South Korea’s Financial Supervisory Service updated first-half compensation data for major corporations through its electronic disclosure system in mid-August. Doosan Group Chairman Park Jeong-won topped the list with six-month compensation of \u20a945.58 billion (approximately $33.0 million), far exceeding Samsung Electronics chief Lee Jae-yong and SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won\u2014the two central figures in the semiconductor cycle.<\/p>\n
The disclosed data also showed LS Group Chairman Koo Ja-eun earned approximately \u20a913.3 billion (approximately $9.6 million) in the first half, while Hanwha Group Chairman Kim Seung-yeon took home approximately \u20a911.58 billion (approximately $8.4 million), ranking second and third respectively. By comparison, Chey Tae-won’s compensation for the same period was approximately \u20a91.75 billion (approximately $1.3 million), while Lee Jae-yong’s disclosed compensation was zero.<\/p>\n
RankNameGroupFirst-Half Compensation (KRW)USD Equivalent1Park Jeong-wonDoosan Group\u20a945.58 billionapproximately $33.0 million2Koo Ja-eunLS Group\u20a913.3 billionapproximately $9.6 million3Kim Seung-yeonHanwha Group\u20a911.58 billionapproximately $8.4 million\u2014Chey Tae-wonSK Group\u20a91.75 billionapproximately $1.3 million\u2014Lee Jae-yongSamsung Electronics00<\/p>\n
Note: Data sourced from South Korea’s Financial Supervisory Service electronic disclosure system, first-half 2026 reports<\/p>\n
Park Jeong-won’s outsized compensation was not fixed salary but rather the vesting of restricted stock units (RSUs) granted three years ago. In 2023, Doosan Group granted him 32,266 Doosan shares, then valued at approximately \u20a92.84 billion (approximately $2.1 million). Under the agreement, these shares could not be exercised for three years. In February this year, Doosan’s share price soared to \u20a91.17 million (approximately $840) per share\u2014a more than 12-fold increase\u2014generating realized gains of \u20a937.59 billion (approximately $27.2 million), accounting for nearly 90% of his disclosed half-year compensation.<\/p>\n
Doosan Group’s explosive share price surge is directly tied to the global artificial intelligence (AI) wave. AI’s rapid development has driven sustained growth in electricity demand, and this conglomerate\u2014founded in 1896\u2014has aggressively positioned itself in nuclear power equipment, gas turbines, and semiconductor precursor materials in recent years, successfully capitalizing on both the nuclear power renaissance and AI industry expansion. The group now operates in 38 countries and regions worldwide, with 2025 revenue of approximately \u20a919.78 trillion.<\/p>\n
The Wealth Logic Behind Zero On-Paper Salary<\/p>\n
Lee Jae-yong’s zero-salary status has persisted for years. South Korean scholar Kim Yoon-joon explained that in 2017, Lee was sentenced to five years in prison by a trial court for bribing former South Korean President Park Geun-hye and her confidante Choi Soon-sil. Facing immense public pressure, he publicly pledged that year to stop drawing a salary, and the zero-pay practice has continued ever since. Some analysts also believe tax optimization is another key consideration behind Lee’s insistence on zero salary.<\/p>\n
Kim Yoon-joon pointed out that on-paper wages are far from the core income source for South Korean chaebol leaders\u2014dividends and share appreciation are the substance of wealth accumulation. According to Forbes’ 2025 South Korea rich list, Lee Jae-yong ranks second with a net worth of $7.8 billion, behind only private equity investor Kim Byung-ju at $9.5 billion. Chey Tae-won saw his fortune double last year amid the AI boom, with the Bloomberg Billionaires Index showing his net worth at approximately $5.6 billion.<\/p>\n
South Korean chaebol groups generally maintain complex cross-shareholding structures. Taking the Lee Jae-yong family as an example, they control Samsung C&T, which in turn controls Samsung Life, which then controls Samsung Electronics. This layered structure allows chaebol families to leverage a vast business empire with relatively little capital\u2014even when direct shareholding ratios are not high, they maintain absolute control over core operations while effectively fending off external takeover attempts.<\/p>\n
Related-party transactions within the group, stock dividends, and associated real estate, art, and other unlisted assets are equally important channels for chaebol family wealth transfer and concentration. The value of these assets never appears in compensation disclosures, yet their actual valuations often far exceed those of listed company shares.<\/p>\n
Shareholder Returns and Wealth Inequality Debate<\/p>\n
Just last week, Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix successively announced large-scale shareholder return plans. Samsung Electronics’ plan announced on the 21st projects total 2026 shareholder returns of \u20a990 trillion to \u20a9110 trillion, described as the largest shareholder return program in South Korean corporate history. The scale far exceeded market expectations and has reignited South Korean societal debate over chaebol dividend mechanisms.<\/p>\n
Some South Korean citizens worry that prioritizing profit distribution to major shareholders\u2014centered on chaebol families\u2014will further widen the wealth gap. For years, the chaebol wealth accumulation model has been viewed as a key driver of South Korea’s wealth polarization. While calls for reform have continued to rise, substantive reform has faced persistent obstacles given the deep entanglement between the economy and the chaebol system.<\/p>\n
In July this year, the South Korean government announced plans to establish a future response fund, channeling excess tax revenue generated by the AI cycle into productive future investments to better leverage the current industrial dividend.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"South Korea’s Financial Supervisory Service updated first-half compensation data for major corporations through its electronic disclosure system in…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":130064,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[27],"tags":[2589,410,409,408,24013,66309,61874,1133,26426,276,240,41248],"class_list":["post-130063","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-doosan","tag-chey-tae-won","tag-doosan","tag-doosan-enerbility","tag-doosan-group","tag-kim-seung-yeon","tag-kim-yoon-joon","tag-koo-ja-eun","tag-lee-jae-yong","tag-park-jeong-won","tag-samsung-electronics","tag-sk-group","tag-south-koreas-financial-supervisory-service"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/130063","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=130063"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/130063\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/130064"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=130063"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=130063"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=130063"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}