Right-wing social media is outraged over Hungary’s new foreign minister’s statements regarding the country’s migration policy under the new administration, accusing the Tisza Party and Péter Magyar of ‘betraying’ their voters.

During Monday’s ministerial hearings, Anita Orbán—not related to Viktor Orbán—responded to questions by stating that the daily €1 million fine imposed on Hungary over non-compliance with EU migration policy must be brought to an end. This, she suggested, would require allowing asylum seekers arriving at Hungary’s borders to submit applications for refugee status.

Orbán added that the EU’s Migration Pact does ‘not entail mass immigration into Hungary’, but rather ‘mutual assistance’ among member states facing significant migratory pressure—whether through accepting a limited number of migrants or offering financial or logistical support.

The news quickly went viral on X, with several right-wing users accusing the incoming government of what they described as ‘an election lie’, referring to Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s campaign statements suggesting a hard-line anti-immigration stance and the possible continuation of Orbán-era migration policies. ‘Do Hungarian voters feel betrayed?’ German economist Richard Werner wrote in a post reacting to Anita Orbán’s remarks.

Some users described the move as a ‘swift surrender’, while others declared more bluntly that ‘Hungary has fallen’.

Hungary, envy of other European countries for refusing migrant-settlers from outside the EU under Viktor Orban – opposing this EU policy – is now caving in: Anita Orban, deputy PM and most likely a US agent, said that to stop financial punishment from Brussels – a campaign…

— Richard Werner (@scientificecon) May 12, 2026

Migration Hardline Made Orbán Famous

The backlash is understandable. Former Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán rose to international prominence in 2015 after taking a radically different approach to the migration crisis facing Europe at the time. While then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel and several Western European leaders promoted open-border policies and pledged to accept large numbers of migrants, primarily from the MENA region, Orbán chose instead to close Hungary’s borders, strengthen security measures, and construct a border fence.

That became the first major long-term conflict between Brussels and Hungary under Orbán—a confrontation that lasted until his electoral defeat on 12 April, despite the fact that several of his migration policies were later partially adopted by other EU member states.

At the height of the standoff, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that Hungary had violated EU asylum law by preventing asylum seekers from applying for protection at the Hungarian border and instead forcing them to submit applications at Hungarian consulates abroad, mainly in Belgrade and Kyiv, while also carrying out what the court described as unlawful pushbacks into Serbia.

In June 2024 the court imposed a €200 million fine, plus an additional €1 million per day until Hungary complies with the EU migration policy. Orbán called the ruling ‘outrageous and unacceptable’, rejected it outright, and maintained the same policies while also refusing to implement the EU’s Migration Pact, which had been finalized at the time.

A Campaign Promise Too Hard to Keep?

During both the campaign and the period following his electoral victory, Péter Magyar consistently emphasized that his government would maintain a ‘very strict position’ on migration, reject ‘any pact or allocation mechanism’, and preserve the southern border fence built in 2015.

Speaking at his first international press conference as prime minister-elect on 13 April, Magyar addressed the daily €1 million fine by stating that the Tisza Party would seek ways to avoid the penalties continuing, suggesting that the legal dispute could potentially be resolved through administrative modifications to Hungary’s asylum procedures. He also criticized the EU’s handling of migration and even promised to scale back legal migration from Asian countries into Hungary.

What Anita Orbán has now said partly contradicts those earlier statements.

First, the rejection of ‘any pact or allocation mechanism’ clearly no longer appears sustainable, given that the foreign minister explicitly referred to the Migration Pact’s principle of ‘mutual assistance’—or ‘compulsory solidarity’, as the pact itself describes it—and even signalled openness towards accepting a ‘limited number of migrants’ under the framework.

‘In theory, applicants could still be placed in controlled facilities near the border while their cases are processed’ 

That directly contradicts what the Tisza Party and Péter Magyar promised during the campaign and what the prime minister himself reiterated during the aforementioned post-election press conference.

Regarding compliance with the CJEU ruling and the removal of the daily fine, it is true that, on paper, the government would only need to adjust several procedural practices to meet EU legal requirements. However, those changes also carry the potential to gradually undermine Hungary’s previous zero-tolerance migration policy.

To comply with the ruling, Hungary would need to allow asylum applications to be submitted at the border, reversing the Orbán-era system based on applications filed exclusively through third-country consulates. Hungarian authorities would also need to end pushback practices. At the same time, the ruling does not explicitly require asylum seekers to enter Hungary freely. In theory, applicants could still be placed in controlled facilities near the border while their cases are processed.

However, according to the CJEU ruling, those facilities must provide conditions ‘complying with EU fundamental-rights standards’, detention must remain subject to judicial review, and asylum seekers must enjoy genuine access to asylum procedures.

That is precisely where the issue becomes significantly more problematic.

Western Examples Fuel Concerns

Once asylum seekers are physically present inside such facilities, the legal and political situation becomes far more complex. Hungary’s earlier transit-zone system already demonstrated how quickly border-control mechanisms can evolve into prolonged litigation before European courts, with applicants successfully arguing unlawful detention, insufficient legal safeguards, and disproportionate restrictions on freedom of movement.

Comparable disputes emerged in Italy’s Lampedusa hotspot system, Greece’s island migrant camps established after the EU–Türkiye deal, and France’s handling of the Calais camps, where courts repeatedly expanded procedural protections and restricted governments’ room for manoeuvre regarding detention and deportation policies.

‘Courts repeatedly expanded procedural protections and restricted governments’ room for manoeuvre’ 

It is therefore understandable to fear that even if Hungary initially maintains tightly controlled border-processing centres, prolonged legal procedures, appeals, and what critics describe as ECHR overreach in migration-related rulings could gradually expand the rights claims available to asylum seekers, including demands for greater freedom of movement inside Hungary itself.

That broader trajectory is already visible in several Western European countries, along with the accompanying consequences regarding public security and social cohesion.

The fact that the incoming Tisza government is already negotiating from a relatively subordinate position vis-à-vis the European Commission—while simultaneously attempting to secure frozen EU funds before the critical 31 August deadline—also strengthens concerns that the government may soften part of its previously hard-line migration stance, despite campaign promises to the contrary.

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