{"id":85778,"date":"2026-07-14T12:08:10","date_gmt":"2026-07-14T12:08:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/85778\/"},"modified":"2026-07-14T12:08:10","modified_gmt":"2026-07-14T12:08:10","slug":"why-north-korea-is-emphasizing-coal","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/85778\/","title":{"rendered":"Why North Korea is emphasizing coal"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Hard-hatted<\/a>Rodong Sinmun, the ruling Workers’ Party’s official newspaper, reported on July 5 that workers at the 2.8 Jikdong Youth Coal Mine are determined to mark this meaningful year through increased coal production. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)<\/p>\n

North Korea held the second plenary session<\/a> of the ninth Central Committee of the Workers\u2019 Party of Korea from June 20 to 22. According to Rodong Sinmun, the party\u2019s official newspaper, the meeting\u2019s purpose was to review North Korea\u2019s progress on 2026 party and state policies. These policies stem from strategic tasks set by the Ninth Party Congress and the new five year plan. The party also said it aimed to discuss and resolve pressing issues needed to put socialist construction on a stable, sustained path of development.<\/p>\n

The second agenda item at the plenary session was titled \u201cOn Boosting the Coal Industry and Transforming Coal Mining Towns Nationwide.\u201d North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said overcoming the coal sector\u2019s remaining backwardness is an urgent task for the successful completion of the new five year plan.<\/p>\n

Kim linked this to construction under his \u201cRegional Development 20\u00d710\u201d policy, which calls for building a factory in a different county each year over a decade<\/a>. Kim also said solving housing problems for coal miners is as important as transforming rural housing, calling it an equally massive construction undertaking. He ordered the creation of coal mining district construction headquarters at the central and provincial levels. He also called for stronger design and construction capacity, along with reliable supplies of equipment, materials and transport, so full scale construction can begin next year. He gave specific instructions to design housing and public buildings suited to mining districts and to turn the Chonsong Youth Coal Mine into a model mine.<\/p>\n

I see this coal push as an extension of Kim\u2019s broader development agenda. In December 2021, at the fourth plenary session of the eighth Central Committee, Kim unveiled the \u201cNew Era Rural Revolution Program,\u201d a rural development policy meant to boost agricultural output and modernize rural living conditions. The policy rests on what North Korea calls the Three Revolutions: ideological, technical and cultural.<\/p>\n

On March 15 this year, Kim visited the Chonsong Youth Coal Mine, part of the Sunchon Youth Coal Mining Complex in South Pyongan province, where he voted in Supreme People\u2019s Assembly elections and met with miners. \u201cFor people to live, grain farming must go well,\u201d he said. \u201cFor the state to live, coal farming must go well. Coal has been and remains the heart of our industry and the engine of our self-reliant economic development.\u201d<\/p>\n

Before that, Kim\u2019s first economic field visit after the Ninth Party Congress took him to the Sangwon Cement Complex in Sangwon county, North Hwanghae province, on March 1. The complex produces roughly one third of North Korea\u2019s annual cement output, about 2 million tons, and was named one of the country\u2019s 10 best enterprises in both 2023 and 2024. Kim told workers there that the party and government regard the complex\u2019s output as one of the most important strategic indicators of national development.<\/p>\n

Why Kim is prioritizing coal<\/p>\n

In my view, three factors explain why Kim is emphasizing coal so heavily right now.<\/p>\n

First, coal underpins his push for a self-reliant energy supply. At the sixth plenary session of the eighth Central Committee in late 2022, Kim set 12 key priorities for the national economy. Grain came first, electricity second and coal third. That ranking tells me North Korea sees coal as a lifeline for both the state and its people\u2019s economy.<\/p>\n

Sanctions and high global oil prices make it difficult for North Korea to import crude oil or other energy resources<\/a>, so it has leaned on its relatively abundant domestic reserves of anthracite and lignite. Higher coal output feeds thermal power plants, which in turn support the metal and chemical industries that agriculture and other sectors depend on. This year marks the first year of North Korea\u2019s new five year economic plan, and state media has emphasized meeting targets without exception,<\/a> touting early achievement of annual goals at mines nationwide. Rodong Sinmun has also reported that young people, university students and members of the Socialist Women\u2019s Union have volunteered to support coal mines, rural areas and raw material bases.<\/p>\n

Second, I believe the coal push is tied to stabilizing cement supplies for the local factories, hospitals and service centers built under the Regional Development 20\u00d710 policy<\/a>. Coal and cement may look like unrelated industries, but they are closely linked. In cement production, coal is not just a fuel; the ash left over from burning it is recycled as a raw material for cement itself.<\/p>\n

Third, the push reflects an effort to overcome outdated mining technology and modernize coal towns. Rural and mining areas are places most North Korean people try to avoid living<\/a>. Improving conditions there, in my assessment, is meant to boost worker morale and productivity, in line with Kim\u2019s rural development agenda. North Korea\u2019s mines also suffer from aging equipment, flooded shafts and power shortages that keep productivity low. The pilot project to digitize and automate the Chonsong Youth Coal Mine as a model mine looks like an attempt to address exactly this problem.<\/p>\n

What this means for the two Koreas<\/p>\n

So what does North Korea\u2019s coal push mean for South Korea?<\/p>\n

First, I see it as a potential opening for energy cooperation if inter-Korean relations improve. North Korea\u2019s coal reserves, including anthracite and lignite, are estimated at about 20.5 billion tons, making it one of the world\u2019s five largest coal-rich countries by reserves<\/a>. South Korea, by contrast, imports all of its coal. If sanctions ease and relations improve, the two sides could build a mutually beneficial model that pairs South Korean mining and processing technology with North Korean coal resources.<\/p>\n

Second, this issue is directly tied to climate policy and carbon neutrality on the Korean Peninsula. A deeper North Korean reliance on coal could hurt the region\u2019s environment. If North Korea expands low-efficiency thermal power and coal chemical industries, it would release more fine dust and greenhouse gases that affect air quality across the peninsula. I believe South Korea should prepare climate and energy cooperation policies that can help North Korea shift toward renewable or lower-carbon energy sources over time.<\/p>\n

Finally, I think South Korea needs a proactive strategy for future energy integration on the peninsula and for North Korea\u2019s regional development. We should keep monitoring the scale of North Korea\u2019s coal industry investment and infrastructure trends in mining regions. Doing so would let us prepare systematically for any future integration of the two Koreas\u2019 energy systems, while also allowing us to develop rural development plans that connect with North Korea\u2019s ongoing Regional Development 20\u00d710 policy.<\/p>\n

\u00a0This column reflects the author\u2019s personal views. Columns by outside contributors do not necessarily reflect Daily NK\u2019s editorial position.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Rodong Sinmun, the ruling Workers’ Party’s official newspaper, reported on July 5 that workers at the 2.8 Jikdong…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":85779,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[28319,141,31,5581,450,9260,5912,454],"class_list":["post-85778","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-korea","tag-central-committee","tag-kim-jong-un","tag-korea","tag-mining","tag-ninth-party-congress","tag-regional-development","tag-sanctions","tag-workers-party-of-korea"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/85778","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=85778"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/85778\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/85779"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=85778"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=85778"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/korea\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=85778"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}