{"id":34375,"date":"2026-04-20T13:05:15","date_gmt":"2026-04-20T13:05:15","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/34375\/"},"modified":"2026-04-20T13:05:15","modified_gmt":"2026-04-20T13:05:15","slug":"india-turkey-ties-explained-pakistan-factor-trade-and-recent-tensions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/34375\/","title":{"rendered":"India-Turkey ties explained: Pakistan factor, trade, and recent tensions"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>India and Turkey held the 12th round of foreign office consultations earlier this month, four years after the mechanism was put on hold. The June 2022 consultation in Ankara was supposed to secure a breakthrough, following years of strained bilateral relations over Turkey\u2019s support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.<\/p>\n<p>Much of India-Turkey relations has been unpredictable and prone to disruptions owing to even minor disagreements between India and Pakistan. This makes it a unique bilateral relationship that has never emerged from the shadow of third-party problems.<\/p>\n<p>Their bilateral merits and advantages are under-appreciated, and confidence-building measures are tried only occasionally and reluctantly, which matters given the potential for deeper ties.<\/p>\n<p>Persistent Pakistan factor<\/p>\n<p>Among the main issues that have held India-Turkey relations is Turkey\u2019s position on <a rel=\"noamphtml nofollow noopener\" class=\"keywordtourl\" href=\"https:\/\/indianexpress.com\/section\/cities\/jammu\/\" target=\"_blank\">Jammu<\/a> and Kashmir, which resonates with Pakistan\u2019s view. The revival of the Cold War-era defence relations between Ankara and Islamabad (both being US allies) and Ankara\u2019s unequivocal support for Pakistan during its last few military conflicts are seen as a choice Ankara has made in the complex geopolitics of South Asia.<\/p>\n<p>In these upgraded strategic relations, Turkish defence exports to Pakistan and military-to-military cooperation are progressing well beyond the region. In return, India\u2019s support for Cyprus is often explained as a reaction to Turkey\u2019s Kashmir policy. Both Turkey and Greece lay claims to the island, which was divided in 1974 when Turkey invaded the north in response to a Greece-backed military coup on the island.<\/p>\n<p>The Turkish Cypriot government administers a third of the northern portion, while the Greek Cypriots control the remainder. Pakistan has consistently backed Turkey\u2019s claims against Greece, at times offering military assistance. In 1983, military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq famously declared that his country would be the first to recognise Turkish Cyprus if it declared independence.<\/p>\n<p>Several Muslim nations, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, which have excellent relations with Ankara and Islamabad, maintain cordial relations with Cyprus. The Cyprus embassy in Tehran is accredited for Pakistan, allowing it to provide consular services to them, and the Pakistani embassy in Beirut is also accredited for Cyprus.<\/p>\n<p>Story continues below this ad<\/p>\n<p>India has recognised this factor in the past. In 1984, when Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Turkish Prime Minister Turgut \u00d6zal met in New <a rel=\"noamphtml nofollow noopener\" class=\"keywordtourl\" href=\"https:\/\/indianexpress.com\/section\/cities\/delhi\/\" target=\"_blank\">Delhi<\/a>, they agreed to pause their differences on Kashmir and Cyprus. This understanding was considered a milestone in improving bilateral relations.<\/p>\n<p>The next Turkish government, led by B\u00fclent Ecevit, further de-hyphenated relations and evolved an independent India policy. Prime Minister Ecevit was known for his fascination with Rabindranath Tagore, and his translation of Tagore\u2019s Gitanjali into Turkish remains his main introduction to India.<\/p>\n<p>Proximity under Erdogan<\/p>\n<p>Turkey saw the end of weak coalition governments, and a conservative-democrat government led by <a href=\"https:\/\/indianexpress.com\/article\/explained\/explained-global\/erdogan-back-at-white-house-what-why-matters-10272609\/\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan<\/a> in 2002 had new political and economic imperatives to redirect Turkey\u2019s foreign relations.<\/p>\n<p>India-Turkey relations saw a breakthrough, marked by frequent high-level visits, exchange of business and cultural delegations, increasing bilateral trade volume, and people-to-people interactions. Bilateral trade grew from $700 million in 2002 to $13.82 billion in 2022.<\/p>\n<p>Story continues below this ad<\/p>\n<p>A big test came in 2019, when India abrogated Article 370, which had accorded a special status to Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan criticised the decision, and was supported by Turkey. By 2019, Turkey\u2019s view of South Asia began matching a Cold War-era template, prioritising security over trade and economy.<\/p>\n<p>Most recently, Erdogan\u2019s India policy reached its decisive end during the brief India-Pakistan conflict last year, following the terror attack in Kashmir\u2019s Pahalgam. Turkey\u2019s condemnation of Operation Sindoor sparked massive backlash in India, with calls for the cancellation of tourism, trade, cultural, and educational MoUs.<\/p>\n<p>Nobody imagined the free fall of India-Turkey bilateral relations would come only months after a meeting of Indian and Turkish officials, academicians, and think tanks in Ankara to discuss ways to improve ties. The Indian Embassy in Ankara was the main supporter of the event with the pro-government Turkish think tank, SETA. The deputy Foreign Minister, Ambassador Berris Ekinci, who led the recent India-Turkey dialogue in New Delhi, was the chief guest.