Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine handed the DPRK a\u00a0unique opportunity to\u00a0bind Moscow to\u00a0itself. Under Boris Yeltsin and even in\u00a0the early years of\u00a0Vladimir Putin\u2019s rule, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang were far from smooth. The Kremlin would periodically recall the old friendship, yet large-scale joint projects were simply out of\u00a0the question\u2014they were seen as\u00a0far too toxic. Russia played the role of\u00a0a\u00a0bridge between the international community, alarmed by\u00a0the Kim regime\u2019s antics, and the regime itself. It\u00a0did so\u00a0not as\u00a0an\u00a0advocate, but rather as a \u201cgood cop\u201d who was perfectly capable of\u00a0presenting its own demands.<\/p>\n
With the launch of\u00a0the full-scale invasion of\u00a0Ukraine, the old constraints disappeared. Russian oil began reaching the world market in\u00a0much the same way as\u00a0North Korean oil\u2014via the shadow fleet. And the front very quickly needed large consignments of\u00a0shells, which the DPRK had in\u00a0abundance: the country had spent its entire history preparing for a\u00a0major war.<\/p>\n
Two worlds, two visits<\/p>\n
The modern history of\u00a0Russian-DPRK relations is\u00a0well illustrated by\u00a0the contrast between Vladimir Putin\u2019s two visits to\u00a0Pyongyang. The first took place<\/a> in\u00a0July 2000, when a\u00a0still-young and, in\u00a0places, pro-Western Russian president arrived in\u00a0North Korea with an\u00a0ambitious mission: to\u00a0persuade the then-leader Kim Jong-il to\u00a0abandon the country\u2019s missile program.<\/p>\n Success would have allowed Moscow to\u00a0achieve several important objectives at\u00a0once. First, it\u00a0would have established itself as\u00a0an\u00a0effective negotiator capable of\u00a0achieving what the West could not. Second, it\u00a0would have persuaded<\/a> then-US President Bill Clinton to\u00a0abandon the deployment of\u00a0missile-defense systems in\u00a0Alaska<\/a>. The American administration at\u00a0the time claimed<\/a> these systems were needed primarily to\u00a0counter the threat from North Korea and countries in\u00a0the Middle East (clearly meaning Iran and Iraq).<\/p>\n Putin hoped to\u00a0demonstrate to\u00a0Washington that the North Korean threat did not exist, and that therefore the deployment of\u00a0BMD systems near Chukotka was unnecessary. After talking with Kim Jong-il, the Russian president emerged before journalists with a\u00a0sensational statement<\/a>: \u201cA thesis was voiced [\u2026] according to\u00a0which North Korea is\u00a0prepared to\u00a0use exclusively the rocket technology of\u00a0other states, if\u00a0they provide such an\u00a0opportunity, for the peaceful exploration of\u00a0space.\u201d Putin emphasized that \u201csuch a\u00a0statement had been made by\u00a0the leader of\u00a0the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of\u00a0Korea for the first time.\u201d<\/p>\n Shortly after the visit to\u00a0Pyongyang, Putin travelled to\u00a0the G8 summit in\u00a0Okinawa, where he\u00a0spoke with no\u00a0little pride of\u00a0his diplomatic success. The joy proved short-lived. At\u00a0the time, inter-Korean relations were experiencing an\u00a0unprecedented thaw. On\u00a012 August a\u00a0delegation of\u00a056 South Korean media editors arrived<\/a> in\u00a0Pyongyang and was received personally by\u00a0Kim Jong-il. He told<\/a> them he\u00a0had promised Putin nothing of\u00a0the sort. The remark, he\u00a0claimed, had been made only \u201cin passing, as\u00a0a\u00a0joke.\u201d<\/p>\n Thus the young Russian president missed the chance to\u00a0become an\u00a0envoy of\u00a0global peace\u2014the man who had personally helped limit the proliferation of\u00a0nuclear weapons beyond the framework of\u00a0international treaties. Freezing the American missile-defense program also proved temporary<\/a>: the new\u00a0US president, George W. Bush, embraced it<\/a> with enthusiasm.<\/p>\n Putin\u2019s next visit to\u00a0the DPRK took place<\/a> in\u00a02024\u2014after Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of\u00a0Ukraine\u2014and unfolded in\u00a0an\u00a0entirely different manner. Now Moscow and Pyongyang found themselves in\u00a0the same boat: sanctioned pariah states jointly confronting the \u201cWestern hegemon.\u201d As noted<\/a> in\u00a0the Treaty on\u00a0Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that replaced the outdated 2000 agreement, \u201cif either party is\u00a0subjected to\u00a0armed attack by\u00a0any state or\u00a0several states and thus finds itself in\u00a0a\u00a0state of\u00a0war, the other party shall immediately provide military and other assistance.