After the decisive electoral victory of P\u00e9ter Magyar\u2019s Tisza Party, Hungary\u2019s next government\u2014like the previous four\u2014will hold a constitutional supermajority in parliament. This paves the way for the full implementation of the party\u2019s programme, which focuses on dismantling the system built over the past 16 years by Viktor Orb\u00e1n and Fidesz\u2013KDNP, including many public officials appointed under the previous constitutional supermajority.<\/p>\n
During the campaign, Tisza placed particular emphasis on what it described as strengthening the system of checks and balances, which includes several proposals to adjust the roles of public officials. The party aims to grant broader and more substantive competences to the President of the Republic, who is currently elected by parliament and largely performs ceremonial functions. <\/p>\n
According to statements by Magyar, the government would reform the electoral law to introduce direct presidential elections, thereby granting the office a level of legitimacy comparable to that of the legislative and executive branches. This would effectively transform Hungary\u2019s political system from a parliamentary model into a semi-presidential one, potentially closer to the Polish system.<\/p>\n
Part of this broader reform package is the introduction of a maximum tenure for the prime minister of eight years, or two terms. This proposal is included in Tisza\u2019s programme<\/a>, which states: \u2018the position of Prime Minister of Hungary may be held by a single person for no more than two terms, that is, for a maximum of eight years.\u2019<\/p>\n In itself, this is not a controversial proposal. In many systems\u2014primarily presidential ones\u2014the mandate of the head of the executive is limited to two terms, as is the case in the US, France, Poland, and Romania. In most European parliamentary systems, however, there is no precedent for constitutionally limiting a prime minister\u2019s tenure. Several long-serving leaders illustrate this, including former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, former Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte, and Slovenia\u2019s Janez Jan\u0161a, who is currently seeking<\/a> a fourth term.<\/p>\n Personalized Legislation<\/p>\n What makes the proposal controversial is that, according to P\u00e9ter Magyar, it would apply retrospectively, meaning that Orb\u00e1n would be ineligible to run for the office of prime minister in 2030, having already served 20 years across five terms. This specific element was not included in Tisza\u2019s electoral programme and was introduced by Magyar during his first international press conference<\/a> as prime minister-elect on 13 April.<\/p>\n At this point, the proposal moves from a general political reform into a clear example of so-called \u2018personalized legislation\u2019, leading critics to describe it as \u2018lex Orb\u00e1n\u2019. <\/p>\n \u2018Orb\u00e1n would be ineligible to run for the office of prime minister in 2030\u2019<\/p>\n The term is not a formal legal category but is widely used to describe laws that are formally general in nature yet substantively target a specific individual.<\/p>\n The consecutive Orb\u00e1n governments over the past 16 years have themselves been accused of using personalized legislation on several occasions. The most prominent example is the so-called \u2018lex CEU<\/a>\u2019, under which the Central European University, founded by George Soros, was forced to relocate most of its programmes abroad, prompting criticism both domestically and from the European Union.<\/p>\n Rule of Law Double Standard?<\/p>\n This creates an interesting situation in which both sides can point to perceived double standards. On the one hand, the use of personalized legislation by previous Orb\u00e1n governments makes Fidesz appear hypocritical when criticizing \u2018lex Orb\u00e1n\u2019 from the opposition.<\/p>\n On the other hand, the same circles\u2014including the EU\u2014that previously criticized the Orb\u00e1n government for using personalized legislation have thrown their full support behind the Tisza Party. Based on their earlier positions, it would logically follow that they should also criticize the incoming government for effectively pursuing a similar course against Orb\u00e1n. This may prove significant in the context of rule of law debates and the unblocking<\/a> of currently frozen EU funds, which was a central campaign promise of Magyar.<\/p>\n \u2018From a domestic legal perspective, the measure would likely be difficult to challenge\u2019<\/p>\n From a domestic legal perspective, the measure would likely be difficult to challenge. With a constitutional supermajority, the Tisza government can amend the Fundamental Law, and the Hungarian Constitutional Court has limited scope to review the substance of constitutional amendments. This means that even a controversial provision could become part of the constitutional order if adopted through the proper legislative procedure.<\/p>\n