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The text of North Korea\u2019s (Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea; DPRK) latest constitution recently surfaced<\/a> in South Korea, making it the first publicly available constitution since the September 2023 revision.[1]<\/a> A review of this law shows the country made changes across a broad range of areas, from Kim Jong Un\u2019s state leadership to economic, social, and cultural policies. Most of them, if not all, merit further research given the importance of this foundational legal document. However, one of the most consequential elements is what the revised constitution suggests about Pyongyang\u2019s longer-term design vis-\u00e0-vis Seoul.<\/p>\n The constitution largely confirms what Kim Jong Un himself had previewed in his December 2023 proclamation<\/a> of a two-state policy and his follow-on calls<\/a> in January 2024 for constitutional revisions. It treats South Korea (referred to specifically as the \u201cRepublic of Korea,\u201d or the ROK, in the document) as a separate state across its \u201csouthern border\u201d by adding a territorial clause and removing the longstanding constitutional unification framework. However, the revised text stops short of codifying some of Kim\u2019s more explicit early 2024 formulations, namely: 1) the territorial clause remains vague and does not mention the contested maritime border, the Northern Limit Line (NLL); and 2) it does not define Seoul as the \u201cprimary foe\u201d or a \u201chostile state.\u201d This has given way to some positive assessments that North Korea may be aiming for \u201cpeaceful coexistence.\u201d<\/a> South Korea\u2019s National Intelligence Service, for instance, even suggested<\/a> the constitution \u201csignificantly toned down hostility\u201d and signaled the intent to \u201cmaintain the status quo\u201d rather than adopt an offensive posture.<\/p>\n However, when viewed in tandem with broader trends and the context in which it was revised, the new constitutional provisions on defense industry development and military preparedness, combined with Kim\u2019s increased anti-South Korea rhetoric and his sharply increased military- and defense-related public appearances since the Ninth Party Congress, all suggest that Pyongyang is laying the groundwork not for \u201cpeaceful coexistence\u201d but rather for a prolonged period of hostile two-state coexistence.<\/p>\n What the Constitution Says\u2026 And Doesn\u2019t<\/p>\n It is worth comparing North Korea\u2019s latest constitution with the revisions Kim Jong Un called for in a January 2024 speech to the Supreme People\u2019s Assembly (SPA). Kim said these issues should be deliberated on at the \u201cnext SPA,\u201d which would have been October 2024, though these changes could have been made at any time from October 2024 to March 2026. [2]<\/a>[3]<\/a><\/p>\n These changes are notable less for what they say than for what they omit.<\/p>\n First, although the constitution now includes a territorial clause defining North Korean territory, it does so in ambiguous terms: it simply describes the DPRK as bordering China and Russia to the north, the ROK to the south and the territorial waters and airspace as \u201cestablished on that basis.\u201d By omitting any mention of the NLL, North Korea also left unresolved key questions regarding this maritime boundary, which it has historically rejected and which has long been one of the Peninsula\u2019s most dangerous flashpoints.<\/p>\n Second, even while codifying Kim Jong Un\u2019s two-state policy by removing reunification and one-nation wording, the revised constitution avoided using the explicitly hostile language that Kim Jong Un used in January 2024, such as references to \u201coccupying, subjugating and reclaiming the ROK and annex[ing] it\u201d in the event of a war, or defining South Korea as an enemy. The latter omission is especially notable because North Korean state media in October 2024, shortly after the SPA had revised<\/a> the constitution, reported<\/a> that the law \u201cstipulates the ROK as a completely hostile state.\u201d<\/p>\n \u201cPeaceful Coexistence\u201d or \u201cHostile Coexistence\u201d?<\/p>\n At a glance, the ambiguities of the territorial clause and the omission of explicitly hostile language could suggest Pyongyang is intentionally preserving strategic flexibility. However, the constitution should be viewed holistically, both in conjunction with the spirit of the law and the broader trends in North Korea\u2019s public messaging. A review of both point to North Korea\u2019s preparation for continued hostile, rather than peaceful, coexistence with Seoul.<\/p>\n The constitution includes some new provisions that receive comparatively less public attention but are nonetheless important. Newly added Articles 60 and 61 stipulate:[4]<\/a><\/p>\n Article 60: The state shall develop defense science and technology and continuously raise the level of the Juche-orientation, modernization, and scientization of the defense industry.<\/p>\n Article 61: The state shall establish a culture of giving importance to military affairs throughout the entire society and ensure thorough preparation for an all-people war of resistance.