Parliamentary elections will be held in Poland next autumn. As is widely known, after eight years of rule by the centre-right Law and Justice party (2015–2023), a centre-left coalition led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk took power. Although polls indicate that his party (the Civic Coalition—a rebranding of ‘Civic Platform’) enjoys very strong public support, its coalition partners (the Left, Polish People’s Party, Poland 2050, etc) are often fighting for their lives. On the right, the situation is quite the opposite—at first glance, the conservative Law and Justice party is in a dire situation, as it is the second most popular party but has ‘only’ 20 per cent support (at its peak, it had twice that), while the Coalition has over 10 percentage points more. However, the right wing in Poland has undergone a significant transformation. Who shapes the Polish right wing today, and what might Poland look like in a year?
Who’s Who in Polish Politics?
To explain Polish politics to Hungarian (and not only Hungarian) readers, we also have to go back to 2005. The post-communist Democratic Left Alliance was losing power at that time—a party that would soon become as discredited as Ferenc Gyurcsány and his Hungarian Socialist Party.
The entire Polish political scene positioned itself as an opposition to the Democratic Left Alliance—including two centre-right parties founded by representatives of the anti-communist ‘Solidarity’ movement. The first was Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice Party, a party with a conservative-social profile, and the second was Donald Tusk’s Civic Platform, with a conservative-liberal profile (yes, in the past, the Civic Platform was a centre-right party; today, it is a typical party of the liberal-left European mainstream). It was widely assumed that these two parties would form a government in 2005 and build a fair Poland, in opposition to the post-communists… However, without going into unnecessary detail, post-election coalition talks collapsed. The Civic Platform and the liberal media voted against Law and Justice (thus, Law and Justice ‘replaced’ the post-communists and became a ‘point of reference’ for all of Polish politics), and the dispute between Jarosław Kaczyński and Donald Tusk has defined Polish public debate for over two decades.
The Law and Justice government lasted only two years—Kaczyński took as his allies the controversial peasant protest party Self-Defence and the national-Catholic League of Polish Families. This government ended in disaster and early elections—and both parties (Self-Defence and the League) were lost forever. The League’s demise will, in fact, have additional consequences for the Polish right…but let’s not get ahead of ourselves just yet.
The years 2007–2015 saw the rule of the liberal Civic Platform and the Christian Democratic Polish People’s Party (a peasant movement with over a century of tradition). In 2015 this coalition lost power—Andrzej Duda, associated with Law and Justice, won the presidential election, and the centre-right also won the parliamentary elections. In 2019 the parliamentary victory was repeated, and in 2020 Andrzej Duda’s victory was repeated.
It is important to understand that throughout its eight years in power, Law and Justice remained the hegemon—it needed no coalition partners, a remarkable political phenomenon in Poland. It’s true that representatives of two small satellite parties (Solidarna Polska and Porozumienie) ran on the Law and Justice party lists, but these were, in fact, factions of the Law and Justice government.
Just as coalition partners squabble among themselves, the eight years of centre-right rule were marked by squabbles within their own camp. Although Jarosław Kaczyński remained the most important figure in the coalition, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki became the point of reference—son of radical anti-communist Kornel Morawiecki, for many years the CEO of a major bank, who remained outside politics until 2015. For many Law and Justice politicians, he was a ‘foreign body’ within the party. Disputes concerned the party’s policy vision, but also ‘spheres of influence’ within ministries and key state-owned companies.
New Player(s) — Confederation…Confederations
Law and Justice has always been a centre-right party, a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists (for many years, the party had considerable sympathy for the British Tories), a pro-American group supporting the Republican Party (which once meant neoconservatism, but today, in turn, a fascination with Trumpism), and situated within the spectrum of the ‘traditional’ political divide. In recent years, movements have emerged in Polish politics that have challenged Law and Justice’s hegemony on the right.
The first, once marginal group, are Polish nationalists. Polish nationalism has a tradition of over 100 years. In interwar Poland, it was a major political force. In the centre of Warsaw stands a monument to Roman Dmowski—a diplomat, co-founder of Polish independence after World War I, but above all, a nationalist ideologue.
During World War II, the Polish far-right formed its own anti-German and anti-Soviet armed forces (National Armed Forces), which continued the fight against the Soviets even after the war. After 1989, on the one hand, Polish nationalism became an ideology that fascinated Polish skinheads, while on the other, nationalist-Catholic politicians attempted to recreate the traditions of the pre-war National Democracy by building the Christian National Union and the League of Polish Families (both parties participated in centre-right coalitions at one point).
Unfortunately, among many young activists of the League of Polish Families fascinated by Polish patriotism and the Catholic traditionalism, there were also those who loved Adolf Hitler more than Roman Dmowski, and the leak of photos and recordings showing the participation of several skinheads associated with the League in neo-Nazi events became a huge problem for the Polish radical right for several years, as the liberal-left media always attacked Polish nationalism as ‘antisemitic’ and ‘fascist’.
