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(Source: Korean Central News Agency)<\/p>\n(Source: Korean Central News Agency)<\/p>\n
Kim Yo Jong\u2019s August 19 \u201cstand on major international affairs\u201d<\/a> has been examined largely for Pyongyang\u2019s response to Trump\u2019s recent overtures<\/a> and clues about the future of North Korea-US relations. The document, however, also showed a striking asymmetry toward two other consequential actors: Russia and China.<\/p>\n North Korea has moved closer to China on important security issues, notably in its approach to Japan. Yet its public portrayal of the bilateral relationship has remained surprisingly restrained despite an unusual spate of high-level diplomatic engagements in recent months. North Korea\u2019s effusive treatment of Russia makes this restraint all the more conspicuous.<\/p>\n Explicit Support vs. Broad Alignment <\/p>\n Kim Yo Jong addressed global and regional security concerns shared by both Russia and China, but her handling of the two countries in connection with those issues was starkly different. She voiced explicit and unequivocal support for Russia on the war in Ukraine and underscored North Korea\u2019s solidarity with Russia by noting that it remained \u201cboundlessly faithful\u201d to the bilateral comprehensive treaty.<\/p>\n By contrast, while Kim Yo Jong\u2019s positions broadly aligned with Beijing\u2019s views, there was no explicit expression of solidarity with or support for China. The omission was particularly notable in her condemnation of Japan\u2019s \u201cmilitary expansion\u201d as \u201cdangerous,\u201d given the ongoing China-Japan diplomatic impasse<\/a>. Pyongyang also had precedent for mentioning Taiwan had it wished to signal support for one of Beijing\u2019s core interests: Kim Jong Un himself publicly endorsed<\/a> China\u2019s position on Taiwan as recently as his June 2026 summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping.<\/p>\n This is not to say that North Korea should have accorded China the same level or type of solidarity as Russia. The nature of its relationships with the two countries is different: for one, North Korea is directly involved in Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine. Still, it is worth noting that Kim Yo Jong did not invoke China once in an unusually broad statement on global and regional security that otherwise overlapped substantially with Beijing\u2019s views. The timing also bears mention, though its significance is unclear: Kim issued her pronouncement while Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was in Seoul for talks<\/a> that included the Korean Peninsula and regional security.<\/p>\n Alignment Without Commensurate Warmth<\/p>\n This builds on North Korea\u2019s subdued signaling toward Beijing despite its growing alignment<\/a> with China on key security issues in the months since Wang Yi\u2019s April visit<\/a> to Pyongyang. North Korea gave restrained<\/a> coverage of high-level diplomatic exchanges commemorating the 65th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in July. It omitted \u201cblood-forged friendship,\u201d a formulation historically used to signal the strength of bilateral ties. And unlike in his April talks<\/a> with Wang and June summit<\/a> with Xi Jinping, Kim Jong Un offered no support for Chinese interests and policies in his meeting<\/a> with a high-level Chinese delegation.<\/p>\n In late July, Kim visited<\/a> the Cemetery of the Fallen Soldiers of the Chinese People\u2019s Volunteers (CPV) to commemorate the 73rd anniversary of \u201cthe victory in the Fatherland Liberation War\u201d (Armistice Day).[1]<\/a> While Kim Jong Un performed all the ceremonial acts, the report did not contain any attributions to Kim and said little about the bilateral relationship beyond its historical foundation. In July 2018<\/a> and 2023<\/a>, by contrast, reports on Kim\u2019s visits to this cemetery contained substantial remarks attributed to Kim on the CPV\u2019s sacrifices and linked that history explicitly to contemporary bilateral ties and their future.<\/p>\n