{"id":3244,"date":"2026-06-23T20:32:15","date_gmt":"2026-06-23T20:32:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/nato\/3244\/"},"modified":"2026-06-23T20:32:15","modified_gmt":"2026-06-23T20:32:15","slug":"nato-and-ukraine-turning-to-private-sector-to-help-crater-russian-airfields-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/nato\/3244\/","title":{"rendered":"NATO And Ukraine Turning To Private Sector To Help Crater Russian Airfields"},"content":{"rendered":"

One of Russia\u2019s biggest advantages in the war against Ukraine is its ability to launch tactical airstrikes from bases largely out of reach of kinetic responses. While we have frequently reported about Ukrainian attacks<\/a> on these bases, they aren\u2019t sustained enough to stop Russia from generating devastating sorties<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Now Ukraine and NATO are looking to the private sector for ways of changing that equation through what is being called the Airfield Denial Challenge<\/a>. It offers a 250,000 Euro award to companies or individuals who come up with workable ideas to prevent Russia from being able to use its air bases.<\/p>\n

\"\ufffd\ufffd\"<\/p>\n

\ufffd\ufffd<\/p>\n

The NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre (JATEC) and NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) have announced the Persistent Airfield Denial Innovation Challenge to find a solution to block enemy airfields. (1\/5)<\/p>\n

\"\u2b07\"<\/p>\n

\u2b07<\/p>\n

pic.twitter.com\/8uKWWEI5pQ<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2014 NATO in Ukraine (@NATOinUkraine) June 22, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

\u201cThe Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) operational experience has firmly established that the ability of the adversary to project air power from secure rear-area airfields remains one of the most consequential asymmetries in the current conflict,\u201d according to NATO\u2019s Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation <\/a>(SACT). \u201cEnemy tactical aviation, operating from bases beyond the reach of conventional Ukrainian strike assets, continues to conduct strikes using guided aerial bombs, cruise missiles, and stand-off munitions against friendly forces, critical infrastructure, and civilian population centers.\u201d<\/p>\n

Objective control footage shows the aftermath of a FAB-250\/500 airstrike carried out by a Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Su-34M fighter-bomber on a warehouse in Kharkiv used to store UAVs and their components. pic.twitter.com\/vnynslqFiO<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2014 Tsar Ivan<\/p>\n

\"\ufffd\ufffd\"<\/p>\n

\ufffd\ufffd<\/p>\n

(@RusHonorBG) June 20, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

The goal of this program is lofty.<\/p>\n

\u201cEach sortie originates from an airfield. Every airfield is a node of vulnerability: if it can be persistently denied, the adversary\u2019s air campaign is fundamentally disrupted at source,\u201d SACT suggested.<\/p>\n

You can see video from one of the Ukrainian attacks on Russian tactical aviation bases below.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s Morozovsk Airbase is currently under Ukrainian drone attack, with several explosions seen in the vicinity of the airfield. <\/p>\n

Morozovsk is home to a number of Russian Air Force Su-34 fighterbombers. pic.twitter.com\/CnEP4U8tjv<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2014 OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) April 4, 2024<\/a><\/p>\n

Ukraine\u2019s ongoing efforts to halt these attacks are insufficient, SACT posited.<\/p>\n

\u201cCurrent workarounds: manned strike aviation, ground-based long-range fires (MLRS, ballistic missiles), and conventional single-unit loitering munitions have demonstrated limited effectiveness against defended airfield targets,\u201d SACT argued. \u201cThey lack the mass-effect, persistence, and EW (Electronic Warfare)-resilience required to simultaneously suppress airfield infrastructure across multiple aim points in a contested environment.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"Ukrainian<\/p>\n

Ukraine has carried out many strikes on airfields, including one on the Morozovsk airbase in Russia. (Google Earth) Google Earth<\/p>\n

The \u201cbattlefield logic is clear,\u201d the NATO subcommand added. \u201cPoint-defense and reactive interception of individual weapons must be complemented by persistent denial at the source.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u201cWe must find technologies that will help to permanently limit the enemy\u2019s use of aviation infrastructure: aircraft, runways, fuel and ammunition storage facilities, and ground support infrastructure,\u201d the Ukrainian Defense Ministry (MoD) explained. \u201cUkrainian miltech companies, startups, and engineering teams are invited to participate.\u201d<\/p>\n

SACT said the challenge is technically agnostic and that it is looking for ideas that include, but not are not limited to, the following:<\/p>\n

\u2022 Uncrewed aerial systems of any configuration or range class<\/p>\n

\u2022 Autonomous or semi-autonomous munitions and loitering systems<\/p>\n

\u2022 Swarming and mass-effect approaches<\/p>\n

\u2022 Alternative delivery mechanisms beyond conventional aerial platforms<\/p>\n

\u2022 Hybrid solutions combining multiple technologies<\/p>\n

Regardless of what type of solution is presented, it \u201cmust be capable of operating in GPS-denied and EW-contested environments, across all weather conditions and seasons, and must demonstrate a credible path to rapid fielding.\u201d<\/p>\n

In addition, SACT is looking for systems that can conduct sustained strikes deep into contested airspace, operate without \u201ccontinuous human control,\u201d be fully autonomous and deliver \u201csufficient mass and precision to suppress multiple aim points across an airfield simultaneously.\u201d<\/p>\n

SACT also wants systems that require minimal training, and have AI-assisted target acquisition that \u201creduces reliance on expert judgment.\u201d<\/p>\n

The solicitation comes with the understanding that whatever solutions are presented won\u2019t be proven, but should be at least in the mid-to-upper tier of the military technology readiness level<\/a> (TRL) scale. It includes systems ranging from those having \u201chigh fidelity\u201d laboratory integration of components to those with prototypes \u201cnear, or at, planned operational systems.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"U.S.<\/p>\n

U.S. Army<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, any solution that will take more than a year to be fielded won\u2019t be considered.<\/p>\n

The deadline for submissions is July 20. Ten finalists will be selected on August 11 and will be invited to a \u201cpitch day\u201d on Sept. 3, tentatively in Poland, to showcase their designs.<\/p>\n

Whether this ambitious program will actually lead to the fielding of any systems that can persistently deny Russia the ability to launch aircraft is very much in question.<\/p>\n

As we have frequently reported<\/a>, Ukraine has one of the world\u2019s most innovative defense technology infrastructures that has created drones<\/a>, missiles<\/a> and other weapons designed, tested and fielded under intense wartime conditions. However, it has still been unable to achieve the goals being sought by this challenge.<\/p>\n

One of the big issues Kyiv faces is the limited amount of funds to pursue some of these advances and what the Atlantic Council has described as<\/a> \u201cUkraine\u2019s inability to mass produce sophisticated weapons or sustain stable military supply chains.\u201d<\/p>\n

Getting an idea into the hands of NATO, which has developed a half-billion fund to develop weapons for Ukraine<\/a>, could ultimately help turn an idea into a workable weapon to keep Russian tactical aviation at bay. Even if that happens, though, the time it would take to develop these weapons at a scale large enough to make a real difference would be a formidable endeavor.<\/p>\n

Contact the author: howard@twz.com<\/p>\n