<\/p>\n<p>Operation Sindoor thus revealed the limits of the trade-centric India-Turkey relations, which failed to work as a shield during a major political crisis. While the Turkish side mostly remained interested in building trade ties, the Indian side gradually found that it didn\u2019t work well in developing more confident political relations.<\/p>\n<p>Story continues below this ad<\/p>\n<p>Turkey remains the only West Asian country that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has not yet visited since he came to power in 2014, except to attend the 2015 G20 Summit in Antalya. Indian External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has also never officially visited Turkey.<\/p>\n<p>Recent setbacks, incentives for deeper ties<\/p>\n<p>After Operation Sindoor, another setback for Turkey came in the form of the India-EU Free Trade Agreement signed in 2026. Since Turkey is a member of the customs union, Indian exports will reach Turkish markets with zero or lower tariffs, but Turkish exports will not receive a similar benefit in India. The way out for Turkey is to ask New Delhi for a comprehensive economic partnership agreement or an FTA, which has been under consideration since Erdogan\u2019s last state visit to India in 2017.<\/p>\n<p>But there are also reasons for the two countries to engage. In 2023, the India-Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEC) was announced as an ambitious counter to China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for infrastructure investment. It does not include Turkey, which has, of late, worked to create a new Development Corridor connecting the UAE, Iraq, and Turkey via train, road, and sea links.<\/p>\n<p>Following the recent conflicts in the Middle East, the IMEC has yet to progress as planned, and the Development Corridor could offer alternative routes for Indian businesses to reach European markets via Turkish ports.<\/p>\n<p>Story continues below this ad<\/p>\n<p>The ongoing Iran-Israel war has also seriously challenged India\u2019s fragile balancing act between Israel, Iran, and the Gulf nations. Interestingly, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have emerged as key players to mediate between the US and Iran. Part of this has to do with Turkey gradually shifting away from its previous ideological pursuits by normalising relations with its key regional rivals, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE. This is of interest to India, which has deep ties with West Asis and a large diaspora residing there.<\/p>\n<p>Despite hurdles to their ties, Indian and Turkish interests in the Gulf, Central Asia, and Africa are gradually converging. A prolonged isolation is neither possible nor helpful to their security, trade, and strategic interests.<\/p>\n<p>Indians often find the Turkish view of India perplexing, in that it fails to fully recognise India\u2019s economic and strategic centrality in the changing world order. Parallely, Turkish institutions, media, and public opinion seem to have little interest in understanding Indian perspectives. India\u2019s policy perspectives on Turkey should also appreciate its bilateral and regional merits. Turkey has effectively changed its strategic profile \u2014 from being a NATO-centric country to a state of multiple alignments, including a direct security role in West Asia and Eurasia.<\/p>\n<p>Theoretically, it is difficult to imagine that two nations with so much regional and global clout can stay isolated and unaffected from each other\u2019s actions for long. The current West Asian crisis might have provided India and Turkey a small window of opportunity to reset their relations. However, given the past hiccups, a reset devoid of regional considerations towards evolving an inclusive or de-hyphenated policy may not be sustainable.<\/p>\n<p>Story continues below this ad<\/p>\n<p>Omair Anas teaches international relations at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University. He was a co-organiser of the 2025 India-Turkey Conference in the Turkish capital of Ankara. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"India and Turkey held the 12th round of foreign office consultations earlier this month, four years after the&hellip;\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":34376,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[16467],"tags":[22924,22919,14858,22922,22925,22923,22915,22920,22916,22918,22921,7098,22917],"class_list":{"0":"post-34375","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-recep-tayyip-erdogan","8":"tag-cyprus-issue-india-turkey","9":"tag-erdogan-india-policy","10":"tag-express-explained","11":"tag-india-eu-fta-impact-turkey","12":"tag-india-foreign-policy-turkey","13":"tag-india-middle-east-corridor-turkey","14":"tag-india-turkey-relations","15":"tag-india-turkey-tensions","16":"tag-india-turkey-ties-explained","17":"tag-india-turkey-trade-relations","18":"tag-operation-sindoor-turkey-reaction","19":"tag-recep-tayyip-erdogan","20":"tag-turkey-pakistan-kashmir-stance"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@people\/116437183558495869","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/34375","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=34375"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/34375\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/34376"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=34375"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=34375"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=34375"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}