At NATO\u2019s July 7-8 Ankara Summit, President Donald Trump can land a big success: advancing a NATO alliance with greater European military contributions, able to handle Russia\u2019s ongoing aggression and support Ukraine\u2019s defense and future security. But will Trump take the win?\u00a0<\/p>\n
For decades, U.S. presidents have pushed European allies to build up their military capabilities. Thanks to Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s threats and Trump\u2019s pressure, the United States is finally winning the argument. Key allies \u2013 especially Poland\u00a0<\/a>and\u00a0Germany<\/a> \u2013 are building up their militaries. Germany and others are deploying more forces to help defend NATO\u2019s most endangered members \u2013 especially the\u00a0Baltic states<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n The Trump administration calls the new, effective alliance that it seeks \u201cNATO 3.0.\u201d In that narrative, \u201cNATO 1.0\u201d was the Cold War-era NATO that kept the peace and contained the Soviet threat in Europe; \u201cNATO 2.0\u201d was more globally engaged (e.g., in Afghanistan) but also less focused and weaker, with European countries letting their militaries shrink. NATO 3.0 would return the alliance to its original purpose of defending Europe from Kremlin aggression, but with European forces more front and center. \u00a0<\/p>\n The Trump administration has succeeded in framing the NATO Summit in these terms: NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has accepted<\/a> that delivering on \u201cNATO 3.0\u201d \u2013 meaning greater European military contributions \u2013 is the goal for the Ankara Summit. Privately, senior civilian and military officials at NATO headquarters and countries on Europe\u2019s exposed Eastern tier say that they accept and even welcome NATO 3.0, with its call for greater European defense capability, including from their own countries. But their caveat is that the United States must do its part: maintain critical military capacity in Europe, be ready to fight if the Russians attack a NATO ally, and, critically, plan the transition to greater European military contributions so there are no gaps in defense coverage. <\/p>\n This is where concerns arise: the Trump administration risks blowing up the emerging deal through chaotic troop withdrawals<\/a>\u00a0from Europe,\u00a0suggestions<\/a> that the United States will reduce its NATO military contributions to nuclear backup and not much else, and quiet but alarming\u00a0ambivalence<\/a> about whether it will honor its obligations to help defend all NATO allies. <\/p>\n The larger question\u00a0being\u00a0posed by\u00a0officials in some of the countries doing the most\u00a0to put meat on the bones of\u00a0NATO 3.0\u00a0is whether the Trump administration seeks\u00a0in good faith\u00a0to rebalance the\u00a0alliance or\u00a0instead\u00a0wants the United States\u00a0to\u00a0disengage from European security\u00a0at\u00a0a\u00a0time when the threat from the Kremlin is greater than at any\u00a0point\u00a0since the early\u00a01980s.\u00a0The answer\u00a0so far\u00a0seems to be that the\u00a0administration includes senior people in both camps:\u00a0those\u00a0who\u00a0seek\u00a0a better alliance (with greater European\u00a0military contributions) and those whose\u00a0objective\u00a0is to pull the United States\u00a0largely out\u00a0of Europe\u00a0regardless of the threat.\u00a0<\/p>\n What to Watch for in Ankara\u00a0<\/p>\n \u00a0There\u2019s\u00a0a lot at stake\u00a0in the Ankara Summit.\u00a0Here\u2019s\u00a0what to look for:\u00a0<\/p>\n Agreement on increased\u00a0defense\u00a0capabilities.