\u201d<\/p>\n At\u00a0that point Putin was still insisting<\/a> that there was no\u00a0question of\u00a0using North Korean soldiers against Ukraine: \u201cWe are not asking anyone for this, no\u00a0one has offered it\u00a0to\u00a0us, so\u00a0there is\u00a0no\u00a0need.\u201d At\u00a0the same time, Russian media reported<\/a> that after the treaty-signing ceremony Putin had drawn attention to\u00a0Western plans to\u00a0supply Ukraine with F-16 fighters and other high-tech weapons for strikes on\u00a0Russia, and had not ruled out the development of\u00a0military-technical cooperation with the DPRK in\u00a0that event. This, in\u00a0turn, could not fail to\u00a0cause concern in\u00a0South Korea, which began to reconsider the question<\/a> of\u00a0direct lethal-arms deliveries to\u00a0Ukraine.<\/p>\n From approval to\u00a0complicity<\/p>\n After the start of\u00a0Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of\u00a0Ukraine, Pyongyang was among the first to\u00a0openly support Moscow. On\u00a02 March 2022 the DPRK voted<\/a> against the\u00a0UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia\u2019s actions. The only other \u201cno\u201d votes came from Russia itself, Belarus, Eritrea and Syria. In\u00a0July of\u00a0the same year North Korea became the second country (after Syria<\/a>) to recognize<\/a> the \u201cindependence\u201d of\u00a0the DPR and LPR.<\/p>\n At\u00a0the time such gestures were largely perceived as\u00a0symbolic. \u201cThe war with Ukraine has created a\u00a0situation in\u00a0which North Korea can easily give Russia diplomatic gifts in\u00a0the expectation of\u00a0reciprocity,\u201d noted<\/a> one of\u00a0the leading Russian-speaking Korea specialists, Andrei Lankov. \u201cPyongyang is\u00a0ready to\u00a0become one of\u00a0those voices, especially since it\u00a0costs it\u00a0nothing.\u201d Lankov also stressed that \u201cin Pyongyang they are generally pleased with what is\u00a0happening in\u00a0the world.\u201d The pleasure was understandable: Russia\u2019s rupture with the West had placed it\u00a0in\u00a0the same category as\u00a0the DPRK, and Moscow (even cut off from Western markets) remained a\u00a0highly valuable ally in\u00a0resource terms.<\/p>\n Another important detail was recorded by\u00a0another well-known Russian Korea specialist, Konstantin Asmolov, who has traditionally taken a\u00a0more benevolent view of\u00a0Pyongyang and publishes in\u00a0pro-government Russian media. In\u00a0an\u00a0article entitled<\/a> \u201cHow Pyongyang Opened the Door to\u00a0a\u00a0New World Order\u201d he\u00a0wrote: \u201cIn 2022 the DPRK officially announced the testing of\u00a0an\u00a0ICBM, and the moratorium officially ceased to\u00a0exist.\u201d<\/p>\n Since April 2018\u2014during preparations for the meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in\u00a0Singapore (which took place on\u00a012 June<\/a>)\u2014Pyongyang had officially declared a\u00a0halt<\/a> to\u00a0nuclear-weapon and intercontinental ballistic-missile tests. The moratorium was formally observed: only shorter-range systems continued to\u00a0be\u00a0launched<\/a>. Yet already on\u00a030 January 2022, when the full-scale invasion of\u00a0Ukraine was still being prepared, the DPRK launched<\/a> its largest rocket in\u00a0the previous five years. It\u00a0was a\u00a0medium-range missile, not yet intercontinental. Nevertheless, Seoul and Tokyo had every reason to\u00a0fear<\/a> that the moratorium was about to\u00a0be\u00a0broken.<\/p>\n And so\u00a0it\u00a0was. Already in\u00a0March, after the start of\u00a0Russian aggression, Pyongyang launched<\/a> the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile, and in\u00a0May three more rockets<\/a>, one of\u00a0which experts assessed as\u00a0intercontinental. The United States attempted to\u00a0tighten\u00a0UN sanctions against the DPRK, but Russia and China vetoed<\/a> the relevant resolution. Moscow thereby effectively embarked on\u00a0the path of\u00a0open endorsement of\u00a0the North Korean missile program.<\/p>\n Trade turnover between Russia and the DPRK did begin to\u00a0grow after the war started, yet not as\u00a0rapidly as, for example, with Turkey or\u00a0China<\/a>. In\u00a02022 it\u00a0amounted to\u00a0a\u00a0mere $\u00a03.78 million. This was largely due to\u00a0the consequences of\u00a0the pandemic: North Korea returned to\u00a0its customary rhythm of\u00a0foreign economic ties extremely slowly. That low base, however, allowed for an\u00a0impressive almost ninefold increase<\/a> in\u00a02023, to $\u00a034.4 million. In\u00a02024 the figure remained at\u00a0the same level\u2014around $\u00a034 million<\/a>. Official data for 2025 have not been published; it\u00a0is\u00a0known only that new commodity categories appeared<\/a>\u2014beer, cigarettes and rapeseed oil. Even in\u00a0Moscow it\u00a0was acknowledged<\/a> that alongside consumer goods \u201cthe second major block is\u00a0hydrocarbons,\u201d i.e. fuel.