{"id":2377,"date":"2026-05-05T02:57:37","date_gmt":"2026-05-05T02:57:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/2377\/"},"modified":"2026-05-05T02:57:37","modified_gmt":"2026-05-05T02:57:37","slug":"north-korea-economy-resources-trade","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/2377\/","title":{"rendered":"North Korea – Economy, Resources, Trade"},"content":{"rendered":"

Kanggye<\/a>Timber-processing factory, Kanggye, N.Kor.(more)<\/p>\n

North Korea has a command<\/a> (centralized) economy. The state controls all means of production, and the government sets priorities and emphases in economic development. Since 1954, economic policy<\/a> has been promulgated<\/a> through a series of national economic plans. The early plans gave high priority to postwar reconstruction and the development of heavy industries, especially chemicals and metals. Subsequent plans focused on resource exploitation and improving technology, mechanization, and infrastructure<\/a>. Little attention was given to agriculture until the 1970s, and it was not until the late 1980s that much effort was made to improve the quality and quantity of consumer goods.<\/p>\n

Reliable information on the performance of the North Korean economy usually has been lacking. Outside observers have concluded that the country<\/a> has consistently failed to meet its stated goals and that production statistics released by the government often have been inflated. Thus, although North Korea has made strong efforts to transform an essentially agrarian economy into one centred on modern industry<\/a> in the post-Korean War<\/a> years, it is generally believed that the country has been only partially successful.<\/p>\n

North Korea\u2019s economic goals have always been linked to the general government policy of self-reliance (juche, or chuch\u2019e). The country shunned<\/a> foreign investment, although it accepted considerable economic aid from the Soviet Union<\/a> and its satellite eastern European countries as well as from China<\/a>. Despite its stated policy of self-reliance, North Korea routinely found it necessary to import such essential commodities as fuels and machinery as well as grain.<\/p>\n

By the early 1990s, North Korea had begun to experience severe economic hardships. The Soviet Union had collapsed, and the communist regimes of its eastern European allies had fallen, depriving North Korea of most of its trading partners and much of its former aid. China reduced but did not completely cut off its provision<\/a> of materials to North Korea, but in 1992 it began to demand cash payments in place of grants-in-aid or credit accounts. In addition, in the mid-1990s the country suffered a series of natural disasters, including floods and drought. Serious grain and food shortages resulted, and starvation and malnutrition were widespread throughout the country.<\/p>\n

The situation improved somewhat by the end of the decade because of a massive infusion of international food assistance. In July 2002 the government proclaimed a new policy intended to deal with the huge gap that had developed between the official economy and the so-called \u201creal people\u2019s economy\u201d (i.e., a black market<\/a>), which was in the throes of runaway inflation<\/a>. But the measures served only as a temporary stopgap; well into the first decade of the 21st century, the highest priority of the government remained the solution of what it called \u201cthe food problem.\u201d<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\"7:023<\/p>\n

Britannica Quiz<\/p>\n

Which Country Is Larger By Area? Quiz<\/p>\n

<\/a> <\/p>\n

In addition to North Korea\u2019s acceptance of foreign aid<\/a> during the 1990s, its poor economic performance during the decade forced the government to begin opening up the economy to limited foreign investment and increased trade. By the end of that decade, North Korea was actively inviting foreign investment from European Union<\/a> (EU) countries, South Korea<\/a>, and others. It was more receptive to discussions with EU and Commonwealth<\/a> countries than it was to the United States<\/a>, Japan<\/a>, and South Korea\u2014the latter three countries having been much more at odds diplomatically and strategically with North Korea since the Korean War (in the case of Japan, since the colonial period) than the others. However, since those three countries have been the main sources of foreign aid in the early 21st century, North Korea has maintained at least minimal contact with each of them.<\/p>\n

