Then, he itemized: $999 billion for America, $90.5 billion for Britain, $66.5 billion for France, $48.8 billion for Italy, $44.3 billion for Poland, adding \u201cRidiculous!\u201d he concluded.<\/p>\n
NATO leaders convene in Ankara next week for a summit already strained by allied refusal to join the U.S. war in Iran, by the Greenland fight, and by months of presidential threats to walk away from the alliance altogether.<\/p>\n
Four of those five figures from Trump match, to the decimal, NATO’s own spending tables<\/a>\u2014the alliance’s annual expenditure report, which the post cites by its date range, \u201c(2014-2025).\u201d<\/p>\n Only the American number improved in transit: NATO’s 2025 estimate for the U.S. is $980 billion, not $999 billion.<\/p>\n And the report’s opening page defines what all of these figures measure: payments each government makes for its own armed forces, for other allies’ forces, or for the alliance as a whole.<\/p>\n It\u2019s a census of national defense budgets, not a ledger of dues. The president’s evidence that NATO costs America a trillion dollars is a document explaining that it doesn’t.<\/p>\n But curiouser still, Trump is characterizing NATO as a charitable endeavor funded by American benevolence rather than naked self-interest. Were that so, NATO simply wouldn\u2019t exist. <\/p>\n Trump’s Got a Point<\/p>\n Measured in raw dollars, the imbalance is undeniable, and it is not even close.<\/p>\n By the alliance’s tally, the U.S. will spend $980 billion on defense in 2025, more than the other 30 armed allies combined, whose estimated total comes to about $608 billion.<\/p>\n It is a gap that has defined NATO politics for a decade, and the burden-sharing complaint deserves more respect than many of the alliance’s defenders, particularly those in European capitals, are willing to give it.<\/p>\n Trump\u2019s pressure has also, demonstrably, worked.<\/p>\n At the 2025 summit in The Hague, allies committed to invest<\/a> 5 percent of GDP in defense by 2035\u20143.5 percent for core military requirements, up to 1.5 percent for broader security spending.<\/p>\n Read More on Analysis<\/p>\n European allies and Canada raised defense expenditure by nearly 20 percent in real terms in 2025, to more than $571 billion in 2021 prices, and for the first time<\/a> every ally met or exceeded the old 2 percent floor.<\/p>\n \u201cFor too long, European Allies and Canada were over-reliant on U.S. military might,\u201d Secretary General Mark Rutte conceded in March, the NATO chief himself validating the premise of the American complaint.<\/p>\n Wealthy allies surely should not treat American power as a permanent fixture of the landscape.<\/p>\n A serious alliance cannot rest on one country absorbing the risk, funding high-end capabilities, and quietly swallowing any political grief at home while the rest of them play catch-up<\/a>, if they are even trying at all beneath the rhetoric of compliance.<\/p>\n There is even a fair test attached. The Hague trajectory gets reviewed in 2029; if Europe converts its new money into headline percentages rather than deployable capability, the transactional critique will have earned another hearing.<\/p>\n NATO, though, must not be reduced in American minds\u2019 to a deadweight expense.<\/p>\n Trump\u2019s Dubious NATO Invoice<\/p>\n \u201cSpending on NATO\u201d is doing dishonest work in the president’s arithmetic.<\/p>\n The money members actually pay to the organization\u2014NATO’s common-funded budgets<\/a> for headquarters, commands and shared infrastructure\u2014runs about $6.3 billion in 2026<\/a>, of which the American share, roughly 15 percent, is under $1 billion.<\/p>\n Everything else on Trump’s list is what each country spends on its own military, and that\u2019s the substance of his complaint.<\/p>\n The White House eyes generous European welfare spending, compares it to lackluster allied defense budgets, and sees an American subsidy through NATO; a debt-funded peace dividend guaranteed by U.S. taxpayers.<\/p>\n But for the U.S., that $980 billion also buys the Pacific fleet, Middle East operations and the nuclear triad\u2014defense costs that would not vanish if NATO dissolved tomorrow.<\/p>\n The post’s Germany line collapses against the same document. \u201cOthers, including Germany, are MUCH LOWER,\u201d Trump wrote.<\/p>\n Berlin’s most recent reported figure in those tables\u2014$93.7 billion in 2024\u2014was the largest defense budget in Europe, ahead of Britain’s.<\/p>\n (Germany’s 2025 entry is marked not yet available, which may explain its absence from the list, but not the claim made about it.)<\/p>\n The same report’s per-capita table records a first in alliance history: Norway now spends more on defense per citizen than the U.S. does.<\/p>\n The receipt Trump is waving contradicts him on nearly every line except the top one.<\/p>\n Article 5 Paid America Back First<\/p>\n NATO’s central promise has been invoked exactly once, and it was invoked, as is oft-repeated to Washington by frustrated allies, for the U.S.<\/p>\n Article 5 was activated<\/a> after the September 11, 2001, attacks, once the North Atlantic Council determined on October 2 that they qualified as an attack on all.<\/p>\n The response was forceful: allies agreed on eight support measures, and Operation Eagle Assist sent seven NATO radar aircraft\u2014with 830 crew members from 13 countries\u2014to fly more than 360 sorties patrolling American skies.<\/p>\n Other allies fought alongside the U.S. in Afghanistan, including Britain, losing hundreds of servicemembers and spending tens of billions of dollars on the war.<\/p>\n The alliance’s most famous guarantee moved aircraft, crews and intelligence in defense of the country now being told it received nothing.