<\/p>\n It\u00a0was in\u00a02024 that Russia and the DPRK actively expanded logistical capacity for trade. To\u00a0the familiar Hasan-Rason railway line<\/a> (in\u00a02021 Russian diplomats and their families had been forced to\u00a0travel along it on\u00a0a\u00a0handcar<\/a>\u2014there was simply no\u00a0other way out of\u00a0the DPRK at\u00a0the time) was added the construction of\u00a0a\u00a0road bridge at\u00a0Hasan-Tumangang across the border river Tumen (construction was recently completed successfully<\/a>). In\u00a02024 the DPRK for the first time since the pandemic opened<\/a> its territory to\u00a0Russian tourists.<\/p>\n But the most significant news that year was the opening of\u00a0the Nakhodka-Rason sea line. Moscow spoke of\u00a0it\u00a0openly, even though in\u00a0reality it\u00a0constituted a\u00a0clear violation of\u00a0the\u00a0UN Security Council sanctions<\/a> imposed in\u00a02017. Those sanctions prohibited the DPRK from receiving more than 525,000 tons, or\u00a04 million barrels, of\u00a0oil per year. Yet according to\u00a0a\u00a0joint investigation by iStories<\/a> and the Open Source Center<\/a>, in\u00a02024 at\u00a0least 50 tankers shuttled between Russia and the DPRK, delivering approximately 1.3 million barrels of\u00a0oil\u2014clearly exceeding the established limit. Britain immediately took note: already in\u00a0May 2024 it\u00a0imposed sanctions on\u00a0the Fuel Bunker Company<\/a> (TBK) that services the terminal in\u00a0Nakhodka.<\/p>\n A\u00a0special panel of\u00a0experts under the\u00a0UN Security Council had monitored<\/a> compliance with sanctions against the DPRK; its mandate was renewed annually. In\u00a02024 Russia vetoed<\/a> its extension, calling the previous sanctions regime \u201cdivorced from reality.\u201d China\u2014Pyongyang\u2019s main economic partner\u2014abstained.<\/p>\n The principal dimension of\u00a0Russian-DPRK cooperation after 2022 became the military-technical sphere. The bulk of\u00a0deliveries occurred in\u00a02023\u2014after the visit<\/a> to\u00a0Pyongyang by\u00a0then-Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. He\u00a0was received personally by\u00a0Kim Jong-un, yet the substantive conversation was apparently conducted by\u00a0DPRK Defence Minister Kang Sun-nam. Clearly the discussion concerned new purchases of\u00a0North Korean shells by\u00a0the Russian army. Deliveries of\u00a0North Korean weaponry<\/a> to\u00a0Russia in\u00a02024 became the basis for American sanctions<\/a> against related individuals and companies. In\u00a0spring 2024 UN\u00a0experts confirmed<\/a> that the Russian army had struck Kharkiv with a\u00a0North Korean Hwasong-11 missile.<\/p>\n The question of\u00a0what the DPRK would receive in\u00a0return\u2014apart from Russian goods and oil\u2014remained open. In\u00a0September of\u00a0the same year Kim Jong-un arrived<\/a> at\u00a0Russia\u2019s Vostochny Cosmodrome<\/a>, where Vladimir Putin was waiting for him. The visit once again confirmed that Russia was now an ally of\u00a0the DPRK<\/a> in\u00a0the development of\u00a0its missile program, rather than part of\u00a0the global system that sought to\u00a0constrain it.<\/p>\n In\u00a0combat and afterwards<\/p>\n Almost no\u00a0one believed in\u00a0the most radical scenario\u2014the direct participation of\u00a0North Korean troops in\u00a0Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine. This was partly due to\u00a0Pyongyang\u2019s own position. Throughout its existence the Kim regime has sought to\u00a0keep North Korean citizens inside an\u00a0information bubble. A\u00a0large-scale deployment of\u00a0soldiers to\u00a0war could seriously distort their perception of\u00a0reality. Even in\u00a0front-line towns and villages where troops are stationed, living standards are often higher than in\u00a0the North Korean hinterland: there are shops, and every house has a\u00a0television, a\u00a0refrigerator and a\u00a0computer with internet access.<\/p>\n \u201cFirst, purely technical problems will arise with logistics and the availability of\u00a0military interpreters. Second, it\u00a0is a\u00a0reputational blow to\u00a0the Kremlin. Can Russia really not cope with Ukraine without North Korea\u2019s help?\u201d wrote<\/a> even the restrained expert Konstantin Asmolov. \u201cAnd third, as\u00a0soon as\u00a0we\u00a0have this kind of\u00a0foreign specialist, it\u00a0will open the door to\u00a0analogous actions by\u00a0the West.