‘In recent years, movements have emerged in Polish politics that have challenged Law and Justice’s hegemony on the right’
The liberal mainstream’s ineptitude in the field of memory politics presented an opportunity for the national right. Donald Tusk’s government failed to properly promote Polish patriotism, deeming it irrelevant. Meanwhile, Polish nationalists began organizing the Independence March on Independence Day. Not only the national right, but also monarchists, Catholic movements, and especially right-wing football fans (against whom Donald Tusk declared war at the time) began participating. For several years, the March was associated with annual riots (the Polish right emphasizes that the police and secret services deliberately incited riots to create a negative image for the nationalists and the event itself), but it has built a brand, becoming not only the most important recurring event in Polish politics but also the largest right-wing event in Europe (with 100,000–200,000 people participating annually).
Another important, albeit highly specific, milieu of the Polish right is Polish libertarianism. For decades, the primary point of reference within this movement was Janusz Korwin-Mikke and his successive parties. Korwin-Mikke and his movement almost always suffered devastating electoral defeats, garnering 1 per cent of the vote.
What are Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s views? Briefly speaking, they are monarchist and anti-democratic, along with a fascination with a libertarian vision of the economy (the Austrian School of economics). Interestingly, when we look at Law and Justice and the Civic Platform, we see that many Polish politicians with conservative-liberal views began their political lives in Korwin-Mikke’s party. The same applies to the libertarian weekly Najwyższy Czas! (Highest Time!) which he edited for years (today edited by one of his associates). Leading stars of conservative Polish journalism wrote for his magazine.
The problem is that Janusz Korwin-Mikke hasn’t made any effort to win the public’s sympathy for years—as an anti-democrat, he’s called the public ‘idiots’, and according to him, ‘idiots’ are nothing to worry about.
However, this is just the beginning—describing all the controversies surrounding Korwin-Mikke would require several articles, so suffice it to say that, as an extreme right-winger, Korwin-Mikke loves (critical) analogies to Nazism. For example, Korwin-Mikke believes taxes are too high, which is why he proclaims that ‘taxes were three times lower under Hitler’.
When Janusz Korwin-Mikke became an MEP, he criticized the European Union in one of his statements, comparing a single legislative proposal to the ideas of the Third Reich and performing the ‘Roman salute’ during his speech. In his extensive dossier, Korwin-Mikke has a history of insulting people with disabilities, women…and seemingly every social group imaginable. This meant that, on the one hand, his party and magazine became breeding grounds for right-wing cadres, but he himself became a synonym for a political madman.
However, Korwin-Mikke also achieved one success: in the 2010s, he became incredibly popular among right-wing internet users. The success of the Independence March (a success for nationalists), Korwin-Mikke’s online popularity, and anti-immigrant sentiment all contributed to the alliance between the nationalist and libertarian right wing, forming a new party: the Confederation Freedom and Independence.
Although eight years ago, when the Confederation began its activities, its support was relatively low, thanks to the consistent work, substantive political activity of the nationalist leader Krzysztof Bosak, the social media activity of the new libertarian leader Sławomir Mentzen (who replaced Janusz Korwin-Mikke—for several years Korwin-Mikke was a member of the Confederation, but today the front-man is his protégé Sławomir Mentzen, an economist, owner of a tax office, who is also a libertarian, but does not perform ‘Roman salutes’ and does not compare everything to Nazism), criticism of Law and Justice for its pandemic policy and excessive favourability towards Ukraine, the party today has around 15 per cent support in polls.
Alongside the nationalist Bosak and the libertarian Mentzen, the Confederation’s third leader was Grzegorz Braun, a director of documentaries on topics including communist crimes and the Catholic religion. However, Braun and his supporters have split from the ‘main’ Confederation, and his party, the Confederation of the Polish Crown, has about 10 per cent support. Braun is an enemy of the European Union and an enemy of all political correctness.
Braun’s defining characteristic is his extreme criticism of Ukraine and Israel. He believes that homosexuals should be flogged (which he considers a liberal idea compared to the idea of capital punishment for this crime). Grzegorz Braun destroyed an exhibition promoting LGBT rights in the Polish parliament, and he attacked Hanukkah celebrations in the Polish parliament by extinguishing the candles with a fire extinguisher—an event that has become iconic for his supporters, and the extinguisher has become an informal symbol of his voters.
Morawiecki’s Association
The success of both Confederations is enormous—note that they currently have greater support than Law and Justice, and perhaps the ‘main’ Confederation will gain more support than the centre-right. Even if this doesn’t happen, Kaczyński’s party will still lose several dozen seats in parliament in 2027 to its far-right rivals.
