confirmed<\/a> changes that had been alluded to in previous North Korean reporting, such as the codification of the DPRK\u2019s two-state policy with the South. However, it also made changes to the composition and mandate of the State Affairs Commission (SAC), elevating Kim Jong Un\u2019s power as its leader, and formalized North Korea\u2019s nuclear command and control. These are arguably the most significant changes to the constitution as they redefine the role of the leader and expand the scope of the government\u2019s supreme power and decision-making organization.<\/p>\nSAC Changes and Implications for Kim Jong Un<\/p>\n
During the first session of the 15th SPA, key changes were made to SAC composition. Notably, membership was expanded from 11 to 13 members, adding new institutional affiliations and policy writs to SAC\u2019s jurisdiction. These changes reoriented the SAC toward the domestic policy space from foreign and military affairs; for example, the number of foreign affairs officials on the SAC was reduced from four to two. Additions included the 1st Vice Premier, a new post created at the 15th SPA, and the director of the Supreme Prosecutors\u2019 Office. The Party Central Committee also got two new SAC slots\u2014the head of Workers\u2019 Organizations and the head of personnel and disciplinary affairs.<\/p>\n
These personnel changes expand the power of the SAC over multiple aspects of the system. The addition of the 1st Vice Premier extends influence over domestic economic policy, while the chief prosecutor adds jurisdiction over law enforcement. Adding the head of the Party Workers\u2019 Organizations Department expands SAC\u2019s oversight into North Korean social life and social controls. The Workers\u2019 Organizations\u2019 slot creates a formal mechanism between workers and social organizations that contributes to Reserve Military Training Units (RMTUs), particularly the Youth League and the Young Red Guards. Finally, the head of the Party Cadres\u2019 Affairs formalizes the SAC\u2019s role in human resources decision-making. Previously, this was done purely through party control mechanisms. And the two Party Central Committee Secretary\/Director slots codify and enhance the SAC\u2019s predominance in North Korea\u2019s political and strategic decision-making cultures.<\/p>\n
Together, these changes consolidate and bolster Kim Jong Un\u2019s decision making authority as SAC Chairman. For instance, the SAC Chairman no longer \u201cguides the work of the SAC\u201d because the Central Committee and\/or General-Secretary can transmit the SAC\u2019s work via Party controls. Article 90 in the constitution even confers recess powers (i.e., between SPA sessions) on the SAC Chairman, granting him the ability to dismiss, appoint or suspend \u201cmajor state officials,\u201d explicitly including the SPA President and DPRK Premier, as well as SPA deputies. While the SPA still elects the SAC Chairman, according to Article 87, the SAC Chairman has a fixed term of five years and the SPA can no longer remove him from office.<\/p>\n
Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications<\/p>\n
Article 89 of the revised constitution establishes Kim Jong Un\u2019s direct command and control over North Korea\u2019s nuclear weapons (\u201ccommand authority over the state\u2019s nuclear forces\u201d) concurrently as SAC Chairman and Supreme Commander of the Korean People\u2019s Army (KPA). The article also establishes the devolution of authority to launch nuclear weapons, meaning in a crisis, or what Pyongyang perceives to be a crisis, Kim Jong Un has the option (may) delegate authority for a nuclear counterstrike to the Nuclear Forces Command (NFC) under the State Affairs Commission (SAC).<\/p>\n
It is highly probable that this does not represent a change to DPRK nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3). Rather, this merely codifies and publicizes, in broad terms, North Korean planning in the event of war or a decapitation strike targeting leadership facilities. Devolved NC3 authority has most likely been on the books for years, especially as it was written into the 2022 Law on Nuclear Forces, along with other war-time contingency planning including devolved conventional force command and control. The article\u2019s mention of delegated NC3 essentially underscores to domestic and foreign audiences North Korean intentions to launch a nuclear counterstrike should Kim Jong Un and core leadership be targeted in an invasion. Notably, because the NFC is part of the constitutional responsibilities of the SAC Chairman, suggesting that that it is subordinate to the SAC.<\/p>\n
Conclusion <\/p>\n
These changes to the constitution are only half of the story. Without a copy of the Party Charter as it stands after the Ninth Party Congress, it is difficult to discern the interplay between party authority and the government. This is needed to fully understand the substantive shifts of regime power and process.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"(Source: Korean Central News Agency) The most recent North Korean (Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea or DPRK) constitution…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":14211,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[4343,3138,31,5620,33,4724],"class_list":{"0":"post-14210","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-south-korea","8":"tag-constitution","9":"tag-domestic-affairs","10":"tag-korea","11":"tag-michael-madden","12":"tag-south-korea","13":"tag-supreme-peoples-assembly"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14210","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14210"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14210\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14211"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14210"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14210"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14210"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/KCNA-SPA-26-0323-300x198.png\")
(Source: Korean Central News Agency)<\/p>\n