\u201d<\/p>\n Nevertheless, it\u00a0happened\u2014under conditions of\u00a0secrecy and only on\u00a0internationally recognized Russian territory, in\u00a0Kursk Oblast, into which Ukrainian forces had entered. First there appeared<\/a> video of\u00a0DPRK soldiers training at\u00a0ranges in\u00a0the Far East, then Ukrainian intelligence reports<\/a> of\u00a0enemy groups behaving quite differently<\/a> from Russian units. And finally, prisoners<\/a> who spoke Korean.<\/p>\n Putin himself, already in\u00a0October 2024, at\u00a0least did not deny<\/a> the presence of\u00a0foreign troops in\u00a0Kursk Oblast. But official confirmation of\u00a0North Korean participation in\u00a0the war appeared<\/a> only in\u00a0April 2025. Simultaneously the Defence Ministry began releasing<\/a> clearly staged videos featuring them. The acknowledgement was clearly timed for 9 May 2025, so\u00a0that North Korean generals could attend<\/a> the parade as\u00a0genuine brothers-in-arms.<\/p>\n Military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang continued after the Kursk operation. Notably, the key negotiator on\u00a0the Kremlin side remained Sergei Shoigu\u2014no longer defense minister but secretary of\u00a0the Security Council. He\u00a0flew to\u00a0the DPRK three times in\u00a02025: in\u00a0March<\/a> and twice<\/a> in June<\/a>; in\u00a0May he met<\/a> in\u00a0Moscow with DPRK Minister of\u00a0State Security Ri\u00a0Chang-dae. The density of\u00a0such contacts has been maintained<\/a>. In\u00a0April 2026 Pyongyang was also visited<\/a> by\u00a0State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin.<\/p>\n In\u00a0July 2025 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived<\/a> in\u00a0the DPRK on\u00a0a\u00a0visit, and a\u00a0year later\u2014in July 2026\u2014a reciprocal visit<\/a> to\u00a0Moscow was paid by\u00a0DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui. In\u00a0the first case the discussion concerned attracting Russian tourists to\u00a0the recently opened North Korean resort of\u00a0Wonsan; in\u00a0the second, more global issues. \u201cPyongyang\u2019s full support for the domestic and foreign policy of\u00a0the Russian Federation is\u00a0unshakeable,\u201d declared Choe Son-hui. She made clear<\/a> that the DPRK and Russia share a\u00a0common enemy\u2014the United States. This formed the ideological justification for military participation: in\u00a0this way, Pyongyang claimed<\/a>, it\u00a0was defending its own sovereignty.<\/p>\n Virtually every step taken by\u00a0the DPRK towards closer ties with Russia against the backdrop of\u00a0its aggression against Ukraine can be\u00a0explained by\u00a0precisely this. Setting aside the details of\u00a0Moscow\u2019s evident desire to\u00a0return to \u201cpragmatic cooperation\u201d with the Western world and especially with the United States, Pyongyang skilfully exploited Moscow\u2019s isolation to improve its own position<\/a>\u2014both economically and militarily. The restoration of\u00a0the flow of\u00a0Russian tourists, as\u00a0well as\u00a0supplies of\u00a0goods and oil from Russia, became a\u00a0serious support after the pandemic, while the experience of\u00a0modern warfare gained in\u00a0Kursk Oblast became a\u00a0strong argument in\u00a0dialogue with Seoul.<\/p>\n According to\u00a0Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky<\/a>, Pyongyang is\u00a0already preparing a\u00a0new, more large-scale participation of\u00a0its soldiers in\u00a0the war. These words are corroborated by\u00a0Reuters<\/a>: the agency reported the transfer of\u00a0North Korean missile units to\u00a0Voronezh Oblast, which would allow the North Koreans to\u00a0adhere to\u00a0their previous tactic of\u00a0participating in\u00a0the war without crossing Russia\u2019s borders.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine handed the DPRK a\u00a0unique opportunity to\u00a0bind Moscow to\u00a0itself. Under Boris Yeltsin and even in\u00a0the…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":131206,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[129],"class_list":["post-131205","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-pyongyang","tag-pyongyang"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/131205","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=131205"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/131205\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/131206"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=131205"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=131205"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=131205"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}