Up until the late 2000s, Orb\u00e1n and his Fidesz party consistently criticised Moscow. Having served as a pro-European prime minister from 1998 to 2002, he then spent his years in opposition actively warning the country against drifting back into the Kremlin’s orbit. In 2007, for instance, Orb\u00e1n spoke out<\/a> against allowing Hungary to become “Gazprom’s happiest barracks\u201d, a riff on the country\u2019s former reputation as the Eastern Bloc\u2019s \u201chappiest barracks\u201d due to its relatively high living standards. The same year, Orb\u00e1n proclaimed<\/a>: “Oil comes from the East, but freedom comes from the West.” A year later, he condemned Russia’s invasion of Georgia, describing it as “an imperialist act of pure power politics.”<\/p>\n Orb\u00e1n\u2019s attitude toward Russia began to shift after Fidesz returned to power in 2010, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Political scientist B\u00e1lint Magyar, who has written about<\/a> Orb\u00e1n’s Hungary as a “mafia state,” has suggested that the pivot could have been triggered by the prime minister being shown compromising footage<\/a> of himself during a visit to Saint Petersburg in 2009.<\/p>\n “I\u2019ve heard that story, but I don\u2019t buy it,” Hungarian journalist and political analyst G\u00e1bor Stier<\/a> told Novaya Gazeta Europe. In his view, Orb\u00e1n is \u201cnot a pro-Russian politician, but a man who pragmatically defends Hungarian interests.”<\/p>\n Maxim Samorukov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, said he agrees that Orb\u00e1n “has become neither anti-Western nor pro-Russian.”<\/p>\n “It’s one thing to be in opposition and criticise the government for ‘selling the country to Russia,’ and quite another to come to power and realise that gas and oil have been coming from there for decades, that nuclear technology is also tied to Russia, and so on,\u201d he explained.<\/p>\n After securing a parliamentary supermajority, the Fidesz government initiated a fundamental revision of Hungary’s foreign policy. In 2011, Budapest proclaimed the doctrine of “Eastern Opening”<\/a>, premised on the idea that Hungary could diversify its foreign policy while simultaneously retaining the benefits of EU membership. Official documents framed this as a need to expand exports and attract investment from China, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, and other countries.<\/p>\n In practice, it came down to cooperation with Moscow and Beijing \u2014 and the actual trade results were modest. Hungarian exports to Russia, for example, began declining as early as 2011, well before the first European sanctions were introduced in 2014.<\/p>\n Supporters of Viktor Orb\u00e1n attend a campaign rally in P\u00e9cel, Hungary, 28 March 2026. Photo: Tibor Illy\u00e9s \/ EPA.<\/p>\n Manoeuvring between West and East allowed Budapest to gain additional leverage in its relations with Brussels \u2014 which, by the early 2010s, the Hungarian authorities had come to regard as their main adversary.<\/p>\n Orb\u00e1n laid out the ideological foundation for this course in the summer of 2014. Speaking before ethnic Hungarians in the Romanian town of B\u0103ile Tu\u0219nad, he rejected Western-style liberalism and announced the construction of an “illiberal state,” citing Russia, China, and Turkey as models.<\/p>\n Orb\u00e1n began openly praising Vladimir Putin as a strong national leader who stands up to “liberal rules” and defends “traditional values.” As B\u00e1lint Magyar noted<\/a>, the relationship between Orb\u00e1n and Putin began to resemble a client-patron dynamic, with the Kremlin rewarding the Hungarian elite through various corrupt and semi-legal schemes, and Budapest repaying it with political services that undermine the unity of the EU and NATO.<\/p>\n This dynamic became especially pronounced after February 2022. Orb\u00e1n has met with Putin four times since Moscow\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. In 2024, he travelled to visit Putin while leading the country that held the EU’s rotating presidency, provoking particularly sharp outrage in Brussels.<\/p>\n “Orb\u00e1n\u2019s current closeness to Moscow would have triggered big protests ten or 15 years ago. But people have got used to this and it no longer provokes shock or anger,” a former senior Hungarian diplomat who had previously worked closely with Orb\u00e1n told<\/a> The Times. “When it comes to his approach to Russia, Hungary is like a frog that is slowly being boiled alive.” <\/p>\n Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orb\u00e1n at the Hungarian Parliament building in Budapest, 17 February 2015. Photo: Szil\u00e1rd Kosztics\u00e1k \/ EPA.<\/p>\n Moscow and Budapest’s mutual dependence is most visible in the energy sector. According to Maxim Samorukov, Hungary has long relied heavily on Soviet-era energy supplies, and successive governments kept that relationship with Moscow alive after the USSR’s collapse. When Orb\u00e1n returned to power in 2010, those contracts let him keep fuel costs and utility bills in check.<\/p>\n “The corrupt element is undoubtedly enormous: those who ‘sit on the pipeline’ in Hungary make insane money. But there\u2019s a real economic benefit for the country, and every Hungarian feels it,” Samorukov said.