<\/p>\n These reflect Kim Jong Un\u2019s broader policy direction since 2023, namely his repeated calls<\/a> for \u201cwar,\u201d \u201ccombat,\u201d or \u201cfight\u201d preparations since a Workers\u2019 Party of Korea (WPK) Central Military Commission meeting<\/a> in early 2023 raised the issue of \u201cmore strictly perfecting the preparedness for war,\u201d and his unusual attention<\/a> to the munitions and defense industries since August that year. The emphasis on defense science and technology and the defense industry is also consistent with the 2021 WPK Charter preamble, which stated that the Party \u201cshall continuously consolidate the country\u2019s defense capabilities by \u2026 developing a self-supporting defense industry.\u201d[5]<\/a> The constitution further reinforces this priority by referencing the defense industry also in the preamble itself.<\/p>\n Article 61 is significant in that it elevates ongoing \u201cwar of resistance\u201d preparation efforts to the constitution. In December 2023\u2014shortly before Kim brought up<\/a> \u201call-people war of resistance\u201d\u2014North Korea enacted a \u201cLaw on the Organization and Operation of the People\u2019s Unit [also known as inminban].\u201d Article 21 of this law stipulated inminban leaders\u2019 role in \u201cpreparations for an \u201call-people war of resistance.\u201d[6]<\/a><\/p>\n Similarly, North Korea\u2019s position toward South Korea hardened during and after the February 2026 Ninth Party Congress, where it defined domestic and foreign policy goals for the next five years.<\/p>\n Though not codified into the constitution, a summary report<\/a> of the Party Congress reaffirmed that the \u201cDPRK remains strong and conclusive in its determination and will to regard the ROK just as a very hostile state and eternal enemy\u201d and clarified \u201cthe Party\u2019s military and strategic policy of fortifying at an early date the southern borderline adjacent to the ROK.\u201d It then issued the blunt threat of \u201cthe ROK\u2019s complete collapse\u201d if it engages in \u201cmischievous acts conducted on the doorstep of a nuclear weapons state.\u201d\u00a0Kim\u2019s speech<\/a> to the SPA the following month, where the North made its last round of revisions to the constitution, similarly declared that \u201cwe will categorically reject, ignore and treat the ROK with the most explicit words and actions by officially regarding it as the most hostile state.\u201d<\/p>\n Notably, Kim Jong Un\u2019s military- and defense-related public appearances have jumped from 27 percent before the Party Congress, to roughly 64 percent since that event was held.[7]<\/a> Consistent with the border fortification policy outlined at the Party Congress, his most recent public appearances have explicitly mentioned the planned deployment<\/a> of \u201cnew-type self-propelled gun-howitzers\u201d to the southern border, and a Party policy<\/a> of \u201cstrengthening the first-line units in the southern border and turning the border line into an impregnable fortress.\u201d<\/p>\n Furthermore, since its launch in April 2025, North Korea has conducted multiple tests<\/a> of the destroyer Choe Hyon in the Yellow Sea (\u201cWest Sea\u201d), where the NLL is disputed, with Kim ordering<\/a> the ship commissioned into the navy in mid-June 2026. Although the territorial clause does not mention the NLL, Kim\u2019s January 2024 speech did reaffirm the country\u2019s longstanding position on this boundary: \u201cAs the southern border of our country has been clearly drawn, the illegal \u2018northern limit line\u2019 and any other boundary can never be tolerated\u2026.\u201d Although the Choe Hyon is intended for deployment with the East Sea Fleet, the ship\u2019s capability tests in the Yellow Sea indicate that militarily challenging the NLL remains a realistic option. In this light, Kim\u2019s remark<\/a> at the Choe Hyon launch ceremony that North Korea\u2019s preemptive naval strike \u201cis not limited to any place or to any line\u201d feels all the more ominous.<\/p>\n One could argue that the gap between the constitution\u2019s hedged language and state media\u2019s explicitly hostile rhetoric reflects deliberate ambiguity, preserving flexibility for future engagement under different political conditions. However, that reading is difficult to sustain when the constitution\u2019s latest version postdates the Ninth Party Congress\u2014suggesting its provisions align with the Party\u2019s directives.<\/p>\n The more convincing interpretation is that Pyongyang is separating the law from policy: using the constitution as a foundational document that codifies the two-state reality without constraining its operational freedom, while articulating hostility toward South Korea through Kim\u2019s speeches, Party doctrine, and defense policy. In this sense, the omission of language such as \u201cprimary foe\u201d or \u201cannex\u201d should not be read as moderation.<\/p>\n Implications and Conclusion<\/p>\n Despite ambiguities and omissions of explicitly hostile formulations, the revised constitution is best understood not as preserving space for future engagement, but as codifying long-term, if not permanent, adversarial coexistence between two sovereign Korean states. That does not preclude future tactical engagement or periods of reduced tension. However, under a hostile coexistence framework, such episodes should be read as tactical instruments, not evidence of a genuine shift in Pyongyang\u2019s long-term posture.<\/p>\n The risk of misreading this is significant. Constitutional ambiguity can look like diplomatic flexibility, but the weight of evidence points consistently in one direction. Treating the omission of explicitly hostile language as a moderating signal, without corroboration from North Korea\u2019s behavior, would be the kind of analytical error that hardens into policy miscalculation.<\/p>\n