![\"Daily](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/nato\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/1787047751_947_0x0.jpg\")
<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Georgian, European Union and NATO flags are seen in Tbilisi, Georgia on September 23, 2025. (Photo by Jakub Porzycki\/NurPhoto via Getty Images)<\/p>\n
NurPhoto via Getty Images<\/p>\n
Last month, dozens of heads of state, defense ministers, policymakers, and defense experts traveled<\/a> to Ankara for the 2026 NATO Summit. During the two-day event, representatives from NATO\u2019s 32 member states discussed defense spending. They also focused heavily on NATO\u2019s work to strengthen the defense industrial base and improve defense manufacturing. Finally, the Alliance continued to pledge its support for Ukraine, with several NATO members announcing new defense aid packages.<\/p>\n Noticeably absent from the summit, however, was Georgia. Since the 2008 NATO Summit, the Alliance has regularly engaged<\/a> with Georgia as a country aspiring to join the organization. NATO established<\/a> the NATO-Georgia Commission in 2008 to strengthen relations with Georgia as the Alliance looks to guide Georgia\u2019s reform efforts and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Then, in 2010, NATO created<\/a> a liaison office in Georgia to further support reform efforts. As a NATO partner, Georgia has also regularly participated in NATO military training and exercises.<\/p>\n But this year, Georgian media reported<\/a> that representatives from the Georgian government were not present at the 2026 NATO Summit. The Ankara Summit Declaration, issued<\/a> at the conclusion of the summit in Turkey this July, also made no mention of Georgia or NATO\u2019s engagement and support for this country. In fact, the last time Georgia was mentioned<\/a> in a NATO declaration was after the 2024 Washington Summit, where NATO called on Russia to withdraw its forces from Georgia. Since then, Georgia has not been mentioned in declarations following the 2025 and 2026 NATO Summits.<\/p>\n \u201cThe growing distance between Georgia and NATO should be seen through interconnected lenses: Georgia\u2019s democratic backsliding and a broader geopolitical reorientation that has increased Russia\u2019s influence over the country\u2019s strategic direction,\u201d Eto Buziashvili, a Research Fellow at the Atlantic Council\u2019s Digital Forensic Research Lab, told me in an interview. \u201cRuling Georgian Dream\u2019s authoritarian consolidation, retreat from the country\u2019s previously declared Euro-Atlantic trajectory, anti-Western rhetoric, and policies increasingly aligned with Russia\u2019s strategic interests have made meaningful political integration increasingly difficult.\u201d<\/p>\n When asked about NATO\u2019s relationship with Georgia last year, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said that he was \u201chighly worried<\/a>\u201d about democratic backsliding in Georgia. Additionally, the 2025 NATO Secretary General\u2019s Annual Report, published<\/a> in March of this year, stated that, following the aftermath of the 2024 Georgian parliamentary elections, \u201celements of NATO-Georgia cooperation were reprioritised.\u201d Nonetheless, the Alliance reaffirmed that \u201cdefence cooperation with the Georgian Defence Forces progressed.\u201d<\/p>\n Meanwhile, following the conclusion of the 2026 NATO Summit and the Georgian government\u2019s absence from the two-day event, former Georgian Ambassador to NATO Levan Dolidze said<\/a> that, at one time, \u201cGeorgia was NATO\u2019s most valuable partner.\u201d Now, Georgia\u2019s status has been \u201ccalled into question.\u201d<\/p>\n Similarly, former Georgian Minister of Defense Tinatin Khidasheli wrote<\/a> on her Facebook page that Georgia was \u201cexcluded from partnership events [with NATO] due to democratic backsliding.\u201d She added that NATO-Georgia relations are now \u201ceffectively frozen.\u201d<\/p>\n Georgia\u2019s distancing from NATO, as well as the European Union, has been apparent under Georgian Dream, the ruling political party in Georgia. Following the 2024 Georgian parliamentary elections, Georgian Dream suspended<\/a> its accession talks with the EU. Additionally, Georgian Dream closed<\/a> its information center on NATO and the EU. Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili also argued<\/a> that integration with NATO and the EU could force Georgia into a war with Russia (although the Russian Federation has occupied roughly 20% of Georgian territory since the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008).<\/p>\n \u201cI think the recent distance in relations follows the pattern of Georgian Dream\u2019s foreign policy, especially since 2022, so this is not an isolated NATO-related story,\u201d Giorgi Beroshvili, an editor at New Eastern Europe magazine, told me in an interview. \u201cFrozen EU talks, rhetoric about \u2018global war party\u2019, being left off the recent summit\u2019s agenda for the first time in over a decade. It adds up.\u201d<\/p>\n In response to Georgian Dream\u2019s actions, members of the Georgian opposition and Georgian citizens have gathered<\/a> across the country to protest Georgian Dream. Unlike the ruling party in Georgia\u2019s government, the opposition and Georgian citizens support integration efforts with NATO and the EU. According to a poll conducted<\/a> by the Institute of Social Studies and Analysis last year, 74% of Georgians surveyed support NATO membership, and 86% support Georgia\u2019s accession efforts to the EU.<\/p>\n Georgian citizens have also called for democratic reforms in the country. Since the parliamentary elections in October 2024, Georgians have organized daily protests<\/a>, which continue<\/a> to this day. The protestors have accused<\/a> Georgian Dream of \u201cdrawing on methods long associated with authoritarian practices in Russia.\u201d The protestors are hopeful that their demonstrations will lead to new parliamentary elections and the restoration of Georgia\u2019s integration efforts with NATO and the EU.<\/p>\n