<\/p>\n Brussels, according to the experts interviewed by Novaya Gazeta Europe, has offered few viable alternatives to Russian energy. Between 2022 and 2025, Russia’s share of Hungary’s oil imports grew<\/a> from 61% to an unprecedented 92%. While the European Union was attempting to restructure its logistics and gradually phase out pipeline deliveries, Budapest systematically carved out exemptions for itself.<\/p>\n The situation in the gas sector is similar. The European Commission plans for all EU member states to fully phase out Russian gas by early 2027. The Hungarian government, however, insists it cannot yet do without Russian energy, even as it continues a policy of supply diversification.<\/p>\n The flagship project that tied Hungary most firmly to Moscow is the expansion<\/a> of the Paks nuclear power plant. The agreement to build two new reactors, a project known as Paks II, was signed in early 2014, behind closed doors and without an open international tender. The project is valued at \u20ac12.5 billion, of which \u20ac10 billion is provided as a state loan from the Russian federal budget. On February 5, 2026, Rosatom began pouring concrete<\/a> for the foundation of the first of the two new reactor units. One of the key Hungarian subcontractors was an entity linked to oligarch L\u0151rinc M\u00e9sz\u00e1ros, a longtime friend of Prime Minister Orb\u00e1n.<\/p>\n Still, there have been some efforts to reduce Hungary’s dependence on Russian nuclear fuel. The potential alternative supplier is the United States, which is currently just as friendly toward Orb\u00e1n; U.S. President Donald Trump has openly backed<\/a> the Hungarian prime minister ahead of the upcoming elections. During Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Budapest in February, an agreement was signed to purchase fuel from the U.S.-based Westinghouse Electric Company as a supplement to Russian supply. However, deliveries are not expected to begin for at least another three years.<\/p>\n Paks Nuclear Power Plant. Photo: Wikimedia<\/p>\n Russia’s influence over Hungary’s affairs has gone well beyond industry and energy. In 2019, the Orb\u00e1n government invited the International Investment Bank (IIB) \u2014 a Russian government-controlled financial institution and a relic of the Soviet-era Council for Mutual Economic Assistance \u2014 to relocate its headquarters from Moscow to Budapest. The bank was granted an unprecedented set of privileges, including exemption from financial oversight, zero taxes, and diplomatic immunity for its staff. Its leadership was also given the right to bring an unlimited number of guests into Hungary, who could then move freely throughout the Schengen Area without the standard security checks.<\/p>\n NATO allies openly described the IIB’s Budapest headquarters as a base for Russian intelligence and a Trojan horse in the heart of Europe. Budapest brushed off its partners’ concerns until the spring of 2023, when the U.S. Treasury imposed direct sanctions on the IIB and three of its senior executives. Only then did Hungary hastily announce<\/a> it was pulling out as a shareholder. <\/p>\n In its willingness to sacrifice Euro-Atlantic security to preserve its exclusive ties with the Kremlin, Hungary has repeatedly put its own security at risk. As the Hungarian investigative outlet Direkt36 reported<\/a>, hacking groups APT28 and APT29, both of which have ties to Russian intelligence, had constant administrative access to the IT infrastructure of Hungary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for at least a decade.<\/p>\n The most significant breach involved the compromise of a secure external network that diplomats use to transmit encrypted NATO and EU documents classified as restricted and secret. Despite the scale of the intrusion, the Orb\u00e1n government never publicly blamed Russia or reached out to NATO allies for emergency assistance. Instead, it adopted a policy of institutional silence, while diplomats continued using the compromised communications systems, putting Alliance data at risk.<\/p>\n When the scandal eventually broke into the political arena, Fidesz members did their best to kill it. In 2024, ruling party MPs simply didn’t show up<\/a> to a parliamentary session called to address the issue, dismissing it as a sham. Opposition lawmakers responded by placing small Russian flags on every empty seat.<\/p>\n Donald Trump and Viktor Orb\u00e1n at the White House in Washington, D.C., 7 November 2025. Photo: Jim Lo Scalzo \/ EPA.<\/p>\n These security failures were compounded by direct leaks at the political level. In March 2026, The Washington Post, citing European intelligence services, reported that Hungarian Foreign Minister P\u00e9ter Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3 had been systematically using breaks during closed sessions of the EU Council to call his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. Moscow was receiving real-time readouts on member states’ positions, the details of sanctions packages, and the parameters of aid to Ukraine. Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3 initially dismissed the story as a “ridiculous conspiracy theory,” then switched tactics and insisted such contacts were standard diplomatic practice.