{"id":67978,"date":"2026-05-12T16:12:10","date_gmt":"2026-05-12T16:12:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/67978\/"},"modified":"2026-05-12T16:12:10","modified_gmt":"2026-05-12T16:12:10","slug":"ukraine-war-may-be-ending-but-world-power-balance-has-already-changed","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/67978\/","title":{"rendered":"Ukraine war may be ending but world power balance has already changed"},"content":{"rendered":"

When Russian President Vladimir Putin said recently that the war in Ukraine was \u201capproaching its end,\u201d many in the West immediately interpreted it as a sign of Russian<\/a> weakness.<\/p>\n

After more than three years of war, any Russian talk of a ceasefire is usually viewed through the same lens: economic pressure, military exhaustion, or political strain inside Moscow. But the Kremlin\u2019s language suggests something more significant.<\/p>\n

Putin has never described this war as a limited conflict over territory alone. From the beginning, he framed it as part of a broader confrontation with the Western-led order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union.<\/p>\n

That matters because it changes how Moscow measures success.<\/p>\n

The central question for the Kremlin may no longer be whether Russia can capture more land in Ukraine. It may be whether the war has already achieved its larger geopolitical purpose. And in some important ways, the world has already changed.<\/p>\n

\"RussianRussian President Vladimir Putin delivers a speech during a military parade on Victory Day, marking the 81st anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War Two, in Red Square in central Moscow, Russia, May 9, 2026. (credit: Sputnik\/Alexander Kazakov\/Pool via REUTERS)<\/p>\n

Europe has lost access to the cheap Russian energy that helped power its industrial economy for decades. Germany, once the economic engine of Europe, continues to struggle with the consequences. NATO has expanded, but Europe has also become more dependent than ever on American military and financial support.<\/p>\n

At the same time, Russia has strengthened ties with China, India<\/a>, and key powers across the Middle East<\/a> despite Western attempts to isolate it.<\/p>\n

This is not a traditional Russian victory. But it is also not the same world that existed before 2022.<\/p>\n

From Putin\u2019s perspective, the invasion of Ukraine was never only about Kyiv. It was about stopping a geopolitical order that Moscow believed had steadily weakened Russia\u2019s position for more than three decades.<\/p>\n

Whether the West accepts it or not, the war has already reshaped global politics in ways that may prove difficult to reverse.<\/p>\n

Russia’s growing limits<\/p>\n

Still, the Kremlin understands the risks of continuing the war indefinitely.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s economy has survived sanctions better than many expected, but it is increasingly functioning as a war economy. Defense spending continues to rise while civilian sectors face growing pressure. Hundreds of thousands of educated Russians, including technology workers, entrepreneurs, and academics, have left the country since the invasion began.<\/p>\n

Perhaps most importantly, Russia is becoming increasingly dependent on China.<\/p>\n

What Moscow once presented as a partnership between equals is gradually evolving into a relationship where Russia needs Beijing far more than Beijing needs Russia. Even within parts of the Russian elite, that reality is causing concern.<\/p>\n

Putin may still maintain firm political control, but he also understands the danger of turning Russia into a permanently militarized state defined by endless conflict.<\/p>\n

That may explain the recent shift in rhetoric. The Kremlin could be moving from a strategy of expansion to one of consolidation.<\/p>\n

Why peace could divide Europe<\/p>\n

Ironically, a ceasefire may create more problems for Europe than the continuation of the war itself. As long as the fighting continues, Europe remains relatively united. There is a clear threat, a shared mission, and political justification for economic sacrifice. But once the war slows or freezes, difficult questions will quickly return.<\/p>\n

Who will pay for rebuilding Ukraine? Can the European Union<\/a> realistically absorb a country of that size and level of destruction? Will European governments maintain sanctions on Russia if economic pressure inside Europe deepens? And will some countries quietly begin reconsidering their economic relationship with Moscow?<\/p>\n

These divisions have been contained during wartime. They may become much harder to manage during peace.<\/p>\n

In many ways, the war itself has become one of the West\u2019s last major unifying forces. But the larger issue extends far beyond Ukraine.<\/p>\n

If the war ends without a decisive Russian defeat, many countries will draw a powerful conclusion: It is possible to challenge the international order, use military force to change realities on the ground, absorb severe sanctions, and survive.<\/p>\n

China is studying that lesson in relation to Taiwan. Iran is studying it in the Middle East. Other authoritarian regimes are studying it as well.<\/p>\n

In that sense, the war in Ukraine may not represent the end of an era but the beginning of a new one \u2013 a world shaped less by Western dominance and more by long-term competition between rival powers and regional blocs.<\/p>\n

When Putin now speaks about ending the war, he does not sound like a leader seeking reconciliation. He sounds like a leader who believes the global system has already shifted enough in Russia\u2019s favor.<\/p>\n

And from the West\u2019s perspective, that may be the most dangerous outcome of all.<\/p>\n

The writer is an entrepreneur and investor, host of The Owl podcast, and co-founder of the Masad HaAretz Institute.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"When Russian President Vladimir Putin said recently that the war in Ukraine was \u201capproaching its end,\u201d many in…\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":67979,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[131],"tags":[250,39667,4093,2700,303,912,329,330,328],"class_list":{"0":"post-67978","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-vladimir-putin","8":"tag-china","9":"tag-former-soviet-union","10":"tag-india","11":"tag-kremlin","12":"tag-middle-east","13":"tag-moscow","14":"tag-russia","15":"tag-ukraine","16":"tag-vladimir-putin"},"share_on_mastodon":{"url":"https:\/\/pubeurope.com\/@people\/116562490344650777","error":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67978","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67978"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67978\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/67979"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67978"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67978"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.europesays.com\/people\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67978"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}