<\/p>\n A skeptic might argue that was a quarter century ago, and the allies sat out Iran this spring, when Trump had called on them\u2014albeit informally, outside of the NATO structure\u2014to materially support Operation Enduring Freedom.<\/p>\n Trump has fumed since March that NATO is a \u201cone way street\u201d<\/a> because members declined to join the Iran war.<\/p>\n But NATO is a defensive treaty, built to answer attacks on members, not to staff a member’s war of choice; by its actual job description, sitting out was the system working.<\/p>\n And even while declining to fight, the alliance carried the war in various ways.<\/p>\n The Republican chairmen of both Armed Services committees credited Germany with providing \u201cseamless access, basing, and overflight\u201d<\/a> for U.S. operations against Iran.<\/p>\n Allied air defenses shot down Iranian ballistic missiles<\/a> fired toward Turkey, according to testimony from the alliance’s top commander.<\/p>\n A one-way street does not usually carry your bombers in both directions.<\/p>\n Europe Is America’s Launchpad<\/p>\n NATO’s deeper value is geography converted into American global reach.<\/p>\n The Air Force’s main operating bases in Europe<\/a> include Lakenheath and Mildenhall in Britain, Ramstein and Spangdahlem in Germany, Aviano in Italy, Lajes in the Azores and Incirlik in Turkey.<\/p>\n Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee at a March posture hearing<\/a>, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, the U.S. European Command chief and NATO’s supreme allied commander, described his command’s core task<\/a> as harnessing Europe’s strategic advantages\u2014its geography, its collective military capability and its economic capacity\u2014to protect vital U.S. interests.<\/p>\n His predecessor put it in even plainer terms.<\/p>\n Access, basing and overflight arrangements in Europe, Gen. Christopher Cavoli told the same committee<\/a>, enable America to \u201cproject U.S. combat power not just within Europe, but globally,\u201d and proved crucial to the defense of Israel in 2024.<\/p>\n The missile-defense architecture makes the same argument in steel and radar.<\/p>\n NATO’s ballistic missile shield<\/a> pairs commonly funded assets with U.S. contributions.<\/p>\n The Aegis Ashore site was declared mission-ready<\/a> at Redzikowo, Poland, in July 2024, along with its twin in Romania, Navy destroyers sailing from Rota, Spain, and an early-warning radar at Kurecik, Turkey.<\/p>\n Moreover, NATO says<\/a> its nuclear deterrence relies on U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe, supported by allied aircraft and infrastructure, while Washington retains \u201cabsolute control and custody\u201d of the weapons.<\/p>\n European allies certainly benefit greatly from living underneath the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But the U.S. also reaps strategic advantages from being able to host its weapons on the European continent with NATO allies.<\/p>\n A country receiving bases, radar, ports, airfields, overflight rights, operational depth and political cover is receiving a return. The return does not erase the cost. But it explains why the cost exists in the first place. And charity is not one of the reasons.<\/p>\n The Market Is Security Policy<\/p>\n The economic case sounds softer than troops and missiles, so it often gets missed. But it\u2019s just as robust.<\/p>\n U.S. goods trade with the European Union totaled an estimated $1.05 trillion<\/a> in 2025, with services trade adding roughly $500 billion more in 2024, by the trade representative’s count\u2014the largest commercial relationship in the world, sustained across a market of some 450 million consumers.<\/p>\n NATO isn\u2019t a heavily-armed trade association, but the data demonstrates the scale of the American stake in a Europe that stays stable, open, and aligned with Washington rather than Moscow or Beijing.<\/p>\n This is where the word \u201cprotection\u201d turns misleading. The U.S. is not guarding a remote museum of postwar gratitude.<\/p>\n It is securing one of its principal economic zones, the infrastructure through which its own forces move, and the political space in which allied governments\u2014as the Iran war just demonstrated\u2014keep the runways lit even for American wars they refuse to join.<\/p>\n The better argument, in Ankara and after, is a hard bargain.<\/p>\n Trump is right to keep pressing allies to carry more of the load; the spending curve since The Hague shows the pressure works.<\/p>\n He is wrong to describe NATO as a favor performed for strangers, because the alliance gives America forward defense, operational access, missile protection for deployed forces and a shield around an immense economic relationship.<\/p>\n A charity asks for gratitude, but a bargain can be renegotiated without pretending the asset is worthless.<\/p>\n Trump may be using his familiar maximalist style of dealmaking in browbeating NATO. But a smart negotiator prices the asset before threatening to tear up the lease, especially when it\u2019s so valuable to them that they can\u2019t thrive without it.<\/p>\n In a polarized era, the center is dismissed as bland. At Newsweek, ours is different: The Courageous Center\u2014it’s not “both sides,” it’s sharp, challenging and alive with ideas. We follow facts, not factions. If that sounds like the kind of journalism you want to see thrive, we need you.<\/p>\n When you become a Newsweek Member<\/a>, you support a mission to keep the center strong and vibrant. Members enjoy: Ad-free browsing, exclusive content and editor conversations. Help keep the center courageous. Join today.<\/a><\/p>\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/nato\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/Top.png\"\/)
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