<\/p>\n Hungarian Foreign Minister P\u00e9ter Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3 speaks at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Budapest, 21 March 2026. Photo: Zolt\u00e1n Balogh \/ EPA.<\/p>\n This set off a crisis within the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Politico, citing multiple EU diplomats, reported<\/a> that in response to the revelations, decision-makers across the bloc have begun “limiting the flow of confidential material to Hungary,\u201d with leaders \u201cmeeting in smaller groups”. European diplomacy and defence planning have indeed shifted substantially toward narrower formats and coalitions \u2014 the E3 (Germany, France, the UK), the E4 (the same plus Poland), the E6 (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain), the Weimar Triangle (Germany, Poland, France), and the NB8 (the Nordic-Baltic states).<\/p>\n “The news that Orb\u00e1n\u2019s people inform Moscow about EU Council meetings in every detail shouldn\u2019t come as a surprise to anyone. We\u2019ve had our suspicions about that for a long time,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk wrote on X<\/a>. He also revealed<\/a> that back in 2019, Lithuania had asked for the Hungarian delegation to be excluded from a NATO meeting over fears of classified leaks. Former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, meanwhile, told Politico<\/a> that Hungary’s potential role as a leak source had come up at the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius.<\/p>\n Hungary’s function as a back channel to Moscow is reinforced by its systematic exploitation of the EU\u2019s decision-making architecture in Russia\u2019s interest. The unanimity requirement in Council votes has allowed the Orb\u00e1n government to turn its veto into a tool of blackmail. In 2026, Budapest blocked the 20th sanctions package against Russia and vetoed a \u20ac90 billion macro-financial loan to Ukraine. Its official justification for the latter was Kyiv’s decision to halt Russian oil transit through the Druzhba pipeline.<\/p>\n Budapest has also been quietly negotiating carve-outs from sanctions lists for members of the Russian elite. Hungarian diplomacy blocked sanctions against Patriarch Kirill and secured the removal of restrictions on the sister<\/a> of oligarch Alisher Usmanov, businessman Vyacheslav Kantor, and Russian Sports Minister Mikhail Degtyarev. As researcher Dorka Tak\u00e1csy of the Hungarian Center for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy told<\/a> Novaya Gazeta Europe in March 2025, at least 27 individuals avoided being sanctioned thanks to Hungary’s efforts.<\/p>\n Brussels has long been searching for mechanisms and legal workarounds to get around the Hungarian veto, but so far no solution has been found that is both effective and painless for the EU as a whole. That search may not be needed for much longer, however. P\u00e9ter Magyar \u2014 the leader of Tisza (Respect and Freedom), currently Hungary’s most popular political party \u2014 is no unconditional pro-European, but he is far from the die-hard Brussels antagonist that Orb\u00e1n has been.<\/p>\n Judging by the polls<\/a>, P\u00e9ter Magyar might already have cause to celebrate: 49% of voters support Tisza against just 39% for Fidesz. But in Hungary, only 93 parliamentary seats are allocated by party lists \u2014 106 are decided in single-member constituencies. And there, partly thanks to gerrymandering in those constituencies, Fidesz is on stronger ground. The N\u00e9z\u0151pont Institute think tank, for instance, claims<\/a> that Fidesz and its junior partner, the Christian Democratic People’s Party, could win 66 of those 106 constituencies, with Tisza candidates taking just 39. That said, N\u00e9z\u0151pont is widely regarded as being close to the current government, so its figures should be taken with a grain of salt.<\/p>\n Losing a friendly government in the heart of Europe would likely be unacceptable to the Kremlin \u2014 and so, according to independent analysts and investigative journalists, Russia’s leadership has launched an interference operation of unprecedented scale to maintain the status quo. The outlet VSquare, citing sources in several European intelligence services, reported<\/a> that the operation is being overseen by Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Sergey Kiriyenko, who in 2025 road-tested similar tactics \u2014 bribery, bot networks, orchestrated protests, and the like \u2014 during the elections in Moldova<\/a>. Operational control on the ground, the report alleged, lies with Vadim Titov, head of Russia\u2019s Presidential Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation.<\/p>\n P\u00e9ter Magyar, leader of the opposition Tisza Party, addresses supporters during the National March in Budapest, 15 March 2026. Photo: Tibor Illy\u00e9s \/ EPA.<\/p>\n According<\/a> to the Financial Times, a detailed plan to flood Hungarian social media with pro-government messaging and undermine Magyar was developed by the U.S.-sanctioned Russian firm Social Design Agency. The campaign focused primarily on Hungarian TikTok.