Efforts have been made throughout North Korea\u2019s history to increase low labour productivity. In the late 1950s the state adopted a mass-mobilization measure called the Ch\u2019\u014fllima (\u201cFlying Horse\u201d) movement that was patterned on China\u2019s Great Leap Forward<\/a> of 1958\u201360. Subsequently, in the early 1960s, programs were instituted in agricultural and industrial management, called respectively the Ch\u2019ongsan-ni Method and Taean Work System. In the late 1990s the country adopted the official goal of building a strong military and a prosperous economy, adopting the motto \u201cKangs\u014fng taeguk\u201d (\u201cStrong and prosperous nation\u201d). Under this slogan Kim Jong Il<\/a> paid meticulous<\/a> attention to the military, his primary base of power, while opening parts of the economy to accommodate foreign investment and trade. North Korea even allowed parts of its territory to be used by foreign (South Korean) businesses, including the sightseeing areas around Mount K\u016dmgang, in the southeast, and the Kaes\u014fng Industrial Complex, in the southwest. However, the operation of these enclosed and restricted areas, known as special economic districts (gy\u014fngje t\u2019\u016dkgu), was conducted strictly under North Korean supervision and was only for the purpose of collecting foreign currencies (mainly U.S. dollars), not as part of the country\u2019s overall economic activity.<\/p>\n

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing <\/p>\n

By 1958 all privately owned farms were incorporated into more than 3,000 cooperatives<\/a>; each cooperative comprises<\/a> about 300 families on about 1,200 acres (500 hectares). The farm units are controlled by management committees, which issue orders to the work teams, set the type and amount of seed and fertilizer<\/a> to be used, and establish production quotas. Produce is delivered to the government, which controls distribution through state stores. There are also state and provincial model farms for research and development<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Agriculture contributes a decreasing proportion to the national economy, but there has been an overall increase in cultivated<\/a> land, irrigation projects, the use of chemical fertilizers, and mechanization. Nonetheless, since the early 1990s, North Korea has had a chronic shortage of chemical fertilizers, seed grains, and farming equipment. Farmers are paid for their labour in money or in kind and are allowed to keep chickens, bees, fruit trees, and gardens. In theory, farmers can sell surplus produce at local markets that are held periodically, but with the food crisis that began in the mid-1990s, any surplus above the subsistence level disappeared. Although farmers fared relatively better than most urban workers during the lean years, even they struggled for survival.<\/p>\n

The main food crops are grains\u2014notably rice<\/a>, corn (maize), wheat, and barley. The country formerly produced enough rice for domestic consumption<\/a>, but some is now imported. Wheat had to be imported even before the period of food shortages, although wheat productivity increased after the mid-1950s. Potatoes, sweet potatoes, soybeans and other beans, vegetables, and tree fruits are raised extensively. Industrial crops include tobacco, cotton, flax<\/a>, and rape (an herb grown for its oilseeds). Livestock raising is concentrated in areas poorly suited for crop raising. Livestock production has increased steadily, especially poultry production, over the country\u2019s history. However, all sectors of agricultural production were drastically affected during the food crisis.<\/p>\n

The northern interior contains large forest reserves of larch<\/a>, spruce, and pine trees. Most of the coastal slopes have been extensively deforested, however, much of this having been done<\/a> by the Japanese during World War II; reforestation programs have stressed economic forestry. Forestry production, after having declined following the war, has not grown substantially. Much of the wood cut is used as firewood. During the severe fuel shortage that accompanied the years of economic crisis, North Koreans indiscriminately\u2014and often illegally\u2014cut down trees for firewood. Many hillsides in the country are now barren; the loss of forest cover contributes to massive flooding in the monsoon<\/a> season, which in turn leads to poor harvests and further economic hardships.<\/p>\n

The sea is the main source of protein for North Koreans, and the government has continually expanded commercial fishing<\/a>. Most fishing activity centres on the coastal areas on each side of the peninsula, although there was an increase in deep-sea fishing beginning in the late 20th century. The main species caught include pollack, sardines<\/a>, mackerel<\/a>, herring<\/a>, pike<\/a>, yellowtail, and shellfish. Aquaculture represents about one-fourth of the country\u2019s fish production.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"KanggyeTimber-processing factory, Kanggye, N.Kor.(more) North Korea has a command (centralized) economy. The state controls all means of production,…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":2378,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[170,1252,1251,1250,31,34],"class_list":{"0":"post-2377","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-north-korea","8":"tag-article","9":"tag-britannica","10":"tag-encyclopeadia","11":"tag-encyclopedia","12":"tag-korea","13":"tag-north-korea"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2377","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2377"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2377\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2378"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2377"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2377"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2377"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}