The following is an adapted version of an article written by the Minister for Regional Development and Public Administration and researcher at the Europe Strategy Research Institute Tibor Navracsics, originally published in Hungarian on the Five Minutes Europe blog of Ludovika.hu.

The Luxembourg Compromise, signed on 29 January 1966, resolved the first major crisis of European integration and also set a precedent for the future on how to manage conflicts of national interest and assert national interests in Community decision-making. It was, therefore, a success, as Community institutions began functioning again after six months of paralysis. It is important to note, however, that the Commission—which is tasked with promoting the Community interest—played only a marginal role in resolving the crisis, so the success is primarily attributable to the member states.

All of this marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of European integration. The euphoria of the early years had come to an end; a time when it might have seemed to many that the interests of the European Community could take precedence over and dominate the national interests of the member states and a new era began in which integration—and the functioning of Community institutions—ultimately and decisively followed the logic of the member states’ national interests. The Commission emerged as the big loser of this shift, having to abandon for the time being its ambition—as envisioned by Jean Monnet—to dictate the pace and direction of integration to the member states as their leader.

The earlier-than-planned completion of the customs union on 1 July 1968 was apparently a success of functional integration. In reality, however, it was yet another urgent signal to the member states that they, instead of the ailing Commission, must take matters into their own hands if they are to achieve the main objective of economic integration, the establishment of the common market.

‘The Commission emerged as the big loser of this shift, having to abandon for the time being its ambition…to dictate the pace and direction of integration’

The fall of the first President of the Commission clearly signalled a turning point. The Council did not extend Walter Hallstein’s mandate on 30 June 1967. The Commission, now headed by Jean Rey—a joint body of all three integration organizations, the European Economic Community, Euratom, and the European Coal and Steel Community—was primarily concerned with resolving its own organisational issues. Hence, the member states took the management of common affairs into their own hands with even greater courage than before.

Another turning point was the unexpected weakening of French domestic politics by French President Charles de Gaulle, who was considered one of the strong men of Europe in that decade, and as a result, he resigned in 1969, only to die that same year. His successor, George Pompidou, retained the traditionally intergovernmental character of French European policy but showed a greater willingness than his predecessor to cooperate with other member states. Thus, issues that the European Community had previously dealt with unsuccessfully—primarily due to de Gaulle’s resistance—were able to be put on the agenda.

The Hague Summit, held on 1 and 2 December 1969, officially marked the end of the neo-functional era of European integration and the beginning of the intergovernmental period. The Heads of State and Government of the member states gathered in The Hague to decide on three issues of decisive importance for the future of European integration. In addition to completing the construction of the common market, the member states decided to take the next step towards the Economic and Monetary Union, a common currency, and the establishment of foreign policy coordination. Overall, this meant deepening their integrational cooperation. The member states also decided on the first wave of enlargement. Overcoming de Gaulle’s veto, they created an opportunity for the EFTA member states to begin accession negotiations. The opportunity was eventually taken by Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, who joined the European Community in 1973.

The continuation of the Hague Summit would later be institutionalized as the European Council in Community—and later EU—decision-making. Alongside the Council, this institution occupies a clearly dominant position, primarily in the area of ​​defining strategic directions, thus ensuring that national interests play a fundamentally decisive role in the major decisions of European integration.

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