<\/p>\n Journalists identified<\/a> dozens of anonymous accounts involved, including a cluster of 34 profiles created within a 48-hour period that shared AI-generated content. For politically engaged audiences, the operation produced fabricated news-style broadcasts featuring AI-generated presenters and commentators criticising Magyar on various grounds. For less politically engaged users, it relied on deepfake videos of Hollywood actors, with clips depicting \u201cLeonardo DiCaprio\u201d and \u201cJohnny Depp\u201d warning Hungarians about rising energy costs if the opposition were to win.<\/p>\n Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Viktor Orb\u00e1n shake hands at a joint press conference following their meeting in Kyiv, July 2, 2024. Photo: Sergey Dolzhenko \/ EPA.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s influence operation has put particular effort into exploiting tensions between Hungary and Ukraine. Fake videos have spread across X<\/a>, including one carrying a Reuters logo that falsely claimed Volodymyr Zelensky had told Politico: “Only backwards people could vote for and support Orb\u00e1n.\u201d Content posted by accounts posing as Human Rights Watch alleged that Ukrainian refugees had carried out thousands of attacks on Hungarian citizens across various EU countries.<\/p>\n Orb\u00e1n himself has played into this narrative as well. The most striking example was the March 5 arrest<\/a> of a transit convoy belonging to Ukraine’s state-owned Oschadbank, travelling from Vienna to Kyiv carrying $40 million, \u20ac35 million, and 9 kilograms of gold. According<\/a> to VSquare, the original plan had been to intercept illegal weapons and manufacture a media scandal around a narrative of “terrorist threat” or “arms trafficking.” When no weapons were found, those running the operation ordered a fabricated money-laundering case to be opened, and government propaganda began pushing the idea of a Ukrainian “military mafia.”<\/p>\n Russian intelligence services have been directly involved in the Hungarian election campaign, according to investigative journalists. According to<\/a> VSquare’s sources, several weeks before the April vote, a team of three career officers from Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, was deployed to Budapest. The operatives arrived under diplomatic cover, giving them de facto immunity from expulsion, and were reportedly tasked with managing networks of local agents of influence and coordinating information operations.<\/p>\n Opposition leader P\u00e9ter Magyar took reports of this operation seriously enough to demand<\/a> the officers\u2019 immediate expulsion. An unnamed member of the parliamentary national security committee later told<\/a> the Hungarian news portal Telex that such information had indeed come in from Western intelligence services, but said there were no Russian agents in Hungary.<\/p>\n A billboard featuring a portrait of Viktor Orb\u00e1n with the slogan \u201cLet\u2019s unite against war\u201d in Budapest, 27 March 2026. Photo: Attila Kisbenedek \/ AFP \/ Scanpix \/ LETA.<\/p>\n Russia’s foreign intelligence service, the SVR, has also been involved. In the summer of 2025, it issued a statement<\/a> claiming that Brussels was \u201cfurious at Budapest’s attempts to pursue an independent policy” and was “seriously considering scenarios for regime change in Budapest.” Kyiv, the SVR added, had, “on Brussels’ orders, actively joined the campaign to bring P\u00e9ter Magyar to power.” Hungary’s state news agency MTI ran the statement without comment.<\/p>\n By March 2026, it was clear that the SVR had effectively joined the Hungarian election campaign directly. The Washington Post published<\/a> details of an internal SVR report, intercepted and verified by European intelligence services, describing a plan codenamed Gamechanger. The strategy involved staging a fake assassination attempt on Viktor Orb\u00e1n, with the goal of replicating the dramatic electoral effect of the real attempt on Donald Trump’s life in July 2024. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov predictably dismissed<\/a> the report as disinformation.<\/p>\n Supporters cheer as opposition leader P\u00e9ter Magyar speaks during the National March in Budapest, Hungary, 15 March 2026. Photo: Bogl\u00e1rka Bodn\u00e1r \/ EPA.<\/p>\n![\"Supporters](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/large.jpeg\")
<\/p>\n![\"Vladimir](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/1775789783_932_large.jpeg\")
<\/p>\n![\"Paks](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/1775789784_926_large.jpeg\")
<\/p>\n![\"Donald](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/1775789784_145_large.jpeg\")
<\/p>\n![\"Hungarian](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/1775789784_693_large.jpeg\")
<\/p>\n![\"P\u00e9ter](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/1775789784_93_large.jpeg\")
<\/p>\n![\"Volodymyr](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/1775789784_928_large.jpeg\")
<\/p>\n![\"A](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/1775789784_860_large.jpeg\")
<\/p>\n![\"Supporters](\"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/1775789784_760_large.jpeg\")
<\/p>\n