Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) bids farewell to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Beijing after their meeting in September at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse on the 80th anniversary of victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the end of World War II. File Photo by Sergey Bobylev\/Spitnik\/Kremlin Pool\/EPA<\/p>\n
Aug. 24 (UPI) — During the past several years, North Korea, or DPRK, has pushed forward plans for the modernization of its military<\/a>, the Korean People’s Army, or KPA. It seeks not only technological advancements to catch up with South Korea, but also valuable combat experience and data.<\/p>\n Enhancing an alliance with Russia<\/a>, North Korea has increasingly intertwined itself with Russian combat operations<\/a> during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.\n<\/p>\n Simultaneously, South Korea, after foiling a coup attempt<\/a> by the former government, has enacted a more pragmatic foreign policy<\/a> in hopes that Russia, China, and the United States apply more pressure towards the DPRK for denuclearization<\/a>.<\/p>\n Seoul’s foreign relations has not been for nothing, as the Lee administration solidified stronger cooperation with Tokyo<\/a> and a landmark<\/a> nuclear-powered submarine agreement with Washington.<\/p>\n Nevertheless, Pyongyang is hedging its bets on combat experience alongside Russian forces, which Seoul has not seen since the Vietnam War<\/a>.\n<\/p>\n With a growingly belligerent North Korea that is becoming more emboldened by the day, the question remains on whether the Republic of Korea will remain complacent or become more assertive.<\/p>\n Deepened involvement with Russia’s war on Ukraine<\/p>\n Part of the modernization the Kim regime wants for the KPA is combat experience, which it can exchange for data and technology sharing with other regimes, such as Vladimir Putin’s Russia.<\/p>\n The DPRK’s involvement with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has steadily increased into confrontation with the West and inevitably South Korea. In late 2022, Pyongyang discreetly<\/a> exported artillery to Russia’s Wagner Group, and later in 2023, after a summit in Vladivostok<\/a>, North Korea increased shell allocations to 1 million for the Russian military.<\/p>\n However, after signing a mutual defense pact<\/a> with Russia on June 18, 2024, North Korea solidified its role against Ukraine and subsequent Western red lines.<\/p>\n In December 2024, the KPA directly intervened<\/a> in the Russo-Ukrainian War during the Kursk Offensive. The intervention arrived after several weeks of logistical preparations and more than 12,000 to 15,000 troop movements from Vladivostok, as reported<\/a> by Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence.<\/p>\n Despite suffering several thousand casualties<\/a>, the KPA not only gained valuable combat experience, but also helped push back Ukrainian forces, or AFU. While many Western militaries would attempt to preserve forces, North Korean conscripts employed frontal assaults<\/a> and took “no step back”<\/a> approaches — particularly due to the strict nature of punishment in the country.\n<\/p>\n Furthermore, reports<\/a> have circulated that an additional further 30,000 to 50,000 KPA troops will be deployed to support Russia’s offensives in Ukraine further. The reports come amid a KPA missile battalion deployment<\/a> in Voronezh province that is equipped with more than 120 ballistic missiles and several launchers.<\/p>\n What Pyongyang has gained from Moscow<\/p>\n The Kremlin is sharing technology<\/a> to help make the KPA’s missiles more guided and accurate, which could prove deadly for another war on the Korean Peninsula. For Pyongyang’s ongoing naval modernization, Moscow transferred<\/a> several modules needed for its nuclear submarine program.<\/p>\n Allocations and provisions of Russian-made air defense systems<\/a> such as the Pantsir-1 are bolstering North Korea’s defensive posture — especially as the Kim regime looks to increase its nuclear weapons stockpiles within its missile belt cities<\/a>. With Russia enhancing drone warfare capabilities, the Kremlin is also sharing its technology and data with North Korea’s own drone warfare program.<\/p>\n Concurrently, North Korea is earning $7 billion to $14 billion<\/a> from weapons exports, labor force participation and troop allocations to Russia. Satellite imagery from the Stimson Center’s 38 North think tank shows<\/a> the completed construction of a new road bridge between Russia and North Korea in Tumangang, which could increase trade and military supplies between the two.\n<\/p>\n Initially drawing international ire for provocative nuclear and ballistic missile tests, including from its closest ally in China<\/a>, North Korea now has Russia as a guaranteed veto in the United Nations Security Council against any condemnations as long as the Kim regime continues the flow of arms and human resources.<\/p>\n South Korea’s balanced, but idle, stance<\/p>\n Despite initially hinting at consequences<\/a> for North Korea’s direct intervention in the war against Ukraine, South Korea has taken an idle stance. Seoul cites its domestic export laws<\/a> as a reason Kyiv is not receiving military support, even as Pyongyang continues to gain experience and knowledge on the battlefield alongside Moscow.<\/p>\n Instead, South Korea is continuing to provide humanitarian aid<\/a> to Ukraine, which will need it for the upcoming winter strikes. Simultaneously, Seoul is looking to grow its own ties with major regional powers and allies as a counterbalance to the Moscow-Pyongyang defense pact.<\/p>\n Against the backdrop of the failed coup by the Yoon administration, which planned<\/a> on potentially starting a war on the Korean Peninsula, current President Lee Jae Myung and his Democratic Party look to keep regional tensions with North Korea low, while bolstering alliances.<\/p>\n After growing ties with the Trump administration — particularly for investing in American companies<\/a> and helping with shipbuilding<\/a>– Washington permitted<\/a> Seoul to develop its own independent nuclear submarine program. The Jangbogo-N<\/a>nuclear submarine program is expected to be commissioned in the late 2030s.\n<\/p>\n South Korea is in talks with Japan about deepening cooperation on denuclearization<\/a> on the Korean Peninsula, potential joint exercises and advanced technology-sharing. Seoul is also seeking concrete NATO cooperation<\/a> as one of its strongest and closest non-member allies.<\/p>\n Potential complacency blowback<\/p>\n However, despite expanding its diplomatic and defense relations, Seoul could find itself in a bind in an increasingly destabilized world. In August, South Korea came under pressure<\/a> from the Trump administration, which cut back joint exercises.<\/p>\n In late 2025, Seoul reached out<\/a> to Moscow with closed-door secret talks over Pyongyang’s growing nuclear arsenal, as the Kremlin influences the Kim regime. Nevertheless, with Russia providing guidance chips and modules to North Korea, along with increasing joint projects on the Peninsula, South Korea could find itself being led on in negotiations that will remain at a standstill.<\/p>\n Furthermore, the KPA is not the only military gaining valuable combat experience thanks to Russia’s aggression. Ukraine’s military is now experienced against the KPA, which could prove valuable<\/a> to South Korea’s military and intelligence services if future conflicts break out on the peninsula.<\/p>\n However, Seoul’s idle stance over Pyongyang’s aggression against Kyiv could see the Ukrainian government turn a blind eye with mild statements of “concern” instead of direct support if another Korean war were to break out in the future.\n<\/p>\n Though both South Korea and Ukraine enjoy good relations, the pragmatic balance in hoping not to draw Russian ire could backfire with an emboldened Kremlin, as Japan learned during Putin’s controversial Etorofu visit<\/a>.<\/p>\n Lastly, if Pyongyang continues to expand<\/a> its nuclear missile arsenal with little progress from major powers, such as Washington, Beijing and Moscow, Seoul may have to lift its own taboo over nuclear weapons<\/a>.<\/p>\n