In his victory speech on the evening of 12 April, after learning the election results, Péter Magyar called on Tamás Sulyok to resign. At an international press conference the following day, he stated that he expects the President of the Republic to convene the inaugural session of the National Assembly at the earliest date permitted by law, invite him to form a government, and then resign.

Two days later, the President of the Republic personally received the leaders of the parties that had entered parliament at Sándor Palace. The chairman of the Tisza Party reiterated the demand at the meeting, and then on 20 April, at the press conference following the first Tisza faction meeting, he also said that the ‘Orbán puppets’ must leave their positions; the President of the Republic, the President of the Constitutional Court, and the President of the Curia were given until 31 May to do so, after which, according to Magyar, the new government will begin to establish the legal framework for their removal.

Tamás Sulyok’s office responded briefly to the future prime minister’s ultimatum: ‘The legal status of the President of the Republic and the conditions for holding office are clearly regulated by the Fundamental Law’ – experts interpret the statement as indicating that the President of the Republic does not plan to leave his position.

Fidesz, which is leaving power, also reacted to the declaration: CitizenGo launched a petition in favour of Tamás Sulyok remaining in office, the Fidesz faction urged its supporters to sign it, and Viktor Orbán himself added his signature to it.

‘Experts interpret the statement as indicating that the President of the Republic does not plan to leave his position’

The tension is not accidental, because despite the fact that the Hungarian head of state does not have strong powers, with the political veto and the means of norm control, he can be a serious obstacle (check and balance) to Péter Magyar’s two-thirds government—all political figures know this.

‘Unfit and unworthy’

‘He is unfit and unworthy to be the guardian of the rule of law in Hungary, to be a moral example and standard for the Hungarian people,’ Péter Magyar said at a press conference following his consultation with the head of state.

According to the prime minister-designate awaiting inauguration, Sulyok is unfit to embody the unity of the nation and to safeguard the rule of law. ‘There have been many occasions when he should have spoken out in defence of children or safeguarded the democratic state order,’ said Péter Magyar, referring to Article 9(1) of the Fundamental Law, according to which the President of the Republic ‘shall embody the unity of the nation and be the guardian of the democratic functioning of the state organization.’

Several ‘accusations’ regarding Tamás Sulyok’s suitability have appeared in the Hungarian press. Without claiming to be exhaustive, the authors suggest that, according to certain documents, there is a well-founded suspicion that he, as a lawyer, previously participated in concluding contracts that enabled the illegal acquisition of land by foreign interest groups; that, as President of the Constitutional Court between 2016 and 2024, he did not do everything possible to prevent the government from weakening the rule of law; and that, following the elections, in which a two-thirds majority voted for ‘regime change’, Sulyok, as the Fidesz candidate, thereby lost his ‘social legitimacy’ in the position of head of state.

Péter Magyar made no secret of the fact that if the public dignitaries he had summoned did not resign, they would be removed by a constitutional amendment.

‘Sulyok, as the Fidesz candidate…lost his “social legitimacy” in the position of head of state’

The Tisza Party’s prime ministerial candidate previously suggested that they would consider introducing the institution of direct presidential elections instead of indirect ones, and that strengthening the presidential powers might also be timely—this could be another way to remove Tamás Sulyok from the Sándor Palace before his mandate expires.

In the meantime, two private individuals also stepped in and submitted a referendum initiative to the National Electoral Office, which states that Parliament should enshrine in law that, in the future, the electorate can directly decide on the President of the Republic. The Office must make a decision on the matter within 60 days; thus, this will be done by mid-June.

Constitutional Debate

The legal situation is not simple. The Hungarian Fundamental Law does not recognize the concepts of ‘unworthiness’ or ‘unsuitability’ for the President of the Republic. (This condition does exist for other positions, such as local government representatives, mayors, or government officials.)

The constitutional reason for this is that the Hungarian head of state has no political responsibility towards parliament in the Hungarian parliamentary system, and therefore cannot be removed for political, professional reasons, or in the event of a loss of confidence.