It’s worth noting that the 2025 presidential election was won by Karol Nawrocki—a historian associated with Law and Justice, president of the important state institution, the Institute of National Remembrance, and also a football fan. He wasn’t one of the leading politicians from Kaczyński’s party—Kaczyński assumed that only a candidate acceptable to radical right-wingers could convince nationalists and libertarians to vote for him in the second round.
‘The 2025 presidential election was won by Karol Nawrocki—a historian associated with Law and Justice, president of…the Institute of National Remembrance, and also a football fan’
On the other hand, Law and Justice politicians still believe they can seize power on their own (which, frankly, is political science fiction these days). How can this be achieved? The premise is simple: regain the right-wing electorate that abandoned Kaczyński’s party and now supports new formations.
Mateusz Morawiecki had a different perspective on this matter. It should be emphasized at the outset that Morawiecki, as a former prime minister, has been accused by some in the Law and Justice party, but particularly by both Confederations, of making numerous controversial decisions. These include Poland’s actions in the European Union, its COVID-19 policy, the scale of support for Ukraine, and its overly liberal migration policy. However, while it’s understandable that the far-right, competing with Law and Justice, is attacking the former prime minister, he himself believes that the party’s mistake is to portray the eight years of center-right rule as a series of disasters, for the sake of factional wars and the construction of a new, radical right-wing image (in the hope that voters of Bosak, Mentzen, and especially Braun will return to supporting Kaczyński).
Morawiecki argues that Law and Justice, under his leadership, achieved a number of economic successes and contributed to Poland’s development. He believes that the centre-right should boast about these and encourage Poles to pursue further economic development, in defiance of the liberals’ ineptitude.
It’s also worth pointing out that Morawiecki proposed a slightly different logic—instead of competing with the Confederations on right-wing radicalism, Law and Justice would become a party for conservative but also centrist voters. Kaczyński’s party would have to accept that it wouldn’t govern alone, but on the other hand, it could enter a coalition with the Confederation (or Confederations) after the 2027 elections.
The problem is that Bosak, Mentzen, and Braun emphasize that they don’t envision Morawiecki as a member of the government, and Law and Justice has also announced that the more conservative former Minister of Education, Przemysław Czarnek, would be its candidate for prime minister.
Finally, during the summer holidays, the dispute between the former prime minister and his internal party rivals reached its peak, and, driven to the brink, Mateusz Morawiecki and some of his associates left his former party and formed their own social movement, Development Plus, which emphasizes the economic successes of centre-right governments and the need to suspend the culture wars and focus on ambitious plans for Poland’s modernization, such as the construction of a nuclear power plant (which is considered one of the main challenges in Poland) and the mega-airport ‘Central Communication Port’. This is a success for the faction hostile to Morawiecki, who got rid of the hated politician, a goal they had been working towards for several years.
However, on the other hand, Morawiecki has led a large group of his supporters, including well-prepared, substantive politicians, out of Law and Justice. Although Morawiecki’s critics assumed that his political movement had no chance of gaining any public support and that the former prime minister’s departure from Law and Justice would be his political death, he still holds a few per cent support in the polls.
The Role of the President
Karol Nawrocki could be the mediator between the feuding, rival right-wing parties. The likelihood that Tusk and his party will continue to govern Poland is currently slim, but the question is whether these four formations will be able to form a joint coalition.
Law and Justice (PiS) treats Mateusz Morawiecki and his movement with disdain—and although the period of public hatred is behind us, the first days of the split were a spectacle of mutual accusations and insults on social media.
Law and Justice (PiS) has a mixed attitude towards the Confederation (Konfederacja), favouring Krzysztof Bosak while dismissing Sławomir Mentzen. It is widely believed that Kaczyński dreams of splitting the Confederation in two. Within the Confederation itself, the rivalry between the two factions is covered by journalists, but the consensus is that nationalists and libertarians understand that only together can they succeed. Both groups remember that for years they each had 1 per cent support.
Law and Justice fears Grzegorz Braun—it is a pro-American party and critical of antisemitism, while Braun criticizes the United States, Ukraine, and above all, Israel and Jews. Commentators are suggesting that Kaczyński may even be pressured by the Americans not to enter into a coalition with Braun under any circumstances.
Sławomir Mentzen, a libertarian, believes that Law and Justice is a ‘socialist’ party and that coalitions with it should be avoided. He emphasizes that every ally of Law and Justice (such as the aforementioned Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families) has met their worst possible end.
Krzysztof Bosak began his political career in the League of Polish Families—he is more inclined to form a coalition with Kaczyński than with Mentzen, but he certainly remains cautious.
The Confederation dislikes Morawiecki, and Grzegorz Braun hates Morawiecki.
Despite all these mutual hostilities, they may be united by Karol Nawrocki (as a bridge-builder between various right-wing movements), the expectations of right-wing voters, and, of course, a shared hostility towards Donald Tusk.
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