a>cannot be engineered solely on the expectation that an adversary will accept our proposals. Wanting peace and believing the adversary wants peace are two different things. South Korea taking the first step is not a mistake, but we must understand why the other side refuses it.<\/p>\n

Diplomacy takes time, and international dynamics may shift. Until then, South Korea must keep the door to dialogue open without simply standing waiting in the doorway. If we desire peace, we need the strength to defend it and to cultivate a diplomatic environment that compels the adversary to the table. Above all, Seoul\u2019s security must never be held hostage by Pyongyang\u2019s choices. We must expand our independent diplomatic space and maintain stable alliances, allowing us to negotiate from a position of strength when Pyongyang eventually reopens the door.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Perhaps North Korea is not refusing our hand because we reached out, but because it has fundamentally altered how it views South Korea. We speak of peace<\/a>, dialogue, and unification\u2014 they speak of nuclear weapons and two hostile states.<\/p>\n

NORTH KOREA ISN\u2019T WINNING WITH NUKES. IT\u2019S WINNING WITH OUR BOREDOM<\/a><\/p>\n

Why won\u2019t North Korea take South Korea\u2019s hand? Perhaps Pyongyang has concluded it simply doesn\u2019t need to.<\/p>\n

If so, Seoul\u2019s response should be neither withdrawing our hand nor shoving it forward. It starts with acknowledging that the adversary we face is not the North Korea of the past. As important as preparing to take North Korea\u2019s hand is understanding why they refuse it.<\/p>\n

Park Joonhye is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics and Unification Studies from the University of North Korean Studies.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"South Korea is once again extending a hand to North Korea. Messages advocating the resumption of dialogue, the…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":124977,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[517,141,171,34,13713,61795,33,2991],"class_list":["post-124976","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-korea","tag-diplomacy","tag-kim-jong-un","tag-korean","tag-north-korea","tag-peace","tag-regime","tag-south-korea","tag-war"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/124976","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=124976"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/124976\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/124977"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=124976"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=124976"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=124976"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}