‘The Hungarian Fundamental Law does not recognize the concepts of “unworthiness” or “unsuitability” for the President of the Republic’

Article 12(1) of the Fundamental Law states that ‘The person of the President of the Republic shall be inviolable’—this means that the head of state enjoys legal and political protection during his term of office. He has immunity, meaning that criminal proceedings cannot be initiated against him while in office, and he cannot be held accountable for his political decisions or actions. However, this does not in itself mean that he cannot be removed from office.

The legislator left one hole in the enhanced, almost hermetic protection of the dignity of the head of state, providing only one procedure for the removal of the president: the impeachment procedure, but strictly only in the event that the head of state has intentionally violated the Fundamental Law or another law in connection with the exercise of his office, or if he has committed an intentional crime. (We will discuss this at the end of our article.)

Several renowned Hungarian lawyers also took part in the legal debate.

Constitutional lawyer László Majtényi, president of the Eötvös Károly Institute, opined that although the two-thirds mandate allows the constitution to be rewritten (and according to him, this is the opportunity for the new majority to create a truly consensual constitution through social consultations), it would be reckless to touch the text of the Fundamental Law just because of changes in personnel.

According to constitutional lawyer Zoltán Lomnici Jr, the head of state cannot be removed by constitutional means. The adviser to Századvég drew attention to the fact that there is no political impeachment procedure in the Hungarian legal system, but instead there is another legal institution: the National Assembly, as a political body, can decide to initiate the impeachment procedure, but only the Constitutional Court can establish the facts and apply the sanction. Lomnici stated that removing the president for political reasons would seriously undermine the authority of the office of the head of state, destabilize the state organization, and this would be a clear violation of the separation of powers.

‘It would be reckless to touch the text of the Fundamental Law just because of changes in personnel’

Criminal lawyer Péter Hack argued that neither the Fundamental Law nor the law regulating the legal status of the President uses the concept of ‘suitability’, and yet, in a constitutional state, it is a fundamental requirement that, in the event of removal from office, the grounds be precisely defined and a legal violation be proven; otherwise, a ‘removal by legislative manoeuvre undermines one of the fundamental pillars of the constitutional state: legal certainty.’ According to the ELTE law professor, the new government must proceed with caution, because ‘their decision sets a precedent; just as they are dismissing the president now, they can dismiss his successor in the same way.’

Béla Pokol, a former constitutional judge and legal scholar, went further. In his view, Péter Magyar’s pressure could exhaust the concept of constitutional violation: by criticizing and calling for the resignation of the head of state in a manner not specified by the constitution, without specifying concrete reasons, and by describing the ‘inviolable’ head of state as a ‘puppet’, he violated the principle of the separation of powers. According to the right-wing legal scholar, Tamás Sulyok should request a constitutional interpretation from the Constitutional Court regarding Magyar’s alleged violation of the Hungarian Constitution before the inaugural session of parliament, and if the suspicion proves to be correct, Magyar would thereby have rendered himself incapable of taking the oath of office.

How Can the Head of State Be Recalled?

As mentioned above, the removal of the president according to the Fundamental Law can only take place within the framework of the impeachment procedure, in the event that the head of state has intentionally violated the Fundamental Law or another law in connection with the exercise of his office, or if he has intentionally committed a criminal offense.

‘If the suspicion proves to be correct, Magyar would thereby have rendered himself incapable of taking the oath of office’

This can be initiated by a written motion by one-fifth of the members of Parliament, and then two-thirds of the members must vote for it. The impeachment procedure is conducted by the Constitutional Court, and if the President of the Republic establishes his public liability based on evidence, he can be deprived of his office.

Lawyers draw attention to the fact that, with a two-thirds majority in Parliament, the Tisza Party could easily refer the case to the Constitutional Court if it wished; however, the Court only conducts a strict review of specific, evidence-based cases, and no such concrete violations have arisen in relation to Tamás Sulyok since his appointment. Moreover, the majority of Constitutional Court judges were elected by the Fidesz-majority Parliament, and replacing them would be a similarly complex procedure to replacing the head of state.

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