\u00a0The\u00a0high point of\u00a0NATO\u2019s\u00a02025\u00a0summit at The Hague\u00a0was\u00a0its\u00a0agreement<\/a>\u00a0for\u00a0allies to reach\u00a03.5 percent\u00a0of GDP\u00a0for\u00a0hard defense spending and 1.5\u00a0percent\u00a0of\u00a0GDP\u00a0for\u00a0defense- and security- related\u00a0spending\u00a0by 2035.\u00a0This was a major success for the Trump administration\u00a0and something\u00a0considered out of reach when first floated.\u00a0The Ankara Summit will need to\u00a0show results in terms of\u00a0achieving\u00a0increased defense capabilities\u00a0rather than just budgetary inputs.\u00a0Doing so will vindicate the\u00a0argument made among the more pro-NATO\/pro-free world\u00a0parts of the administration\u00a0that\u00a0continued investment in the alliance\u00a0remains\u00a0in\u00a0the\u00a0U.S interest.\u00a0The\u00a0summit\u00a0declaration\u00a0could\u00a0also\u00a0endorse easing conditions for joint production and licensing\u00a0between\u00a0allies (and Ukraine)\u00a0for defense production, especially of\u00a0high-end weapons in short supply, like long-range\u00a0cruise missiles and drones.\u00a0<\/p>\n Language on the threat from Russia\u00a0and collective defense.\u00a0The Hague Summit\u00a0Declaration referred to\u00a0\u201cthe long-term threat posed by Russia to Euro-Atlantic security.\u201d\u00a0Russian\u00a0threats and actions against NATO nations\u00a0remain\u00a0high: sabotage,\u00a0drone\u00a0overflights<\/a>, infrastructure\u00a0attacks,\u00a0and\u00a0assassinations\u00a0among them, with the possibility of more if opportunity arises.\u00a0The\u00a0Ankara Summit\u00a0Declaration\u2019s\u00a0language on Russia\u00a0should be\u00a0just\u00a0as strong, including by referring to Russia\u2019s threat not just to Europe but to Euro-Atlantic security, meaning the United States\u00a0as well.\u00a0The\u00a0Hague Summit Declaration also\u00a0referred to the\u00a0\u201cironclad commitment to collective defense as enshrined in\u00a0Article 5 of the Washington [NATO] Treaty\u201d\u00a0that\u00a0declares that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all.\u00a0Anything less\u00a0will be interpreted, including by the Kremlin, as\u00a0NATO\u00a0softening\u00a0its\u00a0support\u00a0for its most vulnerable members and thus inviting more Kremlin pressure\u00a0\u2013\u00a0or worse.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Assurance on\u00a0U.S.\u00a0military presence in Europe.\u00a0During the Cold War, the United States had\u00a0about\u00a0300,000<\/a>\u00a0permanently stationed troops in Europe.\u00a0There are currently about\u00a080,000\u00a0U.S.\u00a0troops\u00a0stationed\u00a0in Europe, a\u00a075 percent\u00a0reduction.\u00a0Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has\u00a0announced<\/a>\u00a0that an\u00a0additional\u00a0review of U.S.\u00a0forces in Europe is underway.\u00a0General Alexus Grynkevich, NATO\u2019s\u00a0supreme\u00a0allied\u00a0commander,\u00a0helpfully\u00a0qualified this by\u00a0suggesting<\/a>\u00a0that planned U.S.\u00a0reductions will take place\u00a0over time and be coordinated with European allies to avoid gaps in coverage.\u00a0<\/p>\n At a minimum, the Ankara Summit should produce an agreement on the principle of no gaps in defense coverage while force presence is adjusted over time.\u00a0Going through with major force reductions in Europe while Russia is waging a war of conquest in Europe, however,\u00a0seems questionable.\u00a0So\u00a0even better, the United States\u00a0could reverse or put on hold its earlier announcements of withdrawals of its forces from Europe. This could include reversing or postponing\u00a0its\u00a0planned withdrawal<\/a>\u00a0of a brigade combat team from Germany or its\u00a0decision to cancel<\/a>\u00a0the deployment of a long-range fires battalion to Germany. The United States could also make good on\u00a0Trump\u2019s\u00a0announcement<\/a> of an\u00a0additional\u00a0deployment of 5,000 U.S. forces to Poland by specifying how this will be done. Clever drafting of such an announcement could avoid the appearance of a climbdown for the administration while emphasizing that greater European contributions made such force adjustments possible.