A conventional narrative holds that China\u2013North Korea relations have declined as Russia\u2013North Korea ties deepened. However, this view mischaracterizes the Russia\u2013North Korea partnership as the cause of weakening China\u2013North Korea relations. In fact, the dynamic may be running in the opposite direction: Pyongyang\u2019s frustration with Beijing likely preceded and motivated its efforts to strengthen ties with Moscow as an alternative.<\/p>\n
First, at the bilateral level, Beijing appears to have increased economic pressure on North Korea. In 2023, Chinese authorities began cracking down on Chinese vessels illegally fishing in North Korean waters, a practice Beijing had tolerated for years.3 These vessels paid access fees to Pyongyang, suggesting that fishing rights constituted a meaningful source of foreign currency earnings for North Korea. China\u2019s crackdown therefore likely disrupted a steady revenue stream for the regime. Beijing also restricted imports of North Korean seafood, further tightening economic enforcement against Pyongyang.4 Similarly, China\u2019s Ministry of Commerce has intensified inspections aimed at preventing illegal ship-to-ship oil transfers to North Korea in or near Chinese waters, which often involve Chinese, Russian, and third-country vessels.5 In 2024, Chinese authorities confiscated smuggled goods and seized North Korean speedboats used for maritime smuggling.6\u00a0China is also believed to have pressured Pyongyang to recall its overseas workers en masse, although North Korea reportedly preferred a gradual withdrawal, as these workers generate valuable foreign currency.7<\/p>\n
At the trilateral level, China has appeared less committed to its relationship with North Korea than Russia has. Table 1 summarizes major developments in North Korea\u2013Russia relations alongside periods of relatively cool China \u2014 North Korea relations. From Pyongyang\u2019s perspective, Russia seems to place greater value on strategic cooperation with North Korea than China does. This contrast was most vividly illustrated during the 70th Armistice Anniversary in Pyongyang in July 2023. China sent Li Hongzhong, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People\u2019s Congress, while Russia dispatched Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. The disparity in rank was widely interpreted as signaling Beijing\u2019s lower degree of strategic prioritization.8<\/p>\n
In addition, while Russia has consistently defended North Korea\u2019s position in the United Nations, China\u2019s diplomatic support has been more limited. Most notably, in 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explicitly stated that Moscow \u201crespects\u201d North Korea\u2019s possession of nuclear weapons and \u201cunderstands\u201d the rationale behind its nuclear development.9 By contrast, Beijing has avoided statement that could be interpreted as recognizing or legitimizing Pyongyang\u2019s nuclear status.<\/p>\n
These developments raise an important question: why did China adopt a more distant posture toward Pyongyang throughout 2023 and 2024? Notably, the cooling of China\u2013North Korea ties coincided with a period in which Beijing expanded high-level dialogue with the United States.10 For China, North Korea is not merely a bilateral issue but also a variable \u2014 and often times a source of friction \u2014 in China\u2019s broader relationship with the West. Following the summit between President Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden at the APEC Leaders\u2019 meeting in November 2023, Beijing appeared determined to stabilize U.S.\u2013China relations in order to minimize further strain on the Chinese economy.11 China has likewise sought to preserve economic exchanges with European countries, as access to European markets, technology, investment, and export destinations remains important for sustaining China\u2019s economic growth amid rising strategic competition with the United States.12 In this context, North Korea\u2019s belligerent behavior became a liability for China\u2019s efforts to stabilize relations with the West.\u00a0<\/p>\n
Western scrutiny of China\u2019s enforcement of sanctions on North Korea also increased during this period, complicating Beijing\u2019s efforts to stabilize relations with the United States and Europe. In November 2023, U.S. ambassadors and their counterparts at the United Nations \u2014 including the EU envoy \u2014 sent a letter to China expressing concern over satellite imagery showing oil tankers in Chinese ports and territorial waters in violation of sanctions on North Korea.13 Beijing responded with its usual claim that it \u201cstrictly implements sanctions and fulfills international obligations.\u201d14 To sustain credibility, however, Beijing needed to ensure that its actions matched its rhetoric, prompting intensified crackdowns on illicit activities linked to North Korea. As noted above, Beijing strengthened sanctions enforcement against North Korea by tightening controls on illicit oil transfers, fishing activities, and North Korean labor arrangements, thereby exposing the growing divergence between Chinese and North Korean interests.15<\/p>\n
From North Korea\u2019s perspective, China\u2019s distancing was likely particularly painful in the post-COVID era. The North Korean economy had already been severely strained by the triple shock of international sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and chronic economic mismanagement. Compared to 2016, North Korea\u2019s exports fell by 94.3% and its imports by 61.5% in 2022.16 At a time when Pyongyang urgently needed external support, China moved in the opposite direction and intensified sanctions enforcement. Uncertain about Beijing\u2019s intentions, North Korea turned to Russia for economic assistance, diplomatic backing, and military cooperation. Yet the closer North Korea aligns with Russia, the more likely China may tighten its enforcement measures \u2014 creating a vicious cycle of growing divergence and mistrust between Beijing and Pyongyang.<\/p>\n
China\u2019s ambivalent stance toward Russia\u2013North Korea military cooperation is likely to have further deepened Pyongyang\u2019s distrust of Beijing. In 2024, rather than promoting trilateral coordination with Russia and North Korea, Beijing resumed a trilateral summit with South Korea and Japan after a five-year suspension.17 Notably, on the same day that President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang in June 2024, Beijing held a security dialogue with Seoul.18 From the perspectives of both Pyongyang and Moscow, such moves may have reinforced doubts about China\u2019s willingness to deepen their military cooperation. It would not be surprising if Moscow shared a similar sense of frustration\u00a0regarding Beijing\u2019s apparent preference to keep its distance.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"A conventional narrative holds that China\u2013North Korea relations have declined as Russia\u2013North Korea ties deepened. However, this view…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":70456,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[12923,519,29630,19927,78,36756,12048,31,2659,36757,34,6919],"class_list":["post-70455","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-north-korea","tag-arts","tag-asia","tag-asia-society","tag-blog","tag-business","tag-countries","tag-education","tag-korea","tag-lifestyle","tag-non-profit","tag-north-korea","tag-policy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70455","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=70455"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/70455\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/70456"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=70455"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=70455"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=70455"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}