\u00a0<\/p>\n Reliance (or\u00a0overreliance)\u00a0on the U.S.\u00a0nuclear umbrella.\u00a0Nuclear coverage may be\u00a0emerging\u00a0as an\u00a0exception to\u00a0the\u00a0United\u00a0States\u2019 drawdown of forces in Europe.\u00a0Reports\u00a0suggest<\/a>\u00a0that the\u00a0United States\u00a0may balance its conventional drawdown with an increase in nuclear weapons\u00a0or dual-use capability in Europe.\u00a0Given Russian threats to use nuclear weapons against Europe, this is a welcome step. But if increased nuclear coverage is intended as an alternative to U.S.\u00a0conventional support\u00a0for NATO security, it could perversely weaken\u00a0the alliance\u2019s\u00a0security\u00a0by forcing\u00a0overreliance on nuclear weapons to deter Russian aggression. In the 1950s, the United States\u00a0faced this problem\u00a0with its doctrine of \u201cmassive [nuclear] retaliation<\/a>\u201d against potential Soviet attacks on NATO, a strategy that raised the question of whether the United States would actually risk nuclear attacks on its own cities by deploying nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. The Ankara Summit could mitigate this risk by endorsing increased nuclear cooperation not as a substitute for, but as a complement to, conventional deterrence and defense of all of NATO against Russian or other aggression.<\/p>\n Support for\u00a0Ukraine\u2019s security.\u00a0NATO membership for Ukraine\u00a0seems\u00a0more remote\u00a0than it was at the Washington NATO Summit in 2024.\u00a0That Summit\u2019s Declaration\u00a0included<\/a>\u00a0the line that \u201cUkraine\u2019s future is in NATO.\u201d\u00a0The\u00a02025 NATO Summit\u00a0Declaration\u00a0didn\u2019t mention<\/a>\u00a0Ukraine\u2019s potential NATO membership\u00a0at\u00a0all.\u00a0But Ukraine\u2019s military position has\u00a0improved since\u00a0then, with\u00a0Kyiv\u00a0emerging\u00a0as a leader in modern military tactics and\u00a0technology, including the design and deployment of drones.\u00a0To use Trump\u2019s famous formula from his\u00a0contentious meeting<\/a>\u00a0with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in February 2025, Ukraine has cards.\u00a0Zelenskyy will be present at Ankara.\u00a0The\u00a0summit\u00a0declaration\u00a0should back\u00a0defense cooperation with Ukraine, including\u00a0joint\u00a0defense production\u00a0and technology sharing,\u00a0and\u00a0increased provision of weapons\u00a0through NATO\u2019s\u00a0Prioritized\u00a0Ukraine Requirements List, a\u00a0mechanism that\u00a0entails\u00a0Europeans\u00a0paying for U.S.\u00a0defense items.\u00a0Given significant\u00a0congressional support for\u00a0Ukraine, the United States\u00a0could announce a creative way to resume funding for munitions and weapons for Ukraine,\u00a0perhaps as\u00a0a \u201clend-lease\u201d type arrangement that might include\u00a0U.S.\u00a0access to Ukrainian defense technologies.\u00a0<\/p>\n In parallel with security support for Ukraine,\u00a0the Ankara Summit could call for\u00a0negotiations to end the Russia-Ukraine War, starting with an immediate, unconditional ceasefire in place. It\u00a0should\u00a0do so coupled with a statement that its members will never recognize Russian annexation of any part of Ukrainian territory, modeled on the U.S.\u00a0Welles Declaration<\/a>\u00a0of 1940\u00a0on\u00a0non-recognition of\u00a0the\u00a0Soviet annexation of the Baltic States\u00a0and the\u00a0Crimea\u00a0Declaration\u00a0<\/a>of\u00a02018, signed\u00a0during Trump\u2019s first term,\u00a0on\u00a0non-recognition of Russia\u2019s annexation of Crimea.\u00a0<\/p>\n